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ABSTRACT

Enlightenment evidential ism argues that a belief is
rational for a person only if that person has sufficient
evidence, arguments, or reasons for that belief.

Sufficient

evidence under this conception of rationality typically
follows a classical foundationalist system which argues that
the belief that P is rational if and only if P is (1)
self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible, or (2)
inferable from a set of beliefs that are self-evident, evident
to the senses, or incorrigible.

In order to be rational about

one's beliefs, a cognizer must be able to trace all of one's
non-basic beliefs back to self-presenting basic beliefs which
coerce (either rationally or probabilistically) one's
non-basic beliefs.

This approach to rationality carries with

it profound implications for the rationality of theistic
belief (i.e., the belief that God exists).

Most non-theistic

evidentialists argue that theistic belief does not satisfy the
criteria for rationality because it typically fails to supply
the sufficient evidence required to maintain it.
By incorporating the valid insights of three
contemporary religious epistemologists (Nancey Murphy,
Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne), it is argued that one
can arrive at a model of rationality in which sufficient
iv

evidence for the rationality of one's beliefs (theistic or
otherwise) does not require that a cognizer trace all
of one's non-basic beliefs (e.q., belief in God) back to
self-presentinq basic beliefs that are thouqht to be coercive
on all rationally attentive people.
The proposed model of rationality arques that, on
one level, sufficient evidence for the rationality of one's
beliefs (includinq theistic belief) incorporates a
reason-based conception of justification which may coincide
with (but need not) a cognizer's attempts to offer rationally
convincing evidence that one's beliefs are true or certain.
On another level, being rational about one's beliefs involves
attempts to marshall enough of the appropriate kind, quality,
and amount of evidence so as to be so rationally convinced of
the truth or certainty of a qiven belief that one can no
longer maintain a reasonable doubt.
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CHAPTER 1

SOME CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO THE RATIONALITY
OF THEISTIC BELIEF
The inquiry of this study arises out of the context of
what is sometimes

re~erred

to as Enlightenment evidential is.

and some current approaches within religious epistemology
offered as viable responses to the conception of rationality
often associated with it.

This assumption, traditionally

referred to as evidential ism, maintains that a belief is
rational for a person only if that person has sufficient
evidence, arguments or reasons for that belief. l

The

implication of this form of rationality for theistic belief
is monumental.

It is argued by many non-theistic

evidentialists that an Enlightenment commitment to
evidentialism necessarily implies that theistic belief does
not stand the test of rationality because it typically fails
to supply the sufficient evidence required to maintain it. 2
lKelly James Clark, Return to Reason (Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 3.
2 see , for example, William K. Clifford, "The Ethics
of Belief," in Lectures and Essays, ed. Leslie Stephen and
Frederick Pollock, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1886), 339-63.
See also, Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism (New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1976).

1

2

It has been suqqested that until recently, the vast
majority of reliqious epistemoloqies have remained within the
evidentialist tradition.

Some have attempted to provide the

necessary evidence for rationality of belief in God, aqreeinq
with Enliqhtenment thinkers that theistic belief is rational
only when such a belief is warranted by sufficient evidence.
This position, aptly called theistic evidentialism, embraces
the Enliqhtenment conception of reason and arques that
theistic belief is rational precisely because it does in fact
meet the Enliqhtenment criterion of sufficient evidence.
Theistic evidentialists, accordinq to Alvin Plantinqa
and Kelly James Clark, typically function under classical
foundationalist conceptions of epistemology (althouqh not
exclusively) and attempt to offer evidence for theistic belief
that is thouqht to be rationally compellinq in virtue of
classical foundationalist criteria for rationality.J
Non-theistic evidentialist objectors, however, criticize this
position in assertinq that theistic evidentialists have
consistently failed in their attempts to provide the
sufficient evidence required for rational theistic belief.
Another form of reliqious epistemology that is said to
be a product of the evidentialist tradition is the position of
theistic fideism.

Theistic fideists essentially aqree with

3 I t is recoqnized that evidentialists also employ
coherentist or reliabilist theories of knowledqe. Plantinqa's
primary criticisms, however, are directed aqainst classical
foundationalists.

3

the evidentialist assumption that theistic belier is rational
only if there is sufricient evidence for such belief.

But

rather than attemptinq to provide evidences to meet the
evidentialist's conditions for rational belief in God,
theistic fideists abandon the enterprize altoqether and arque
that it is epistemically acceptable to hold theistic belief
without beinq compelled to supply the requisite evidence
(whether or not such evidence is thouqht to eXist).4

Since

theistic fideism holds that it is not necessary to provide
sufficient evidence (or that no sufficient evidence exists)
for rational theistic belief, many contemporary theists (both
evidentialists and non-evidentialists) who maintain that
theistic belief fits consistently within one's theory of
knowledqe, arque that the position of theistic fideism is
irrational.
Notwithstandinq, there are others on the landscape of
contemporary reliqious epistemoloqy who suqqest a conception
of rationality which seriously challenqes Enliqhtenment
critiques of the reasonableness of theistic belief. s

With

the advent of Kuhnian epistemoloqy,6 along with its
4Ke lly Clark, Return to Reason, 7.
SC. stephen Evans and Merold Westphal, Christian
Perspectives on Religious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 1993), 2.
6 The reference here is to Thomas S. Kuhn, The
structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of

Chicaqo Press, 1962); Cf. Kuhn's revisions of paradigm
incommensurability in his second edition of the aforementioned
text (1970) and his The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in
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subsequent revisions by various philosophers of science,'
some recent religious epistemologists have promoted the
rational acceptability ot theistic belief from arenas outside
the Enlightenment conception ot rationality.

The

resu~t

of

this endeavor has provided the field of religious epistemology
with three contemporary, innovative and intriguing conceptions
of rationality for theistic belief:

(1) There is the notion

suggested by postmodern thinker Nancey Murphy that claims to
knowledge and rationality in both science and theology are at
best tentative (or fallible) and in need of continual
revision. 8

Theistic belief (or a theological system) is

considered rational when the evidence for that theory or
belief fits the best explanation at the time.

(2) There is

the argument advanced by Reformed epistemologist,
scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1977).
'For example, lmre Lakatos, and A. Musgrave, eds.,
criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridqe: University
Press, 1970); Cf. Larry Laudan's competitive improvement on
Lakatos's system in his Progress and its Problems (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1977). See also, Paul
Feyerabend, "Consolations for the Specialist," in Criticism
and the Growth of Knowledge, 197-230; idem, Against Method
(London: New Left Books, 1975); and idem, Science in a Free
Society (London: New Left Books, 1978).
8 We will define Murphy's conception of postaodernity
in more detail in chapter two. For purposes of the present
study, while it is recoqnized that there are various forms
of postmodern thought in the theological and philosophical
disciplines, our focus will concentrate on Murphy's efforts
to qo beyond Enlqhtenment conceptions of truth and knowledge
by rejecting all approaches to epistemic justification,
rationality, and evidentialism which rely on any form of
foundationalism in knowledge and correspondence in truth.
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Alvin Plantinga, that belief in God is rationally acceptable
apart from meeting the demands for rational and empirical
certitude thought to be contained in the Enlightenment
standards of evidentialism and rationality.

For Plantinga,

there is an appreciable difference between providing evidence
for a belief (in a manner si.ilar to Enlightenment standards)
and providinq the grounds or warrant for a belief (in teras of
what we would expect to be the case if the belief in question
is true).

(3) Richard Swinburne, as a logical outgrowth of

his cumulative case evidentialism for theistic belief (in
which the rational case for theistic belief is offered through
a series of inductive arguments in which the evidence and
premises argue only for the probablity of the existence of
God), argues that one is rational in holding theistic belief
because that belief does in fact meet adequate evidential
conditions for rationalty.

What is offered in support of any

rational belief (scientific, theistic, or otherwise) should be
the best avai1able evidence (along with standards for
evaluating the evidence) that can lead one to credibly accept
the likelihood (or probability) of truth with respect to the
belief in question.
Both Murphy and Plantinga (albeit for different
epistemic reasons) seriously attack conceptions of knowledge
which are said to uncritically adopt Enlightenment standards
for rationality in religious epistemology.

Inherent to the

Enlightenment theory of knowledge is the notion that (a) all

6

rational beliefs must be supported with propositional evidence
or arguments, and (b) that an epistemic process of this nature
most often takes place within the ranks of some form of
foundationalist conception of knowledge.

Consequently, while

non-theistic evidentialists argue that traditional religious
epistemology has repeatedly failed to supply sufficient (or
undisputed) evidence for theistic belief, Murphy and Plantinga
offer differing and competing conceptions of rationality that
challenge the notion of sufficient evidence for theistic
belief based on the Enlightenment criteria for rationality.
As a case in point, exponents of antifoundational
epistemologies (e.g., Nancey Murphy and Nancy Frankenberry)
argue that a rejection of all forms of foundationalism (i.e.,
the methodology through which a good part of Enlightenment
evidentialism is thought to receive its rational impetus) in
epistemology is necessary if there is to be a rational basis
for theistic belief.

And yet both Murphy and Frankenberry

insist that abandoning foundationalism as part of a rational
approach to acceptable truth-claims in science or theology
does not necessarily force one to the inevitable positions of
radical skepticism or relativism. 9

The empirical approach

9This is the position held in a cogent article by
Nancy Frankenberry, "Pragmatism, Truth, and Objectivity"
Soundings 74 (Fall-winter 1991): 514. See also, Frankenberry,
Religion and Radical Empiricism (Albany: Suny, 1987), 4-19.
See also, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, "Is the Postmodernist
Always a Postfoundationalist? Nancey Murphy's Lakatosian Model
for Theology" in Essays in Post-foundationalist Theology
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 73-90. A1so, there are
different forms of foundationalism, and as we will see, Nancey

7

espoused by Frankenberry, for example, argues that such
alternatives do not exhaust the epistemic possibilities
available for those who reject foundationalist models for
producing acceptable claims to truth in conceptual
endeavors. 10

Frankenberry and other antifoundationalists

further insist that an absence of all forms of foundational ism
in religious knowledge does not necessarily warrant a position
that all constructions of meaning are relative and
incommensurable.

Rather, they argue, it is precisely through

some anti-foundational theory of knowledge that one is not
forced to epistemoloqical skepticism and a purely arbitrary
methodology for seeking an intellectual warrant for preferring
some beliefs and ways of knowing over others. 11
The contemporary significance of antifoundationalism
for postmodern thought is, as scientific theoloqian Nancey
Murphy has stated, found in a thorough rejection of the
Murphy rejects all forms of foundationalism, whereas Avin
Plantinga specifically centers his arguments against the
classical version of foundationalism.
10Frankenberry, "Pragmaticism," 5.
11Ibid. See also, Robert J. Priest, "CUltural
Anthropology, Sin, and the Missionary," in God and culture,
ed. John D. Woodbridge and D. A. Carson (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1993), 85-105; Richard Bernstein, Beyond
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and
Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983),
8, 4, 11; and Richard Rorty, Consequences or Pragmatism
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 162. See
also, Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror or Nature (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979).
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exclusive scientific empiricism and evidentialism underqirdinq
Enliqhtenment epistemoloqy.12

The impetus for Murphy's

lanquaqe comes out of some recent conceptions of knowledqe in
the philosophy of science.

Murphy's writinqs advocate a

postpositivistic methodology for theistic belief which she
claims complies with the current standards of evidence within
the philosophy of science. ll

She further proposes that

theistic theories take on a new collaborative effort with
science, one that concerns itself with the extent to which an
epistemology adequate for science should approximate an
epistemology suitable for the truth-claims of reliqion. 14
At another point on the spectrum of concepts of
rationality is the revolutionary notion of rationality
evidenced in the writinqs of Reformed epistemoloqist, Alvin
Plantinqa. 15

Plantinqa, amonq others, approaches the issue

l2See Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific
Reasoning (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 13, n. 18.
See also, Jeffrey stout, The Flight from Authority (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
llIbid., 192.
l4Nancey Murphy, Theology, X11. See also, Nancey
Murphy, "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword Puzzles,"
Zygon 24, no.3 (1989): 299; and J. Mouton and J. C. Pauw,
"Foundationalism and Fundamentalism: A critique," in Paradigms
and Progress in Theology, ed. J. Mouton, A. G. van Aarde, and
W. s. Voster (Human Sciences Research council, 1988), 176-186.
See also, Nicholas Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth
(Washinqton, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982).
l5Alvin Plantinqa, "Reason and Belief in God," in
Faith and Rationality, ed. Alvin Plantinqa and Nicholas
Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1983), 16-93. Cf. Kelly James Clark, Return to Reason (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990). The discussion concerninq Reformed
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of rationality on the assumption that the classical
foundationalist model for rationality is no lonqer a viable
option in epistemoloqy.

A critical feature of Plantinqa's

system is his arqument that classical foundational ism does not
satisfy its own criteria for rationality.

Classical

foundationalism holds that belief P is rational if and only if

P is either (a) self-evident, evident to the senses, or
incorriqible or (b) inferable from a set of beliefs that are
self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorriqible. 16
By consequence, then, theistic belief that is argued for (and
ultimately accepted) under a classical foundationalist system
of rationality is neither a basic belief nor inferable from
such beliefs.

Accordinq to this analysis, reliqious

epistemoloqies based on classical foundationalism are on the
same tenuous epistemic qrounds as their non-reliqious
counterparts.
Since classical foundationalism is said ultimately to
fail as a compellinq theory of knowledqe (and consequently
fails as part of a system of rationality), Plantinqa contends
that reliqious epistemoloqists should abandon altoqether any
epistemic system which cannot satisfy its own conditions for
rationality.

By rejectinq the Enlightenment's reliance on

classical foundational ism and evidentialism, Reformed
epistemoloqy will essentially follow the literature contained
in Clark's volume.
16 P l antinqa, "Is Belief in God Rational?" 24-25.
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epistemologists like Plantinga argue that there no longer
remains a leqitimate evidentialist objection to theistic
belief (i.e., belief in God).

The reason is that belief in

God is thouqht to escape any objections based on the
evidentialist assumption of rationality.

Plantinga's approach

to rationality is thought to go beyond the limits of
traditional evidentialism and offer less rigorous and
demanding criteria tor what is legitimately rational and basic
among one's set of beliefs.

Plantinqa argues that beliefs of

this nature are in fact rational, even though they do not
satisfy the conditions for rationality under classical
foundational ism.
With the work of Swinburne, there is a return to the
program of theistic evidentialism.

Swinburne also attempts to

show that theistic theories and beliefs can follow a model of
rationality consistent with scientific theorizing.

His

approach, however, differs significantly from Murphy'S in that
he argues that such a methodology is one in which our best
inductive arguments of the available evidence can result in
conclusions of probability for theistic belief; that is, we
can judge our theories and beliefs on evidence (includinq
theistic belief) to be more likely true than not.
Swinburne's system further differs from Murphy's in
that he accepts a form of correspondence in truth, and argues
for an epistemic structure which is essentially foundational
in nature.

It will be suggested that his approach comes

11

closest to satisfying the features necessary to an adequate
model of rationality.

Swinburne will argue, for example, that

there are degrees of rationality which increasingly account
for greater evidence and greater likelihood of truth.

The

highest degree of rationality one can apply to a belief
(theistic or otherwise) is one in which a cognizer has in fact
verified a belief as true on the total available evidence.
All other acceptable degrees of rationality are such that a
cognizer may have good reason to continue questioning what the
evidence delivers in terms of the likelihood of truth.
~he

Dissertation Question

It may be stated, then, that the epistemic theories
underlying the systems of Murphy, Plantinga, and Swinburne
represent some of the most influential attempts at formulating
a concept of rationality for belief in God among the religious
epistemologies currently fashionable as either (a) offering
alternative answers to the evidentialist assumption that
surfaced out of the classical foundationalist epistemology of
the Enlightenment, or (b) in some way satisfying the
18th-century evidentialist objections forever enshrined in the
tomb of Humean skepticism.

The central question of the

present study may be put forth as follows:

Do the

aforementioned systems of nonfoundational religious
epistemology (e.g., Murphy), Reformed epistemology (e.g.,
Plantinga), and theistic evidentialism (e.g., Swinburne)
provide tenable models of rationality for belief in God?

If

12

not, what are the necessary features which make a belief
(whether scientific, theistic, or otherwise) rational?

Such

an inquiry attempts to make a distinction between the content
of religious belief (e.g., the trinity) and the specific

epistemic reasons that warrant or justify theisitic belief as
being rational.
Various secondary questions naturally arise out of
this concern.

For example, if it can be established that the

evidentialist assumption is not without its own epistemic
difficulties, as Plantinga suggests, then to what extent are
theistic evidentialists compelled to provide only what
evidentialists would accept as sufficient evidence (either
rational or empirical) for theistic belief?

Additionally,

must one reject all forms of foundationalism in epistemoloqy,
as does Murphy, if one is to have an acceptable notion of
rationality for belief in God?

Are epistemic systems that

fail to supply evidentialist notions of sufficient reasons for
theistic belief necessarily fideistic in nature?

Or is it

possible to offer, as C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal
suggest, a middle ground theory of rationality for theistic
belief that attempts to strike a balance between the
epistemological arrogance of evidentialism and extreme systems
of irrationality, relativism and skepticism?17

In

addressing these concerns, our purpose is to offer a
17see , for example, their Christian Perspectives on
Religious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993), 3.

13

constructive analysis of the internal logic of the systems in
question (as opposed to their historical developments) and
provide a plausible system of rationality which draws upon
various credible epistemic features residing within those
systems.
As we will see, Murphy and Plantinga offer competing
systems of rationality in response to what Alvin Plantinqa
refers to as the collapse of classical foundationalism in
epistemoloqy.18

As such, the evidentialist objection since

Hume and the Enlightenment is ultimately satisfied in the
adoption of rational systems incommensurable with the form of
rationality embraced under the original objection.

And as we

will further see, while some contemporary theistic
evidentialists are committed to developinq rational systems
for theistic belief which attempt to provide evidential
responses to the objections raised by non-theistic
evidentialist (e.q., Richard Swinburne's cumulative case
evidential arguments), Murphy and Plantinqa offer rational
systems for belief in God which attempt to escape
evidential ism altogether.

The cognitive claim of theistic

belief, they assert, is ultimately satisfied in a context that
accepts the criteria of an entirely different system of
rationality, one that is at the same time consistent with
18P l antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 60-61. See
also, "Is Belief in God Rational?" in Rationality and
Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 7-27.

14

either the dictates of scientific knowledqe or some other
alternative form of rationality.

But is there a more

preferable alternative to the three systems mentioned above?
Is there, for example, an option for rationality in theistic
belief that combines the positive features of all three
epistemic models?
'l'he Purpose

or

the Study

It is the intention of this study to suqqest that a
more tenable model of rationality for theistic belief may be
found in a synthesis of certain epistemic features of Murphy's
postmodern scientific epistemology for theology, Plantinqa's
Reformed epistemology, and Swinburne's cumulative case
evidential ism.

The impetus for such a synthesis is fueled in

part by the role philosophy of reliqion plays in furnishinq a
substantive epistemology for the acceptable truth-claims of
theistic belief in an increasinqly scientific and
technoloqical society.

The form of epistemology we ultimately

embrace as satisfyinq the conditions for what constitutes
rational claims in science and reliqion will in turn radically
shape the future epistemic practices of these conceptual
enterprises.

This particularly concerns the type of claims

that can be leqitimately constructed and accepted by adherents
of both disciplines.
Since the advent of Enliqhtenment standards of
rationality, the claims of reliqion and theology appear to
have cowered increasinqly in the face of .odern conceptions of

15

scientism.

If, however, it can be argued effectively that the

truth-claims of both science and reliqion do in fact share the
same essential epistemic conditions for rationality, then
perhaps future discussions between the two disciplines can
proqress alonq more acceptable lines without either enterprise
capitulatinq to indefensible criteria for rationality.

Qualifications on the Areas of Inquiry
In attemptinq to meet this aqenda, it must be
stipulated that it would be impossible in a study of this
length to deal adequately with the extensive literature
devoted to the whole discipline of reliqious epistemology.
The followinq factors, then, have been brouqht into
consideration: first, our primary objective is to identify the
essential features to each of the models of rationality
indicated above.

While it is recoqnized that the respective

epistemic systems up for consideration have broader
application to a wider ranqe of concepts within the realm of
theistic belief, our focus will be to consider the inner loqic
that constitutes these rational systems and offer analysis
with respect to whether the features and criteria of these
systems do in fact provide adequate approaches to rational
theistic belief.

It will be suqqested that there are inherent

difficulties to each system, and that such difficulties
require further criteria to make a stronqer argument for
rational belief (theistic or otherwise).

Second, in keepinq

with the many studies in reliqious epistemology involved in

16
investigating the rationale for theistic beliefs seeking a
middle ground between epistemological arrogance and
relativistic skepticism,19 the present study proposes to
contribute to this discussion by attempting a synthesis of the
three forms of religious epistemology described above.

The Method and Scope of the study
In order to develop the proposed project successfully,
chapter two will set forth the essential tenets of Nancey
Murphy's brand of postmodern rationality.

Discussion will

ensue with respect to some of the positive contributions in
this line of thinking.

Much of Murphy's thinking is done in

the silhouette of recent philosophy of science (Thomas Kuhn,
Karl Popper, Paul Feyerabend, and Imre Lakatos) in which a
clarion call has been sounded against scientific positivism's
role in modernity as the final arbiter of rationality and
certitude in the truth-claims of the social sciences of which
religious knowledge plays so crucial a role.

It is

anticipated that the epistemic concerns raised in this chapter
will set the tone and rationale for the remainder of the
study.
Murphy proposes what she regards as a thoroughly
postmodern alternative to aodern notions of rationality in
19As mentioned above, c. stephen Evans and Merold
Westphal, Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, 3.
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reliqious knowledqe. 20

Murphy is chosen specifically for

her scientific methodology which emerqes as a natural
outqrowth of the epistemology of recent philosophy of science.
It will be arqued that, when compared aqainst the rational
systems of Plantinqa and Swinburne, Murphy's brand of
postmodern epistemology represents the most radical step away
from the rationality of Enliqhtenment evidentialism.

This

chapter will review her insiqhts and suqqested modifications
of recent philosophy of science and offer initial critiques of
the epistemie limitations inherent to the Lakatosian system
she proposes as a viable rational approach to theistic belief.
Chapter three will investiqate the manner in which the
rationality of Alvin Plantinqa's Reformed epistemoloqy is
offered as a competinq alternative aqainst postmodernism in
the rejection of classical foundational ism in reliqious
epistemoloqy.

Once aqain, the purpose of this chapter will be

to define Plantinqa's notion of rationality and consider its
20 I bid., 13 and 201. See also, Murphy and James Wm.
McClendon, Jr., "Distinquishinq Modern and Postmodern
Theoloqies," Modern Theology 5 (Apil 1989): 145-168; J. L.
Austin's Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961);
and Ludwiq wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
(New York: Macmillan, 1953). For an analysis of community and
consensus knowledqe, see Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, 2d
ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984);
and Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985). See also, Peter Berger
and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New
YorK: Doubleday, 1967). Cf. Murphy, Theology in the Age of
Scientific Reasoning, 7-8; W. V. o. Quine, "Two Dogmas of
Empiricism," in Philosophical Review 40 (1951): 20-43; and
W. V. o. Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York:
Random House, 1979).
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insights and potential limitations in offering a credible
approach to the rationality of theistic belief.

Initial

criticisms will be offered for the purposes of directing the
project toward its ultimate objective of a middle ground
position incorporating various epistemic features in all three
systems.
Chapter four will consider Richard Swinburne's
cumUlative case evidentialism for theistic belief.

The

rationale for reconsidering an evidentialist model of
rationality for theistic belief surfaces out of the argument
that there are fundamental epistemic principles that govern
rational claims to truth (whether scientific, theistic, or
otherwise), and that such a system of rationality does in fact
follow (and need not jettison) a moderate foundational
structure of evidentialism.

Swinburne's notion of rationality

(as a form of evidentialism) involves the epistemic features
necessary to avoid the tendencies toward relativism that are
often inherent in many postmodern systems (e.g., Murphy's
Lakatosian model of rationality).

It will be argued that his

system salvages many of the positive features of
foundationalist structures of epistemic justification, while
at the same time offering a tempered view of the prospects of
evidentialist arguments that follow an inductive and
pobabilistic approach to the rationality of belief.
Chapter five, then, will propose an actual concept of
rationality that borrows from various insights of the three
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systems considered, yet without succumbinq to the problems
they have been shown to have.

That is, after examininq the

critical features in the rational models of Murphy's
antifoundational episteaoloqy, Plantinqa's Reformed
epistemology, and SWinburne's rationality for theistic belief
based on its probability on evidence, chapter five will seek
to contribute to the field of enquiry by incorporatinq certain
features from the rational models of all three systems in the
attempt to arrive at a model of rationality which seeks a
middle qround position between the rational certitude of
evidential ism and the potential forms of praqmatism and
extreme relativism characteristic of many recent rational
systems.

CHAPTER 2

A TENTATIVE APPROACH TO RATIONALITY
THE PROVISIONAL STATUS OF BELIEFS
It was indicated in chapter one that recent challenges
directed against Enlightenment standards of rationality have
urged epistemoloqists on the contemporary scene to advance
novel (or siqnficantly revised) conceptions of rationality to
show that one is rational in holding one's beliefs.

Fueled by

the belief that we are experiencing a new crisis in our
ability to provide rational claims to knowledge in the
coqnitive disciplines, particularly in science and religion,
many critical thinkers in the field of religious epistemoloqy,
particularly scientific theologian Nancey Murphy, are focusing
their efforts on building a marketplace of remarkably
innovative and provocative options for the rational
justification of theistic belief. l

It is at the horizon of

this context that we observe one of the most elaborate efforts
lFor example, see R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan
Sweetman, Contemporary Persprectives on Religious Epistemology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also, Michael
Peterson et al., Reason & Religious Belief: An Introduction to
the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991); C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal, eds., Christian
Perspectives on Re~igious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 1993); and David S. Dockery, ad., The Cha~~enge of
Postmodernism: An Evangelica~ Engageaent (Nashville: Broadman
Press, 1995).
20
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(fueled by recent philosophy of science) aimed at exposing
what are thought to be the weaknesses of traditional models of
rationality in demonstratinq when one is rational in holding
the basis claim of theism.
Nancey Murphy proposes a model of rationality in which
she arques that religious epistemology has both the ability
and the obligation to provide rational support for theistic
belief.

Like many current models of rationality, Murphy's

criticisms of evidentialist conceptions of rationality are
rooted in a thorough rejection of any form of epistemology
(whether in philosophy, science or reliqion) which attempts
to rationally support its coqnitive claims accordinq to
Enlightenment (modern) conceptions of truth, justification,
and rational belief.

Murphy's model for the rationality of

cognitive claims in theism, for example, advocates what she
views as an approach which complies with the qoing standards
of evidence and rationality currently fashionable within
certain models of rationality in the philosophy of science. 2
2Nancey Murphy, Theology in an Age of Scientific
Reasoning (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990),
192. Murphy's work was developed through a number of articles
before it reached the form in her book cited above. See, for
example, "Theology, the Transformation of Science: A
Niebuhrian Typology for the Relation of Theology to Science,"
Pacific Theological Review 18 (Spring 1985): 16-23; "Relating
Theoloqy and Science in a Postmodern Age,· Center for ~heology
and the Natural Sciences Bulletin 7 (Autumn 1987): 1-10;
"Acceptability Criteria for Work in Theology and Science,"
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 22 (1987): 279-98;
"From Critical Realism to a Methodoloqical Approach: Response
to Robbins, Van Huyssteen, and Hefner," Zygon 23, no. 3
(1988): 287-90; "Theology: An Experimental Science?"
Perspectives in Religious Studies 15 (Fall 1988): 219-34;
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Murphy's model of rationality is directed aqainst all
forms of (or attempts at) certainty in knowledqe.

This, she

contends, is most often associated with classical
foundationalist approaches to rationality.

Foundationalist

theories of knowledqe take a limited class of beliefs (i.e.,
epistemoloqically basic) to have a privileqed epistemic
status.

It is thouqht that basic beliefs are self-justifyinq,

and so they do not stand in need of any further justification
from other beliefs.

Non-basic beliefs, on the other hand,

require justification by appeal to basic beliefs. 3

Murphy

believes that all forms of certainty and foundational ism in
knowledqe represent episteaic commitments that make it
difficult for us to revise our beliefs or theories in liqht of
new evidence.

The foundationalist commitment to basic beliefs

that are indubitable, for example, betrays a methodology which
she believes is far too strict and unworkable for any model of
rationality. 4

Since the foundationalist commitment is one of

"Theology: An Experimental Science?" Perspectives in Religious
studies 15 (Fall 1988): 219-34. "Truth, Relativism, and
Crossword Puzzles," Zygon 24, no. 3 (1989): 299-314; "Another
Look at Novel Facts," Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science 20, no. 3 (1989): 385-88. "Scientific Realism and
Postmodern Philosophy," ~he British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science 41 (June 1990): 291-303; and "Theology and the
Social sciences--Discipline and Antidiscipline," Zygon 25
(1990): 309-16.
3John L. Pollock, Contemporary ~heories of Knowledge
(Savaqe, Md.: Rowman , Littlefield, 1986), 26.
4 see , for example, Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy,
and Mark Nation, eds., Theology ~ithout Foundations: Religious
Practice & the Future of Theological Truth (Nashville:
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cartesian certainty and indubitability (an unworkable model in
the thinkinq of many contemporary epistemoloqists),5 what is
needed is a rationality model that is much more open to the
possibility that our current scientific (or theistic) beliefs
may be wronq and in need of serious revision.
Murphy's model of rationality, then, contends that one
is rational in holdinq one's belief on the basis of evidence
that fits the best explanation at the time.

This requires

specifyinq a criterion for choice between competinq theories
and beliefs.

Evidence that represents the best explanatory

fit is the kind of evidence that is likely to offer solutions
to the anomalies of our previous theories and beliefs, so lonq
as those solutions do not represent ad hoc explanations of the
data.

Such a model of rationality for theistic belief follows

an essentially Lakatosian model of reasoninq, in which our
theories and beliefs about the world are at best tentative and
provisional.

Even if our beliefs are thouqht to be true in

Abingdon Press, 1996); Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism &
Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy set the
Theological Agenda (Valley Forqe, Pa.: Trinity Press
International, 1996); and Richard R. Toppinq, "The

Anti-Foundationalist Challanqe to Evanqelical Apoloqetics,"

The Evangelical Quarterly 63, no. 4 (1991): 45-60.

5see , for example, the introductory remarks in the
first chapter. See also, Alvin Plantinqa, "Reason and Belief
in God," in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God,
ed. Alvin Plantinqa and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 16-93 (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); and
Plantinqa, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" in contemporary
Perspectives on Religious Epistemology, ed. R. Douqlas Geivett
and Brendan Sweetman, 133-41 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992).
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some correspondence sense, Murphy's contention is that there
is no likelihood that we could know this for certain, given
our rational and evidential limitations.
One is not rational if one holds one's beliefs with
certainty.

For this would suggest that one is not open to the

possibility that future evidence could falsify a given belief.
We are justified (and consequently rational) in holding our
beliefs on the basis of a wide variety of experiences and
other beliefs, even though we fully expect them to be
provisional and tentative, so long as our reasons for holding
them square with the current standards of rationality in
certain approaches to scientific theorizing.

Verification of

a belief's truthfulness, then, is not so much a matter of
determining whether a belief corresponds to the world (while
this may be possible), but rather of determining whether a
belief is likely to be unsurpassed in its claims.

On this

conception of rationality, it is highly likely that most
views, because they are provisional in nature, will be
surpassed.

The reason for this, as we will see, is that

Murphy's criterion for the truthfulness of a belief must be
consistent with what she views as the tentativeness of one's
belief.

Beliefs are at best tentative because the evidential

reasons for holding them must comply with the best explanatory
fit available at the time.
As we will see, Murphy'S system represents the
furthest move away from the model of rationality we will
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propose as beinq a more adequate approach to demonstratinq the
rationality of our beliefs on evidence.

Her rejection of

approaches to rationality based on foundationalist theories
leads to an inevitable relativism in truth and knowledqe which
is unnecessary on our model of rationality.

We will arque in

chapter five that problems of certainty in rational belief
(includinq theistic belief), while not requirinq the
sufficient evidence of Enliqhtenment evidentialism, can be
adequately resolved by appealinq to a model of rationality
that accounts for appropriate evidence of the riqht kind and
amount.
~he Pos~modern Con~ex~

It is no easy task to qet a qrasp on Murphy's notion
of rationality in coqnitive and conceptual activities,
especially where it concerns the matter of truth and epistemic
justification that are so closely associated with admittedly
postmodern systems of reliqious epistemology and theoloqical
proleqomenon.

While much of Murphy's thinkinq focuses on

scientific and theoloqical theorizinq, we can make reasonable
application of the essential features of her model of
rationality to the matter of rational belief on evidence.

It

may be necessary, therefore, at the outset of a survey of
Murphy's particular brand of postmodernity to distinquish it
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from the more popular forms of postmodernism familiar to the
theological enterprise.'
Althouqh the term postmodern is often employed to
represent collective efforts on the part of some thinkers to
go beyond Enlightenment conceptions of knowledqe and truth
(i.e., the conserted effort at rejectinq all approaches to
epistemic justification, rationality and evidentialis. which
rely on any form of foundational ism in knowledge and
correspondence in truth) some thinkers such as David Griffin
have attempted to show that a more precise use of
postmodernity refers to "a diffuse sentiment rather than to
any set of doctrines.

. . ."7

While Griffin's description

appears to cover much of the essence of postmodernis., and
while the various forms of postmodernism do share certian
characteristics in common, Griffin more importantly goes on to
capture some of the more salient features of postmodern
theology which result in clear distinctions within the
'see, for example, David Ray Griffin, "Introduction:
varieties of Postmodern Theoloqy," in Varieties or Postmodern
Theology, ed. David Ray Griffin, William A. Beardslee, and Joe
Holland (Albany: state University of New York Press, 1989),
1-7. See also, the abundance of primary and secondary sources
on deconstruction (mostly on Derrida) listed in Gary John
Percesepe's challenging article, "The Unbearable Lightness of
Being Postmodern," Christian Scholar's Review 20, no. 2
(1990): 118-35; and Merold Westphal, "The Ostrich and the
Boogeyman: Placing postmodernism," Christian Scholar's Review
20, no. 2 (1990): 114-117.
7 David Griffin, "Introduction to SUNY Series in
constructive Postmodern Thouqht," in varieties or Postmodern
Theoloy, xii.

27

movement, most notably, the distinctions between its
deconstructive and constructive forms. 8
The more deconstructive brand of postmodern theology,
argues Griffin, attempts to overcome the modern
(Enlightenment) worldview by eliminating "the inqredients
necessary for a worldview, such as God, self, purpose,
meaning, a real world, and truth as correspondence."9

In

contrast to this deconstructive brand of the movement, writes
Griffin, is a far more constructive form of postmodernism:
It seeks to overcome the modern worldview not by
eliminating the possibility of worldviews as such, but by
constructing a postmodern worldview through a revision of
modern premises and traditional concepts. This
constructive or revisionary postmodernism involves a new
unity of scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious
institutions. It rejects not science as such but only
that scientism in which the data of the modern natural
sciences are alone allowed to contribute to the
construction of our worldview. 10
Given these distinctions, it is helpful to see that Murphy's
model of rationality is probably closer to a constructive form
of postmodernism.

She contends, nevertheless, that it is not

possible to go beyond the tenets of modernity (i.e.,
traditional approaches to rationality based on evidential ism)
8 Although Griffin describes four basic types of
postmodern theology (e.g., constructive, deconstructive,
liberationist and restorationist), our purpose at this point
is to provide a place for Murphy's brand of postmodernism by
comparing and contrasting its relation with the deconstructive
and constructive aspects of the movement. See, for example,
Griffin's "Introduction: Varieties of Postmodern Theology," in
varieties of Postmodern Theology, 2.

9Griffin, "Introduction to SUNY Series," xii.
lOIbid., xii.
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if one's system continues to cling to outdated concepts, such
as foundationalist theories of knowledge, referentialism and
representationalism in the philosophy of language, truth as
some form of correspondence, and atomistic notions of the
human person (individualism) and historical meaning. ll
While Murphy agrees with some postmodern efforts to
reject any notion of truth as correspondence, she explicitly
argues, however, for the construction of a model of
rationality which attempts to formulate criteria for theory
choice (and rational belief) that those of the more
deconstructionist brand typically want to jettison. l2
Murphy's postmodern constructive thought, however, differs to
some extent from the form of constructionism described in
Griffin's taxonomy of postmodern theology.

Murphy contends

that the very arguments between 'mainline' epistemologists and
their skeptical opponents have shifted.

The modern framework

tended to presuppose foundationalism in epistemology as the
one commensurable feature among them, but the dawning of
postmodernism (if it is truly postmodern) brings with it a
whole new realm of epistemic possibilities.

Her particular

style of postmodernism is characterized by changes in the last
l1 I bid., xiii. See Nancey Murphy's "Scientific Realism
and Postmodern Philosophy," in Anglo-American Pos~moderni~y:
Philosophical Perspec~ives on Science, Religion, and E~hics
(Boulder, Colo.: westview Press, 1997), 1 and 44-5.
12 see , for example, Murphy's description of Lakatosian
Theology in Theology in an Age of Scien~ific Reasoning,

183-192.
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fifty years in three specific domains of philosophical
discourse: epistemology, philosophy of lanquage, and
metaphysics:
In epistemology and philosophy of science, there was the
rejection of foundational ism in favor of the holist views
of the likes of Quine and Kuhn. In philosophy of
language, there was the shift from theories of meaninq
based on reference or representationalism to a focus on
the social uses of language! found especially in the works
of Austin and Wittgenstein. 3
Murphy believes this represents a gestalt switch far more
radical than other constructive approaches representing a
synthesis of modern and premodern worldviews. 14

The shifts

in the philosophical areas mentioned above are so
incommensurable with modern conceptions of thought that there
is no modern mooring that can safely harbor them.

But they do

not, for Murphy, represent aimless driftings toward the
horizen of relativism; rather, they simply represent a
different range of options than was the case in modernity.
13Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 2.
14Ibid. While the philosophical ramifications of
Murphy's postmodern paradigm are far-reaching, the scope
of this study is to limit our discourse to its implications
for the rationality for theistic belief. For the application
of her system in the broader context of theology, see Nancey
Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, On the Horal Nature of the
Universe: ~heology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1996); Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy,
and C. J. Isham, ed., Quantum cosmology and the Laws of
Nature: scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 2d. ed.
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993 and
1996); and Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur
Peacocke, eds., Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives
on Divine Action (Vatican City state and Berkeley, Calif.:
Vatican Observatory and Center for Theology and the Natural
Sciences, 1995).
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Thus, while Murphy agrees with other constructionists that the
modern conceptions of the so-called rational approach to both
scientific and theistic belief can no lonqer be supported, she
does not support the retreat to fideism so characteristic of
those forms of late modern theoloqy.

As Griffin points out,

those features often represented theoloqical statements which
were not open to a public investiqation of the evidence and
typically appealed lito criteria of validation other than the
public criteria used in science and science-based philosophy,
that is, self-consistency and adequacy to qenerally accessible
facts. nlS
In attemptinq to answer the various challenqes of the
evidentialists, Murphy notes that theoloqians are often
hesitant to draw close connections between theoloqical and
scientific theories "for fear that as science proqresses the
theories current today will be replaced, and the theoloqical
formulations will then have to be abandoned as well."l6
Rather than beinq cauqht in the same relativizinq as the
medieval theoloqians who tied their formulations to
Aristotelian cosmology, Murphy argues that theistic theorizinq
(and theistic belief) can escape the quandary of accommodatinq
to the requireaents for rationality in traditional approaches
lSGriffin, "Introduction: varieties of Postmodern
Theology," 2.
l6Murphy, "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword Puzzles,"
299.
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to science.

The way to do this is by adopting a new concept

of rationality consistent with recent philosophy of science.
In Murphy'S analysis, the Middle Ages are often
characterized as enjoying a coherent worldview.

In such a

worldview there were places for both science and theoloqy.
But Murphy argues that this characterization of that era is
probably a myth.

She argues instead that the various theories

offered as satisfying the data (and anomalies) of both science
and theology (e.g., scriptural descriptions of a seemingly
flat earth and the emergence of a Copernican theory of the
solar system) were in every way as incomplete and incoherent
as in our present time.

The real difference between the two

eras has to do with the dominance of one discipline over
another.

Whereas in the Middle Ages theology dominated the

first moves of inquiry, the present context is characterized
by the formative position of the natural sciences.

Neither

methodological starting point is acceptable due to what Murphy
believes are inherent epistemic problems.

Instead, Murphy

argues for the warrant of a new approach to theorizing across
the two disciplines.

She writes:

However, a picture of science and theoloqy as different
regions of the same puzzle should remind us that theology
cannot be governed exclusively by the demands for
consistency with science (and other areas of knowledge),
but is also to be constrained by its own clues--that is,
by its own proper sorts of data, including the practices
and experiences of the religious life. 17

17 I bid.,

307.
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This approach proposed by Murphy seeks to offer a position
whereby theists are neither forced to follow a model of
rationality consistent with modern (Enliqhtenment) notions of
scientific theorizinq, nor abandon the responsibility to
provide rational support for belief in God.

So the data for

theistic theories (or beliefs) will be different (e.q., the
communal consensus' assumed non-referential and
non-representational nature of reliqious lanquaqe and
experience), and such theorizinq will follow a basically
Lakatosian model of rationality.
In settinq the staqe for her Lakatosian proposal,
Murphy draws heavily upon Jeffrey stout's analysis of the way
in which David Hume's challenqe to theism produced radical
chanqes in epistemoloqy throuqh the modern period (in
philosophy, rouqhly, from 1650 to 1950) and the consequences
of those chanqes on theoloqy and ethics. 18

In his recent

work on the history of philosophy, author Wallace Matson notes
that Hume's Dialogues was not meant as an attempt to demolish
reliqion altoqether, but simply to arque that "the inference
from the alleqed desiqn in nature to an infinitely wise,
powerful, and qood Author of nature is invalid."19

stout,

l8Murphy, Theology, 3. See also, Jeffrey stout, Flight
from Authority (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981).
19See Wallace Matson's New History of Philosophy, vol.
2 (Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), p. 366.
Cf. Murphy, Theology, 2.
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however, directs his readers to two siqnificant turning points
in epistemology that resulted from Hume's challenge:
The first was the rejection of the medieval concepts of
knowledge based upon the study of the authorities and
deductive reasoning in favor of the modern period's
foundationalism--that is, the concern with the
reconstruction of knowledge on self-evident foundations
(whether intuitionist or empirical). The second (still in
proqress) is the substitution of a holistic approach for
that very foundationalist doctrine. 20
It is Murphy's contention that modern epistemology, which is
so closely identified with foundationalism, must find its
replacement in epistemoloqical holism and Lakatos's research
proqrams of probable reasoning.

Murphy's postmodern notion of

rationality is one which is characterized by at least three
fundamental features, as indicated above:

First, there is the

rejection of foundational ism in epistemology for a form of
post-foundational ism similar to Quinian holistic coherentism.
Second, there is a change from an exclusively representational
and referential use of language to a much qreater emphasis on

J. L. Austin's and Ludwig wittgenstein's philosophy of
language which views language as action, and meaning as use.
Like Austin and wittgenstein, Murphy does not entirely deny a
referential element to language, but she does argue that it's
use is far more limited than previously believed.

Murphy

2~urphy, ~heology in the Age of Scientific
Reasoning, 3. For good discussions on holistic epistemology
and its relation to other disciplines, see Richard Rorty,
Philosophy and the Hirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979); and Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermenuetics and Praxis
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsyvania Press, 1983).
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contends that the referential element in language has little
or no value for theorizing in theism.

Third, there is the

replacement of an emphasis on the indivdual as the sole
arbiter of what is rational (i.e., cartesian certainty) with a
renewed sense of the importance and irreducibility of
community. 21

For purposes of our discussion, however, we

will concentrate on the manner in which Murphy's rejection of
foundationalist theories results in a model of rationality in
which our beliefs (including theistic belief) can be tentative
and provisional at best.
The Emergence of Tentative Beliefs: A Survey
of its Historical Roots
Murphy's application of Lakatosian philosophy of
science for the justification of cognitive claims in religion
is a clear attempt to retrieve theistic belief from the grasp
of fideism and deliver it to the world at large through the
public criteria of a scientifically credible epistemology.

It

is Lakatos' postmodern model that, according to Murphy, will
take the debate beyond the realm of scientific realism (which
she thinks even in its more critical form is an attempt to
21Murphy, Theology in an Age of Scientific Reasoning,
13 and 201. See also, Murphy and James Wm. McClendon, Jr.,
"Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies," Modern
Theology 5 (Apil 1989): 145-68; J. L. Austin's Philosophical
Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); and Ludwig
wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (New York:
Macmillan, 1953). For an analysis of community and consensus
knowledge, see Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, 2d ed.
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) and
Robert Bellah at al., Habits of the Heart (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985).
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salvaqe modern conceptions of the referential and
representative theory of lanquaqe, as well as correspondence
in truth) and offer a truly non-foundational model of
rationality.

Scientific realism, for example, holds that

science proqressively arrives at true, "or approximately true
theories about the real, theory-independent world 'out there'
and does so in a rationally justifiable way."22
The Lakatosian model of rationality that Murphy
propose is closer to a form of rational nonrealism.

Rational

nonrealism holds that, while science is an objectively
rational discipline (i.e., we ouqht to accept qood scientific
theories), it does not necessarily aim at qivinq us true or
approximate truth in the correspondence sense.

Rather,

science attempts to provide a variety of other epistemic
functions (e.q., synthesize sense data, predict and control
phenomena).23

When applied to the rationality of theistic

belief, for example, concepts such as justification, truth,
and objectivity convey profoundly different meaninqs.

The

quest for certainty in truth (from a correspondence sense) is
replaced with deqrees of relativism in knowledqe, but such an
effort, arques Murphy, need not exist without the means to
22see, for example, J. P. Moreland, Christianity and
the Nature of Science (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House,
1989), 139. See also, Moreland, Scaling the Secular city
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1987), 186-97. See
also, Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2d ed. (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984 and 1991).
23Moreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science,
140.
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arbitrate, in a nonarbitrary fashion, between equally coherent
epistemic options. 24
Murphy's systea is fueled in part by concerns over
the epistemic relativism surfacing out of recent abandonments
of the quest for certainty in evidentialist theories of
knowledge.

In order to avoid the trend toward relativism (and

in order to continue to offer good evidence and reasons for
the rational claims of theism), Murphy proposes a model of
rationality that she believes entirely redefines traditional
notions of truth and knowledge (i.e., epistemic
justification).

What begins to emerge is a model of

rationality in which truth and knowledge are viewed at best as
an adequate solution to the previously unresolved epistemic
problems so characteristic of theorizing across the conceptual
disciplines of science and theoloqy.

Murphy's answer to this

is her proposal for theoloqy to adopt the probable reasoning
theory of Lakatos's scientific research programs.

Before we

give a closer examination of Lakatos's theory, it is worth
noting what Murphy believes we stand to gain by the acceptance
of her proposal: First, it is intended to go beyond the
realism debate in offering a more substantial basis on which
both theology and science can stand up to philosophical
24Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity:
Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, and Ethics,
52-62. See also, Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism &
Fundamentalism: Bow Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the
Theological Agenda, 106-9; and her Reasoning & Rhetoric in
Religion (Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press International,
1994), 260-67.
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scrutiny; and second, it is said to block the move to
theological relativism that so often results out of the
discourse of pluralism and the historical and social
conditioning of knowledge. 25
The rationality model of Iare Lakatos' scientific
reasearch programs follows a course of reasoning similar to a
number of prominent thinkers in recent philosophy of science
(e.g., Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend).26

Its historical roots

can be traced back to the attempts of the logical positivists
to set forth a criterion of demarcation to distinquish between
science and metaphysics, and to reconstruct all (scientific)
knowledge from experience. 27

The verification theory of

meaning was an attempt by the logical positivists to establish
a criterion of demarcation between propositions which were
thought to have meaning and those which did not.

A subsequent

theory of confirmation ultimately resulted as well.

The

logical positivists employed the verification theory of
25Nancey Murphy, "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword
Puzzles," Zygon 24, no. 3 (1989): 299. See also, J. Mouton and
J. C. Pauw, "Foundationalis. and Fundamentalism: A Critique,"
in paradigms and Progress in !'heology, ed. J. Mouton, A. G.
van Aarde, and W. S. voster (Pretoria, South Africa: Human
Sciences Research Council, 1988), 176-86.
26In addition to Murphy's analysis, see Ian Hacking's

Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975).
27Murphy, !'heology, 52. Cf. Murphy, "Acceptability
Criteria for Work in Theology and Science," Zygon 22 (1987):
284. See also, J. P. Moreland's insightful analysis of this
movement in science in Christianity and the Nature of Science
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1989).
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meaning as a way of demonstrating that a sentence has no
meaning unless one could specify its verification procedures.
In its most rudimentary form, the theory of confirmation was
meant to show that any statement whose meaning was not
potentially verifiable on the basis of sense experience was
meaningless--it was not to be regarded as science. 28
The most noted response to the verification principle
was that the principle itself was not verifiable.
were other problems as well.

But there

Murphy notes that sense data do

not provide a very handy starting point for the meaning of
propositions: they occur only once; they are private, and
equally problematic, our language has an awkward way of
referring to them. 29

The major shift away from this line of

thinking came out of Karl Popper's new theory of demarcation
(i.e., a modification to the concept of what makes science
scientific).

Popper held that science is characterized by the

fact that its theories are falsifiable. 30

The theory that

should be accepted as being the most scientific is the theory
that is the most highly falsifiable, yet not in fact
falsified. 31
28Murphy, ~heology, 52. See also, Arthur C. Danto,
connections to the World: ~he Basic concepts of Philosophy
(New York: Harper 5 ROW, 1989), 55.

29 Ib id., 53.
30 I bid. See also, Karl Popper, ~he Logic of scientific
Discovery (New York: Harper & RoW, 1965). Popper's work was
originally published in 1935.

31Murphy,

"Acceptability Criteria," 284.
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Popper's methodology represented a decisive shift from
the logical positivists.

First, the claims of science, rather

than relying on the principle of verifiability for their
rational acceptance, would find such acceptance on the basis
of whether a theory could be falsified (i.e., whether one
could state in advance what will count as falsifyinq it).
Second, his theory of demarcation of science was not offered
as a theory of meaning.

The statements that did not count as

science were not considered as nonsense in the way that was
true for the loqical positivists.

Murphy notes a further

quality of Popper's theory that had a siqnificant role in the
shift to probable reasoning:
A second important change was in the data: Popper's basic
statements were reports of repeatable experiments or
observations rather than the philosopher's sense data.
Such reports are not incorrigible; if called into question
they can always be tested by attempts to falsify further
observable consequences drawn from them. Here we see the
beginning of the end of the loqical positivists'
foundationalism in that science is no longer seen to rest
on an indubitable foundation. 32
We see with Popper, then, the beginnings of what would come to
be understood as a post-positivistic theory of scientific
knowledge.

Carl Hempel, another scientist within the ranks of

the neopositivists, sought a deductive connection between
theory and observation.

Statements describing observations

were to be tested by initial hypotheses and auxiliary
hypotheses which would ultimately confirm the connection
between theory and data.

The hypothesis (a law or theory), as

32Murphy, Theology, 54.
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Murphy notes, "is then tested by the deduction of further
observable consequences fro. it, which, if borne out by
experiment or observation, are taken to confirm the
hypothesis.

Likewise, when a consequence is not borne out,

the theory is disconfirmed.,,33
Neopositivism was seen to be the system which would
show that science was subject to cumulative growth and the
objective testing of all its assertions.

But with the advent

of philosophers of science such as Paul Feyerabend and Thomas
Kuhn, the neopositivist notion of progress in science was
challenged.

Both Feyerabend and Kuhn pointed out that science

does not follow the simple process that Popper projected. 34
As Murphy correctly points out, Kuhn's major contribution was
"to show the dependence of theory choice in science on factors
other than observation and loqic."35

Kuhn argued that,

rather than the succesive accumUlation of knowledge, the
history of science could be seen as a succession of paradigms.
While the term clearly carries much broader conceptual notions
for understanding a number of theories and data, "paradigm" is
33 I bid., 55.
34See Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New
Left Books, 1975); and Thomas Kuhn, The structure of
Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970).
35Murphy, Theology, 56. See also, Kuhn, The Structure
of scientific Revolutions, 92-110; and Kuhn's "Objectivity,
Value Judgment, and Theory Choice," in The Essential Tension
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977),
320-39.
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often used synonymously with the idea of a theory and refers
to the accepted examples of problem solutions in a qiven
field.

Each paradiqm has its own set of laws, theories,

applications, and instrumentation that are employed to
accommodate the solutions to puzzles particular to that qiven
paradiqm.

Those who work within a qiven paradiqm are said to

share the same view of science and the same rules and
standards for scientific practice.

In Popper's view of

science, falsification was proposed as a method that would
replace verificationism.

But the standard criticism aqainst

Popper's view was that the discordant data used to falsify a
theory were seldom seen to do just that.

Accepted theories

were rarely replaced in the absence of an alternative theory.
Science typically viewed the discordant data as falsifyinq the
auxiliary assumptions used to support the primary theory.36
These auxiliary assumptions were subsequently subjected to
modification without affectinq the accepted theory.
Kuhn's point was to arque that science progresses by
radical shifts between paradiqms. It is the paradiqm as a
whole--with all its standard rules, puzzles, solutions, and
associated theories--that scientists accept at any qiven time.
The data and observations up for review are always interpreted
in terms of a qiven paradiqmatic worldview.

Kuhn asserted

that there are no theory-independant data; all data are
36For a qood analysis and interaction with Kuhn's
oriqinal thesis, see Ian Barbour, Myth, Models and paradigms
(New York and London: Harper & RoW, 1974), 93-124.
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interpreted in light of a given paradigm.

Furthermore, since

these paradigms control how one interprets data, as well as
the standards and rules that are used in experimenting with
the data, Kuhn argued that rival paradigms are
incommensurable.

The critical factor in Kuhn's reasoning

comes at the point in which he asserts that there are no
independent data that provide scientists with the ability to
arbitrate between competing paradigms.

It is to this notion

of science that Lakatos was responding.

In Murphy's analysis,

Lakatos's view of scientific rationality is one in which it is
necessary to specify the criterion for choice between
competing research programs. 37

In Kuhn's view, a paradigm

is chosen for any number of reasons.

The typical choice of a

paradigm is based on its problem-solving ability.

One

paradigm may be better equipped to solve the anomalies that
led its competitor into crisis.

Other reasons for paradigm

choice could be based on simplicity or accuracy of empirical
fit.

What is essential to understand from the Lakatosian

perspective is that, unlike the methods suggested by Popper
and Hempel, once a paradigm is accepted, its basic laws and
theories are not subjected to testing by falsification or by
further hypotheses; they are simply assumed and used for
solving the various problems encountered by the paradigm.
Kuhn's thesis has a direct impact on Lakatos's
scientific research programs in that Kuhn's ideas represent,
37Murphy, Theology,

59.
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as Murphy states it, "the total replacement of foundationalism
with a holistic view of science."38

To accept a paradigm is

to accept, for a variety of reasons, all at once the complete
and unquestioned worldview of that paradigm.

only when its

problem-solving ability appears to be outweighed by a qrowing
number of anomalies is the paradiqm open for replacement.

The

upshot of Kuhn's analysis is that the reasons behind
revolutions in science (i.e., radical paradiqm shifts) have
little or nothing to do with a normative method of chanqe. 39
There is no identifiable method of rationality that accounts
for revolutions in science (i.e., there seems to be no way of
accounting for why one chooses one theory over another, given
the normal practice of science).

One of the central tenets of

Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions is that the
scientific community could not speak in terms of the kinds of
theories that ought to be accepted; rather it could speak only
in terms of those theories which have ultimately surfaced
through the history of science as being the champions of a
particular problem-solving quest.

What is now necessary to

bring post-positivism into full bloom is a system which
38 I bid., 57.
39This is the same criticism Murphy states of stephen
Toulmin's analysis of the history of science. Although he is
able to describe why various changes took place in science
(similar to Kuhn's thesis), he is not able to propose a
normative methodoloqy for science. See Toulmin's Foresight and
Understanding (New York: Harper & Row, 1961). Murphy's point
is to demonstrate that Lakatos takes the necessary steps in
such a direction (Theology, 56-58).
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purports to account for the rational features that underlie
the construction and acceptance of scientific theories.
Murphy proposes that this is found in the work of Imre
Lakatos.
Modern verses Postmodern Conceptions
of Rationa~ity

Murphy proposes that rational theorizing in theology
take on a new collaborative effort with science, one that
concerns itself with the extent to which an epistemology
adequate for science should approximate an epistemology
suitable for reliqious epistemoloqy.40

At the center of

this discussion is Murphy's contention that philosophers of
reliqion can (and should) employ a system of rationality which
offers the kind of evidence that could count as the data for a
scientific theoloqy.41

Inherent in this method is the

conviction that any form of foundationalism must be replaced
by a system of epistemological holism. 42

This holism is

based in part on the notion that no clear distinctions can be
drawn between the basic and nonbasic beliefs so characteristic
40See, for example, Nancey Murphy, "Philosophical
Resources for Postmodern Evanqelical Theology," Christian
Scholar's Review 26, no. 2 (1996): 184-205.
41Murphy, 'l'heology,

xii.

42This, as we will see, involves her three-part system
of (a) the rejection of all forms of foundationalism; (b) the
rejection of referentialism in lanquaqe; and (c) the
SUbstitution of community in place of individual atomism in
theistic theorizinq. It also involves her notion of
tentativeness, fallibilism, or probable reasoninq, including
her notion that truth is what is insurpassable.

45

of foundationalism. 43

There are no beliefs Corset of

beliefs) that have a privileged epistemic status (or
self-justifying starting points) that is rationally coercive
on all reasonably attentive people.
The Problem With Foundationalism
Murphy's Lakatosian model of rationality for
theistic belief is a model which denies the adequacy of
foundationalist theories of knowledge.

Murphy arques that

both empirical and rational attempts at locating foundational
categories of beliefs to serve as justificaton for the rest of
knowledge have failed.

She states that there is a sort of

Murphy's Law working against the foundational
epistemologist: 44
Whenever one finds suitably indubitable beliefs to serve
as a foundation, they will always turn out to be useless
for justifying any interesting claims; beliefs that are
useful for justifying other claims will always turn out
not to be indubitable, and in fact will be found to be
dependent upon the structure they are intended to
justify.45
We can see this playing itself out by taking a brief look at
the inner logic of empiricist foundational ism.

The modern

empiricists tended to recognize that ordinary reports about
what one perceives are corrigible.

So the way to recover

certitude in synthetic claims was to make claims about one's
43 I bid., 194.
44In its most fundamental form, Murphy's Law states
that "whatever can go wrong will."
45Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & FUndamentalism, 90.

46

perceptions themselves.

The

~ediate

mental objects of

perception became one's "sense-data," and this was what served
as the true foundation for empirical knowledge.

It's not so

much that one "sees a brown doq," but rather, it's that one
"seems to be seeing a brown doq."

What was incorrigible was

the claim of one's sense-data, because it was thought that
there was no imaginable way in which they could be overridden
or corrected.

Sense-data were thought to be indubitable. 46

The problem with this, argues Murphy, was that the
gain in certitude of the foundation was offset by the problem
of how to use appearance-statements to justify c1aims about a
real, objective world.

The deliverances of certainty along

these lines were too harsh, and as a result, there was a shift
(especially among philosophers of science, such a Karl Popper)
to focus attention on ordinary scientific facts.

The upshot

of this was that Popper and others recognized "both that the
facts themselves could be called into question and that the
structure of scientific theory restinq on these 'piles' was
only probable."47

Empiricist foundationalism reached its

end, argues Murphy, when it became a generally accepted notion
within the philosophy of science that scientific facts are
theory-laden.

And further, it is not just scientific facts

that are dependent upon theoretical interpretation, as Kuhn
46 I bid., 90.
47I bid., 91. See also, Karl Popper, The Logic of
Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper, 1965); trans. Popper
et ale of Logik dar Forschung (Vienna, 1935).
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argued, but it is also true with respect to the construction
of the experimental apparatus used to make our observations of
the world (e.g., the construction of an electron microscope
and interpretation of the images i t produces).48
The quest for rationalist foundations, says Murphy,
does no better in offering us certitude about our beliefs.
with respect to Descartes' so-called foundational beliefs
(i.e., his "clear and distinct ideas"), what turns out to be
indubitable in one intellectual context is rather questionable
in another.

Murphy thinks, as she arqued in the case of

empiricist foundations, there is a tradeoff between utility
for justifying important claims and indubitability.

So when

Descartes arqued (e.g., in the premise to his arqument for the
existence of God) that there is at least as much reality in
the efficient and total cause as in the effect, Murphy points
out that it is not only difficult to understand what this
means but there is also no way of knowing that it must be
true.

His questionable premise does not offer us certitude,

even if i t is useful in his arqument for the existence of God.
On the other hand, Descartes' cogito ergo sum (HI think,
therefore I am") does have foundational certitude, but without
proof of God's existence (and the quarantee it provides for
the veracity of sense experience), there is no way to arque
48I bid. See also, N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery
(cambridge: Cambridqe University Press, 1958). Cf., Thomas
Kuhn's, The structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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from Descartes' inner thoughts to the existence of an external
world. 49
other efforts at certitude suffer from the same kinds
of difficulties.

Immanuel Kant's nsynthetic a priori

knowledge n may have been useful in giving us a distinction
between empirical knowledge and some other kind of knowledge
not dependent upon experience, but there has been no consensus
about how to define this other kind of knowledge.
Philosophers recognize as unsuccessful the attempts that have
been made to arque that formal systems, such as logic or
mathematics are examples of synthetic a priori knowledge; the
deductive consequences of such systems, while necessarily
true, are not necessarily true of anything in the world.

That

is, when we attempt to apply them to reality (e.g., using a
system of geometry for navigation in space), the calculations
are not always reliable or certain. 50
For reasons like these and others, Murphy arques that
we should abandon the foundationalist structure of the
justification of beliefs (including theistic belief) and
replace it with a new model that will more adequately
represent the way we come to have rational beliefs.

Murphy

thinks that theistic theorizing along foundationalist lines
parallels problems of the saae kind of theorizing in science
and philosophy.
49 Murphy,

SOIbid.

She claims, for example, that when

Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism, 92.
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conservative theists "were forced to admit that the biblical
texts contained contradictions, a common move was to argue
that only the oriqinal autoqraphs were inerrant."51

She

further writes:
This claim is incorriqible (since all of these are lost)
but the incorriqiblity comes at the cost of needinq to
ground theoloqy on somethinq inaccessible to contemporary
theologians; the lost autographs are inerrant but useless.
This parallels the empiricists' move to (inaccessible)
sense-data in the observer's mind. And parallel to the
recognition of the theory-ladenness of scientific data is
the recoqnition of the theory-ladenness of biblical
interpretations--the hermeneutic circle. 52
Furthermore, the problem of incorriqibility of theistic belief
on the basis of ordinary religious experience is that we have
no consensus in terms of what this inner experience is.

If

theists attempt to correct this problem by paralleling Popper
and the other neo-positivists (i.e., to recognize ordinary but
fallible experience as the foundation), we have yet another
problem parallel to that of the ordinary theory-ladenness of
scientific data.

Different religious communities will tend to

choose their criteria accordinq to their previously accepted
theories. 53
A Nonfoundational Holism
Murphy's answer to the problems of foundationalism is
found in part in

w.

V.

51 I bid., 93.
52Ibid.
53 I bid., 93-4.

o. Quine's holistic theory of

50

knowledge. 54

The holistic theory differs from

foundationalism in at least two respects: First, there is no
requirement for intrisically indubitable (unrevisable)
beliefs.

On a holistic account, there is no sharp distinction

among types of beliefs (i.e., there are no self-justifying
basic beliefs upon which all other non-basic beliefs depend).
Beliefs differ only in terms of degrees, that is, how far
removed a belief is from the boundary of experience.

Second,

in contrast to foundational ism (in which the direction of
rational assent is one that only moves up from the
foundational basic beliefs), holism has no preferred direction
of reasoning.

The reasoning picture of holism is one in which

there are many different kinds of connections among beliefs in
the web.

There are those of strict logical implication, but

there are also weaker probabilistic arguments.

Some arguments

move forward to further conclusions, while other arguments may
move "backward" to presuppositions.
According to Murphy, the holistic approach allows one
to take into account the notion that "the data (scientific
facts, interpretations of texts, or whatever) are
theory-laden, partially dependent on theoretical
knowledge. "55

This is different from some of the

54 see , for example, Willard V. o. Quine, "Two Dogmas
of Empiricism," Philosophical Review 40 (1951): 20-43; and
Willard Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, 2d ed.
(New York: Random House, 1978).
5S Murphy,

Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism, 94.
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neo-positivists' notions that all of our data are
theory-dependent.

This kind of distinction goes a long way

in showing the difference in justification between
foundationalist and holistic accounts of knowledge.

In

holism, each belief is supported by its connection to other
beliefs in the web and, ultimately, to the whole.

This means,

according to Murphy, that -justification consists in showing
that problematic beliefs are closely tied to beliefs that we
have no good reason to call into question.

So the coherence

of the web is crucial for justification. n56
The implication for justification is that when
inconsistencies arise (i.e., conflicts within the web of our
beliefs or with anomalies in our experience) there are many
ways to revise our theories or beliefs in order to restore
consistency.

Murphy admits that our choices at this point

will be somewhat pragmatic, since the objective is to mend the
web with as little disturbance to the whole as possible.

But

there is a sense in which the cognizer thinks that some
beliefs, such as the laws of logic are held immune from
revision, nexcept under the most extreme pressure from the
experiential boundary, since, with their central location, to
change them would necessitate changes throughout the web. n57
56Ibid.
57Ibid.
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This, of course, seems to be the crux of the matter,
since Murphy seems to realize that the criteria one uses on a
holistic account to restore consistency in the web are
pragmatic.

As we will see in chapter five, the model of

rationality we will propose as a more adequate approach will
suggest that a moderate (or fallibilist) foundationalism,
together with a criterion for justification which accounts for
an appropriate amount of the right kind, amount, and quality
of evidence, is sufficient for adjudicating rationally among
competing theories or beliefs.
To be sure, there are problems even within holism.
For example, notes Murphy, "we can imagine, alongside our own
web, a variety of competing webs, and the question then arises
how to chose among them." S8
this point?

How do we avoid relativism at

She argues that Quine is not too concerned with

the potential problem of relativism, since, on his model, the
web of beliefs takes account of the whole of knowledge.

This

means that i t is always possible in theory to gradually alter
the whole, but it is impossible to imagine replacing the
entire web at once.

But Quine's version of holism, argues

Murphy, was conceptualized in a context where it was thought
that we have a fairly circumscibed view of what counts as
knowledge.

As Kuhn has argued, basic conceptions of science,

logic, and our everyday knowledge of the sensible world, have
been challeged by a proliferation of radically different
S8rbid., 98.
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paradigms (conceptual theories) that are evaluated and
replaced as a whole.

And furthermore, the theoretical

elements of a paradigm help determine what will count as facts
(i.e., there are no theory-neutral data).59

The Lakatosian Methodology:
specifying the criterion
Lakatos' methodology, as Murphy indicates, was in
direct response to the problem of relativism in the systems of
Quine, Kuhn, and popper. 60

The concern was to provide a

criterion for rational choice that qets us beyond Kuhn's
notion that paradigms involve their own standards of success.
Kuhn arqued that whatever standards are universal to science
(consistency, empirical fit, fruitfulness) are "insufficient
to determine the choice amonq competinq paradiqms."61

And

while Popper's proqram of falsification was thouqht to be
essentially correct in Lakatos' thinkinq, he did want to
temper Popper's program with Kuhn's insiqhts of the
59 I bid., 99.
6~urphy,

"Acceptability criteria," 284.

61Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 52.
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theory-Iadeness of paradiqms.62

Lakatos argued that,

despite the notion that there are no theory-independent data
and that standards for qood scientific research are
paradiqm-dependent, one can judqe rationally between competinq
paradiqms.

It is Murphy's contention that Lakatos provided

science with a rational structure by specifyinq a criterion of
choice between competinq research programs.

This means that

research programs will always involve a set of theories and a
body of data.

Accordinq to Murphy's description of Lakatos's

methodology, a research program is structured by the followinq
features:
1.

it includes a set of theories and a body of data;

2.

one theory, the "hard core," is central to the proqram;

3.

conjoined to the core is a set of auxiliary hypotheses
that toqether add enouqh information to allow the data to
be related to the theory;

4.

types of auxiliary hypotheses are (a) theories of
observation or of instrumentation and (b) lower-level
theories that apply to the core theory in different kinds
of cases; and further,

5.

the auxiliary hypotheses form a "protective belt around
the hard core since they are desiqned to be modified when
potentially falsifyinq data are found. 63

62Murphy, "Acceptability Criteria," 285. See also,
Murphy'S Theology, 59; and Karl Popper, "Falsification and the
Methodology of Scientific Research Proqrammes," in The
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical
Papers, Volume 1, ed. John Worall and Greqory currie,
(Cambridge: Cambridqe University Press, 1978), 8-101.
63Murphy, Theology, 59. Cf. "Acceptability Criteria,"
285. See also, Imre Lakatos, Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge, ed. Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), 91-196.
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As Murphy explains it, then, a research program (Lakatos' term
for paradiqms) is a "temporally extended series of complex
theories whose core remains the same while auxiliary
hypotheses are successfully modified, replaced, or amplified
in order to account for problematic observations ... 64
Lakatos's contribution was to show that the history of
science is not the succession of paradigms of the Kuhnian
model, but one of competing research programs.

Briefly put,

some of these programs are described by Lakatos as
"progressive" and others as "degenerating."65

Degenerating

research programs are those in which the core theory is
salvaged by ad hoc modifications of the protective belt.
Lakatos indicates that we seem to have some notion of what
these ad hoc modifications are, but it is difficult to propose
criteria which could rule them out.
Murphy notes that the heart of Lakatos's methodology
is found in the procedures recognized as being scientifically
acceptable.

She further states that a research program is

said to be progressive when the following conditions are met:
(1) each new version of the theory (i.e., the core theory
along with its auxiliary hypotheses) preserves the unrefuted
content of the previous research programs with which it
competes; (2) each new theory has excess empirical content
over its predecessor; that is, it is able to predict some
64Murphy, Theology, 59.
65Murphy, AnglO-American Postmodernity, 52.
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novel, hitherto unexpected facts; and (3) some of these
predicted facts are in fact corroborated. 66

Since the goal

of Lakatos's methodology is both to provide a rational
criterion for choice between competing paradiqms and to
demonstrate the progressive nature of science, he states that
when the first and second conditions are met, a theory is said
to be theoretically progressive.

When all three of the

conditions are met, the theory is considered to be
progressive.

empirica~~y

It follows from this that a theory is

degenerating if it solves some of the initial anomalies of the
previous paradigm, but does not allow for prediction and
discovery of any novel facts. 67

So the choices we make are

among two or more competing series of theories, and the one
judged most rational is the one most progressive.

An additional feature of Lakatos's methodology is
found in his distinction between mature and immature science.
The research program of a mature science includes both a
negative and a positive heuristic, both of which are necessary
for the future development of the program.

These distinctions

are considered by Murphy to be significant advances over the
Kuhnian conception of theory choice in science.

For Kuhn, the

only avantage of immature science was its pre-paradigmatic
nature.

The goal in this setting was to focus on adopting a

paradigm in order to get on with serious research.
6~urphy, Theo~ogy,

67Ibid., 59-60.

59.

For

57

Lakatos, however, both mature and immature science are
characterized by a negative heuristic.

This negative

heuristic is related to the auxiliary hypotheses and simply
represents the methodological rules by which they protect the
hard core from falsification; that is, the falsification is
directed against the auxiliary hypotheses for which suitable
modifications can be made.

This t.plies that there is a bard

core set of beliefs or theories of which either one could be
unaware, could assume without question, or could be treated as
if they are irrefutable. 68
The positive heuristic is also connected to the
auxiliary hypotheses, only in this instance the auxiliary
hypotheses are developed according to a preconceived plan.
Lakatos describes the positive heuristic as "a partially
articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change,
develop the 'refutable variants' of the research-programme,
how to modify, sophisticate, the 'refutable' protective
belt. 1169

The positive heuristic may face further

modifications and variations, but it does not take place in
the random and unplanned fashion thought to be the case with
respect to the auxiliary hypotheses of immature science.

The

essential function of the positive heuristic is the
68 J • Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in
Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans,
1997), 81.

69Lakatos, "Falsification," 50. See also, Murphy,
Theology, 60.
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strengthening of the protective belt (the auxiliary
hypotheses) that shields the hard core theory from
falsification.
The value of Lakatos's theory of scientific research
programs, according to Murphy, is that it provides a
methodology that is applicable to theorizing in theism.

It is

a way in which theistic claims to rationality can be in
keeping with the standards of rationality for science.

That

is, in Lakatos's analysis, we have science at any point in
which "there is a series of theories whose empirical content
(sometimes) increases as the auxiliary hypotheses are modified
to avoid falsification."70

FUrthermore, mature theories are

those in which the content-increasing modifications take place
according to a preconceived plan.

So there is said to be an

objective reason for choosing one program over another "when
the former has a more progressive record than its rival--that
is, a greater demonstrated ability to anticipate novel
facts." 7l
Murphy thinks that Lakatos's criterion helps answer
the problem of relativism in two ways: First, Lakatos claims
that research programs (conceptual theories) need to be
evaluated in terms of how they change over time.

The data

offered in support of a theory (or belief) do not provide us
with enough information for choice if they are only considered
70Murphy, Theology, 60.
7lI bid., 60-60.
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at some temporal cross-section of a theory's history.
Empirical progress is an intrisically historical approach.
Murphy thinks that this temporal dimension of Lakatos' program
is absolutely essential for any model of rationality that
begins with a holistic account of justification of individual
beliefs and then goes on to answer how one justifies an entire
web of beliefs (one's theory or paradigm).72
Second, in Lakatos's methodology, each research
program involves a series of a temporal succession of
theories, and each has a relatively slight modification over
its predecessor.

If the program is progressive, then each new

theory is better than its predecessor (i.e., it has more
empirical content than the previous theory, apart from some ad
hoc hypotheses to account for it).

Some of this excess

content is ultimately corroborated (i.e., it accounts for
novel facts), and this is what amounts to the criterion for
rational choice among competing theories and beliefs.

In

terms of its application to theistic theories or beliefs, one
must not only have access to the range of religious experience
but one must also be able to formulate criteria for correctly
identifying valid and reliable knowledge claims for theism.
For example, one of the more pressing problems in the search
for suitable data is to "finds ways to distinguish data that
72Murphy, Anglo-American postmodernity, 53.
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have a bearing on the nature of God and those that bear only
on the psychology or history of religion."73
Crucial to this program for Murphy is the thoroughly
postmodern idea of communal discernment as the most typical of
religious practices.

While it is difficult to see how her

system succeeds in avoiding referentiality in language and
correspondence in truth, Murphy argues that suitable data for
theistic theories or claims are "constructed" out of what is
thought to be a consensus on the activity of God in observable
events in the life of the church.

Other crucial data for

theology could include scriptural texts, historical facts,
sociological and anthropological data, and possibly facts from
the natural sciences. 74

So it is the event of communal

consensus in which the useful data for theology resides.

The

construction of claims about God's activity in the human life
on the basis of communal consensus (i.e., discernment) is what
Murphy refers to as a Christian epistemic practice (i.e., the
justified data of theology).

Still other criteria for what

counts as the data of the experience of communal consensus
includes the following:
witness,

(1) agreement with the apostolic

(2) evidence of a Christ-like character (i.e.,

freedom from sin, fruits of the Spirit, etc.), and (3)
consensus of the community based on prayerful discussion.
73van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist
Theology, 82.
74Murphy, Theology, 130.
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When such criteria are .et, it can be recognized with
reasonable certainty that such activities represent authentic
works of the Spirit, and so theology can proceed to claim it
as data for theological research programs.
But it is an appeal to these kind of data that
represents one of the .ore powerful challenqes for Murphy's
proposal.

As van Huyssteen points out, -if her qoal is to

meet the challenqe of probable reasoninq, then not only her
Lakatosian methodoloqy, but also the data that feed into it,
must conform to scientific epistemic practices. lt7S

If the

purpose is to offer a rational alternative to foundationalist
forms of the rational justification of beliefs, then it is
precisely an appeal to these kind of data that is in doubt.
These choices would seem to represent prior commitments on her
part (similar to foundationally basic belief), since it is
difficult to state her criteria for choice.

It seems that it

would be difficult to show that claims about God's activity in
the human life (i.e., the data for theoloqy) on the basis of
such discernments constitutes the criteria for rational
choice.

How could one rationally argue that such choices

conform to Lakatosian criteria for rational choice, rather
than the kinds of prior commitments that Murphy claims are so
characteristic of foundationalist evidentialism?

On this

basis, there is no reason why the propositions of scripture,
7S Van

Theology, 83.

Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist
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apostolic witness, and the authority of Christ should be
considered criteria for judgment, since Murphy has not
provided good reasons why such criteria constitute the data
for a Lakatosian methodology.
It would appear, then, that these criteria have their
epistemic foundation in a deeper and prior commitment.

But it

would seem that this is not at all commensurable with Murphy's
attempt at probable reasoning and at a holistic,
nonfoundational epistemology.76

Since her criteria for the

data of theology appears to rely on prior commitments (i.e.,
the authority of Scripture, the Spirit, etc.), theological
methodology turns out to be very different from the sciences.
This would imply that Murphy's system does not avoid the kind
of prior commitments identified with the foundationalist
systems of rationality she hopes to rep1ace.

The final

element to consider in the search for rational criteria, then,
has to do with the matter of truth.

This will help determine

the role of community consensus in locating valid data for
rational theistic claims.

Holism and Truth
Murphy argues that both the correspondence and
coherence thories of truth do not do justice to the truth
76 I bid., 83-84.
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claims made in science and theology.77

Murphy rejects the

correspondence theory in favor of what she defines as a
MacIntyrean unsurpassability theory.

Drawinq on Alasdair

MacIntyre's recent work in ethics and epistemology, Murphy
argues that her meaning for truth is one of unsurpassability,
a standpoint which suqqests that whatever is true will never
be shown to be inadequate in its central contentions. 7S

For

MacIntyre (whose notions of truth are applied to moral
traditions), a person's intelliqence is embodied and enqaqed
in the world; it cannot stand objectively removed from a
person's subjective preferences. 79

This beinq the case,

human judqments are 'true' only in a secondary sense.

Murphy

writes of MacIntyre's view:
Havinq an adequate qrasp of reality means beinq able to
say how thinqs are rather than how they seem to be from
some particular, partial, and limited standpoint; adequacy
is known by contrast with inadequacy. Enquiry aims at
77Nancey Murphy, "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword
Puzzles," Zygon 24, no. 3 (1989): 299. See also, J. Mouton and
J. C. Pauw, " Foundational ism and Fundamentalism: A Critique,"
in Paradigms and Progress in Theology, ed. J. Mouton, A. G.
van Aarde, and W. S. Voster (Pretoria, South Africa: Human
Sciences Research Council, 1988), 176-186.
7SSee Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity:
Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, and Ethics
(Boulder, Colo.: westview Press, 1997), 125. Cf., Alasdair
MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); and Idem, "Moral
Relativism, Truth, and Justification," in Noral Truth and
Moral Tradition: Essays in Bonor of Peter Geach and Elizabeth
Anscombe, ed. Luke Gormally (Blackrock, Ireland: Four Courts
Press, 1994), 6-24.
79MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 385. See also, Murphy,
Anglo-American Postmodernity, 123.
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transcendinq distortions and limitations; truth is teleos
of inquiry. 80
This gives the impression that MacIntyre's view is a sort of
realism, but what he means by "an intellect adequate to grasp
reality" is the suggestion that there are a variety of
dimensions of one's life that are said to conform to what is
real.

Truth is an intimate relation between knowing and

engaging in social practices.
On MacIntyre's account, we can know which theory is
true (ontologically) through the awareness of whether one's
account of reality conforms to existing traditions and social
practices that (a) either solve problems that their
predecessors could not solve (including an explanation for why
those previous systems could not solve certain difficulties),
or (b) show that one's tradition has the resources for
overcoming its own intellectual crises, while other existing
rival theories continue to meet with persistent and
intractable problems relative to their particular cases. 8l
This approach, as we will see, also gives insight to the
epistemological problem of the justification of a belief or
theory on evidence.
In relying in part on MacIntyre's views, Murphy wants
to emphasize the nature of truth in terms of the role it plays
8~urphy, Anglo-American Postmoderni ty,

123.

8lI bid., 124. Murphy states that the process under (a)
is what MacIntyre refers to as diachronic justification and
the process under (b) is understood as synchronic
justification.
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in pointinq out the radical discrepancies (particularly as it
is understood in the correspondence view) between our older
beliefs about thinqs in the world and the world as it is now
understood to be.

It is not difficult to see the Lakatosian

influence on her acceptance of MacIntyre's account.

MacIntyre

argues that it is a cognizer's recoqnition of a lack of
correspondence between what the mind previously judqed and
believed, and reality as it is now perceived, which makes
those earlier judgments and beliefs false.

Truth for one's

present mind-set (and the judgments which are its expression)
is to claim that this kind of inadequacy (or discrepancy) will
never appear in any possible future situation, reqardless of
what developments in rational inquiry may occur. 82

A

tradition, then, is true only if it proves to be a better
alternative than its live competitors for solvinq problems
relevant to that tradition.

One may even qo as far as to say

that it solves "the problems of rivals that cannot be solved
usinq the rival's own resources and, furthermore, is able to
explain why thinqs must have appeared as they did to its
predecessors and contemporary rivals from their more limited
or defective perspectives."8l
Murphy qoes on to distinguish between MacIntyre's
accounts of the meaninq of truth (i.e, an adequate qrasp of
82Maclntyre, "Moral Relativism," 356-358; as quoted in
Murphy, Anglo-American Postemodernity, 124.
83Murphy,

Anglo-American Postmodernity, 125.

66

reality) and of the criteria for vindicatinq truth claims.
While she is apprehensive of MacIntyre's notion of meaning,
she looks more favorably on his arguments for the criteria for
truth.

Murphy argues that an ontoloqical conception of truth

as correspondence is inadequate for a nonfoundational model of
rationality. 84

She differs with MacIntyre's meaninq of

truth as adequatio intellectus ad rem (i.e., havinq an
adequate qrasp of reality), insistinq that it fails on the
qrounds that "excerpted from the corpus of his work, it is
sure to be misunderstood; it may be • • • translated into a
modern correspondence theory with an associated modern
realism ... 85

Murphy further explains:

However, I believe his account of the criteria for
vindicatinq the truth of claims of traditions or rival
standpoints can be readily appropriated and applied to the
problem of adjudicatinq between rival theoloqical or
reliqious traditions. I propose, then, that when we claim
for a reliqious standpoint that it is true, we mean to say
that in its central contentions it will never be shown to
be inadequate in any future situation no matter what
developments in rational enquiry may occur. • • • The
criterion for makinq such a bold claim is survival of the
sort of dialectical questioninq of the standpoint in
relation to its rivals that MacIntyre has so eloquently
descr ibed. 86

84Ibid., 118. Like most epistemic systems concerned
with the possibility of makinq truth claims for theism, Murphy
attempts a distinction between a definition of what it means
to say that a thinq is true (alonq with what she believes is
consistent with a nonfoundational model of rationality) and
criteria for judqinq whether a qiven claim is in fact true.
85Ibid., 125.
86 I bid.
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Thus, the meaning of truth is that of unsurpassability, and
her criteria for determininq whether a particular theory is in
fact unsurpassable is its ability to stand aqainst its rivals
in terms of its problem-solvinq task.

Murphy, in makinq these

distinctions, believes she has provided an adequate theory of
truth in which to employ MacIntyre's account of the criteria
for vindicatinq the truth claims of traditions.
Murphy confidently admits that MacIntyre's criterion
for adjudicatinq between rival traditions does little to
satisfy those who are committed to the corresponence theory of
truth.

But she qoes on to urqe us that with some additional

steps to MacIntyre's account, the correspondence theory may be
rejected in favor of her idea of unsurpassability.

And while

her comments are directed specifically toward the matter of
adjudicatinq between rival scientific, philosophical, and
theological traditions, I believe her essential remarks
concerning MacIntyre's criteria for vindicating the truth
claims of rival traditions has application to the rationality
of theistic beliefs and the claims to truth that so naturally
surface out of theorizinq in general. 87
Briefly put, if we qrant for the sake of the arqument
that the correspondence view qives us an account of the
meaning of truth, then our next concern, arques Murphy, has to
87 See Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism, and
Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 128; and
David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2d ed. (Chicaqo:
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 40-41.
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do with the criteria for truth.

Simple assertions about

observable states of affairs might satisfy us with saying that
a statement in some way pictures or represents the way things
are.

For example, liThe cat is on the mat" is true i f f the cat

to which we refer is indeed on (not under or beside) the mat
to which we refer.

But Murphy argues that such notions are

inadequate when we ask for criteria for truth claims regarding
entire traditions.

This is where she believes MacIntyre's

account of the criteria proves useful.

She writes:

For here we are not concerned with individual sentences in
a context where language and epistemology can be taken for
granted. Rather, we are concerned with the whole system
of concepts, epistemological and metaphysical theories,
and even "local" theories of truth!
But this concern on Murphy's part appears to confuse the
ontological question of the meaning of truth with the
epistemological matter of determining whether a given theory,
tradition, or statement is true.

One cannot automatically

rule out a correspondence notion of truth simply because it is
difficult to determine epistemologically whether or not
certain conditions have indeed been satisfied. SS

Murphy

seems to imply that the ontological conditions that make our
common assertions of empirical matters true somehow change
when we go on to justify or verify the truthfulness of entire
traditions.

But she has provided no good reasons for

concluding as such.
S8 Feinberq,

"Truth," 4-5.
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Murphy responds to this challeqe by statinq that, if
what MacIntyre . .ADS by what she calls truth as
unsurpassability is some form of correspondence, then we have
no qrounds for "assuming that passinq MacIntyre's tests
ensures that a tradition's beliefs and concepts adequately
correspond to reality or correspond better than the rejected
rivals."a9

The primary reason for this is because there is

no definitional connection between such justification (i.e, a
theory's ability to solve problems and stand aqainst its
rivals) and correspondence.

Nor can one appeal to a weaker

experiential connection, since this would imply some sort of
direct insiqht into the nature of reality.

Our tendency in

such a case would be to compare reality itself with our
preconceived ways of looking at it and talkinq about it. 90
She writes:
The criterion (unsurpassed so far) provides the best
possible evidence for truth (will remain unsurpassed), and
furthermore, the criterion bas a reasonable (conceptual)
connection with the meaninq of truth. The criterion
falls short of a necessary and sufficient condition for
truth--trutb claims are fallible, as are all other claims.
However, this is just what we should bave expected; it
should not be possible to have a biqher deqree of
~~~!~~~il reqarding the truth of'S is true' than of S
What is critical from Murphy's point of view is that her
MacIntyrean approach ensures that, should we conclude at some
a9 Murp hy, 127.
90 I bid.
91Ibid., 128.
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future date that we had been mistaken about a truth claim, it
will be the result of havinq developed better concepts or
theories (assuming that the previous systems were inadequate
for solving their anomalies), not the result of a
correspondence comparison of any sort between the old
conceptions and "reality" itself. 92
Murphy argues that in the best of cases, "one can
claim only that a qiven tradition at a qiven staqe of its
development is the best so far."93

But how does this sit

with those who are used to making absolute claims to truth and
would arque that Murphy's position is in fact relativistic?
Murphy arques that the objection can be reasonably met by
pointinq out that absolutism and relativism do not have to be
viewed as dichotomous positions.

They may be better viewed as

limits on a range of possible positions regarding the

decidability of truth claims.

Our only real option is "to

consider theorists' relative positions on the scale of
possiblities in between."94

Assessment of Murphy's Hodel
of Rationality
It may be arqued that the positive features of
Murphy's proqram are not unique to the postmodern paradiqm
(i.e., such features are clearly present in foundationalist
92 I

bid.

93 I bid.
94 I bid.
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models other than classical foundational ism) , and as such,
they may represent still useful features for a rational
epistemology for theistic belief.

In one sense, it may be

argued that she has not entirely jettisoned the epistemic
features of modernity.

(1) Murphy clearly does not accept

extreme forms of relativism in truth; (2) her position is a
conscious effort to avoid fideis. by arguinq that theistic
theories and beliefs should be based on an objectively
rational discipline; and (3) it calls for the justification of
truth-claims accordinq to the qoinq standards of rationality
in contemporary philosophy of science.
One major response to evidentialism has to do with the
rediscovery of the role of reliqious experience in theoloqical
reflection.

The break from Enliqhtenment standards of

evidential ism has caused some to increasingly depend on the
concept of reliqious experience.

But as van Huyssteen points

out, the greatest challenge for the nonfoundationalist,
however, is how to retrieve reliqious experience as a valid
methodological starting point for theoloqical reflection. 95
Such efforts seek to construct an imaginative approach to
theological reflection that begins with ordinary human
experience.
It may be legitimately arqued that Murphy's model of
rationality does in fact espouse a certain degree of epistemic
95 wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundatjona~ist
Theology, 74.
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relativism.

Although she intractably denies that her position

warrants this conclusion, such relativism comes as a logical
outgrowth of the nonfoundationalism she attempts to employ in
suggesting that theoloqy follow Lakatos' scientific model of
rationality.

Murphy writes:

It must be noted, however, that the theological
methodology proposed here, while providing a counter
to total relativism, offers no absolutist view of
rationality, even within our (loosely) empiricist
worldview. There is no instant rationality in science
or theoloqy.96
Theorizing in theism flows from an anti-authoritarian and
postfoundational epistemic program.

The data of such a

paradigm for theology illustrate its "counter to total
relativism" by selecting from the manifold of religious
experience those elements which claim to yield some form of
knowledge of God. 97
Although Murphy attempts a ncnfoundational theology by
seeing religious experience as the primary data for
theological research programs, her model of rationality lacks
a well-developed theory of experience.

Murphy is able to say

that experience provides some ground for theological belief
and its rationality (c.f., William Alston),9S but she is not
96Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific
Reasoning (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990),
207.

97Van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist
Theology, 82.
985ee , for example, William Alston, "The Autonomy of
Religious Experience," International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 31., nos. 2-3 (1992): 67-87; idem, Percieving God:
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able to say precisely in what manner this must take shape.

We

have only some subjective conviction that God is acting in our
lives, but no "objective" way of establishing this conviction,
or for justifying the claim.

Since the data of experience

(whether scientific or religious) always inevitably involve
interpretation, Murphy has no objective way of establishing
the epistemic reliability of communal discernments and of
justifying one's conceptual frameworks.
Furthermore, as Van Huyssteen indicates, it would seem
that one can hardly compare the replicable process of
Christian discernment or community consensus with the
disciplined control of the scientific experimental context.
In fact, Van Huyssteen's form of relativism would appear to
argue against Murphy's approach, contending that such a
process, at best, demonstrates that both scientific and
theological facts are theory-laden, that they function within
the context of traditioned experience (a la Kuhn), and that
"degrees of objectivity" exist and are always cu1turally
bound. 99

Such an epistemology works against a concept of

objectivity in theorizing which argues that, whi1e our
conceptual frameworks do influence our interpretation of the
The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, New York and
London: Cornell University Press, 1991); and idem, "Religious
Experience as a Ground of Religious Belief," in Religious
Experience and Religious Belief: Essays in the Epistemology of
Religion, ed. Joseph Runzo and Craig K. Ihara (Lanham, Md.:
University Pres of America), 31-51.
99 Van Huyssteen, 85.
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data, we are not so theory-laden as to never qet beyond our
conceptual frameworks to see the data objectively.
Murphy admits that, while Christian discernment and
communal consensus may meet all the standard requirements of
scientific data, they will not be of the same quality
(reliability, replicability) as those of the natural sciences.
And since qood reasoning is said by Murphy only to riqhtfully
surface out of a Lakatosian methodology of probable reasoninq
within the data of hard core theories, unless the truth-claims
of theoloqy can be shown to adhere exactly to Lakatos' hard
core theory, one can not even be sure that that the data of
theoloqy are even probable. 100

But as Van Huyssteen has

suqqested, theological programs, in contrast to Murphy's
thesis, have been shown not to function at all like scientific
research programs.

Lakatos' criteria of relative empirical

progress could hardly be used to adjudicate between competinq
theoloqical theories.

Murphy never ultimately justifies her

thesis that the most empirically progressive theological
programs provide knowledqe of God and his revelation to the
world. 101
Murphy's admonitions aside, it would seem that, while
clearly fashionable from the postmodern context, her theory of
truth leaves us with serious reservations for the possibility
of any kind of truth claim.
lO~urphy, Theology,

lOlVan Huyssteen, 86.

In the first place, her
173.

75

epistemological procedures for the verification of truth
claims or traditions (the criteria) may be consistent with her
meaning of truth, but if the meaning of truth is understood as
unsurpassability, how could one ever state when such a
condition has been satisried?
unsurpassability look like?

What, exactly, does
And furthermore, from the

question of procedures for verification, it does not seem that
we could ever be in a position to know (with any reasonable
degree of certainty) that a given tradition or truth claim is
unsurpassable in the way that Murphy suggests.
Secondly, on her definition, a theoretical system or
simple truth claim is always passable in that claims to truth
are always fallible.

In this sense, it is difficult even to

know that one is moving in the direction of unsurpassability.
If claims to truth are always fallible, as Murphy suggests,
then we end up with a view of truth in which truth is a matter
of what is pragmatic or useful for solving problems from one's
perspective.

This assumes, of course, that we never really

get beyond our cultural, linguistic, and conceptual biases,
and if this is the case (and there is no good reason to

thii~

that it is), then in what sense can we speak of truth in terms
of a condition that remains unsurpassed?
Murphy's position raises the further question of what
it means to say that a claim is fallible.

If what makes a

truth claim fallible (i.e., possibly shown to be false at some
later point) is that it fails to satisfy some condition other
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than one of correspondence (i.e., one's proposition or theory
about a certain state of affairs does not in fact describe
conditions in the world), then in what sense is it fallible
and able to be surpassed?

To simply say that it does not

adequately solve problems is a vague answer, since, apart from
a correspondence notion, it would seem that what counts as a
problem (and why it should count) aaounts to little aore than
a personal construct designed to satisfy one's pragmatic
conceptions of what theories (or truth claims) should or
should not do.
The point to be made here is that Murphy mistakenly
employs epistemological procedures (one of being unsurpassed
so far)

in order to determine the ontological condition of

truth as unsurpassability.

This can be readily seen in her

notion that 'truth' is the condition of a claim that is
unsurpassable in its "central contentions."

While she

attempts to identify what the central contentions of a truth
claim or tradition might be, once again, if it is not
understood from a correspondence sense, it is difficult to
state what conditions a claim that is unsurpassable must
satisfy.

For Murphy, the answer to this question is that such

a claim must be open to being falsified at some future point.
But this amounts to an epistemological matter rather than a
definition for the ontological status of truth.
Equally problematic is the question of the kind and
degree of evidence that would be required to show that a claim
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or tradition is in fact unsurpassable.

Since Murphy's

ontoloqical notion of truth (i.e., what truth is) ultimately
ends up relyinq on her idea of the criteria and procedures for
determininq truth (i.e., how we know when a particular claim
or tradition is in fact true), it would seem that one could
never be in a position to know that enouqh evidence has been
produced to

say that a qiven system satisfies the condition

of unsurpassability.

It seems obvious that no person (or

community) is in a position to have exhaustive knowledqe of
the relevant data, or to know which data are relevant for
determininq whether a qiven system is in fact unsurpassable.
Murphys's idea of truth is inextricably connected to her
criteria for epistemic verification.

Thus, in the final

analysis, her ontoloqical condition for truth ultimately
reduces to an epistemological criterion in keepinq with her
postmodern theory that truth is more a matter of what i t takes
to solve theoretical anomalies than an ontoloqical reality to
which we have theory-independent access (and can know in most
cases that we do in fact adequately access it).

It must be

stated that Murphy's requirement for certainty in the quest
for truth is misplaced.

As we will see on our proposed model

of rationality in chapter five, the matter of the truth and
certainty of a claim has to do with the kind, quality, and
deqree of evidence one has for a qiven belief.

This is to be

distinquished from the kind of unobtainable certainty that
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Murphy warns is so indicative of most foundationalist systems
of evidentialism.
Van Huyssteen argues that Murphy's holistic
epistemology implies more than simple communal discernment and
communal consensus for contemporary theoloqical reflection.
There are foundationalist elements.

While Murphy appears to

disarm all forms of foundationalism in her central argument,
her designation of the presupposed existence of God as the
"hard core" for a theological research proqram (A la Lakatos)
and the added contention that this hard core will always
typically contain reference to God, raises the hermeneutical
problem of the metaphorical and epistemic function of
religious language.

In addition, her attempt at a distinction

between "hard core beliefs" and others that can be regarded as
auxiliary hypotheses in the context of a holistic postmodern
theology seems to suggest some degree of prior commitment to
certain beliefs or theories having a privileged status.

The

"hard core beliefs" of her Lakatosian model may, in fact, lead
to a subtle form of foundationalism.

And this goes against

her attempt at a form of rational nonrealism. 102
Murphy's holistic approach of current postmodern and
postfoundational thought, argues Van Huyssteen, can be revised
to make credible tentative claims through the epistemic access
we have through the metaphoric nature of human language.
Murphy, however, sees any attempt to define a relation between
l02 I

bid., 88.
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language and the world as a modern approach, rather than a
postmodern position where words like "real" or "exists" are
restricted to the meaning they obtain from being used within
certain linguistic frameworks.

In Van Huyssteen's approach to

critical realism (an approach that Murphy rejects as
attempting to salvage correspondence in truth and
referentialism in language), the epistemic purpose of
metaphorical language is not to transcend the world of human
experience, but rather to set limits to the range and scope of
our theological and scientific language.

As such, Van

Huyssteen argues that a weak form of critical realism (i.e.,
one that takes seriously the realist assumptions of the
Christian faith) claims that onels subjective encounter of the
world is of the same order as one's re-creation of the world
in language.

He argues that language is never seen as a

derivative of an "objective" world and so does not find truth
in a correspondence with such a world.

This, or course, does

not deny the existence of an extralinguistic world, but it is
an epistemic affirmation that this reality is mostly
encountered in language. I03
As Van Huyssteen further points out, it is possible
that Murphy's inclusion of God as the hard core of a
theological research program reveals the kind of prior
commitments if theistic claims are to reflect the criteria for
rational choice exhibited in scientific theories or claims.
l03 I bid.
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In the extreme form of Murphy's view, argues van Huyssteen,
religious beliefs may require no explanatory support and can
in the end be seen as just part of a groundless language-game.
But when theological beliefs, however, "become a species of
belief whose truth is 'discovered' only by means of criteria
internal to the language-game itself, this leads not only to a
relativistic understanding of justification, truth, and
language, but to an epistemological relativism which would be
fatal for the cognitive claims of theological
statements. "104
In the final analysis, it may be helpful to see that
Murphy's concept of justification (i.e., the criteria for
rational choice among theories and beliefs) relates closely to
her theory of truth and other notions.

Rather than

justification being a reason-based conception (as we will
argue on our model of rationality), it ends up being a
two-step process that may confuse methodological starting
points and basic statements of concepts.

First, from an

ideological (postmodern) perspective, Murphy begins with a set
of ideas about truth, knowledge, and justification (i.e.,
community consensus) that are simply concepts (i.e., in the
way of prior commitments).

Second, from a methodological

starting point (where she believes she is being postmodern in
her use of MacIntyre's notion of truth and Lakatos' scientific
104 I bid.,

89.
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model of rationality), it may be that she actually ends up
with foundational commitments that do not reflect a truly
non-foundational and postmodern methodology.

So while many of

her presuppositions of content are postmodern in nature (i.e.,
they state points of view that deny modern notions of truth,
knowledge, and language), she continues to uphold a method
ology (or rational approach) that is not thoroughly divested
of starting points in prior commitments, and as Van Huyssteen
contends, comes suspiciously close to a subtle form of
foundationalism. 10S
Murphy's arguments against foundational ism, for
example, may have more to do with the practical notion that no
set of ideas has a privileqed epistemic status.

But Van

Huyssteen has shown that much of her methodology does not qet
beyond certian foundationalist assumptions.

This does not

necessarily show that Murphy's conception of rationality is
wrong, but it does suggest that she accepts certain
postfoundational ideas without offering a truly
post-foundational methodology for arrivinq at those ideas.
This would further suqgest that her system may not be a truly
postfoundational epistemology.

Perhaps one response to this

is, given Murphy's arguments, one need not rule out in advance
the possibility of a rationality model that follows some form
of foundational ism.

Furthermore, an adequate model of

lOSWentzel van Huyssteen, Postfoundationalist Theology
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998),

82

rationality should be able to offer a methodoloqical startinq
point from which one can leqitimately extract a set of ideas
consistent with it.

As Moreland has pointed out aqainst

Murphy's kind of approach, for example, "scientists do not
always hold their beliefs tentatively, especially durinq
periods of what Kuhn called normal science.,,106

What is

needed, then, is a model of rationality in which the criteria
for rational belief do not depend on the kind of subjective
factors in Murphy's proposed Lakatosian model.

As Paul

Feyerabend has indicated, the proposed historicist-holism of
Lakatos's approach does not provide objective criteria for
knowinq when i t is fair to eliminate a less proqressive
research proqram, since even proqrams which are proqressive
overall are sometimes known to be deqenerate for a time. l07
10~oreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science,

32.

107See Paul Feyerabend, "Consolations for the
Specialist," in criticisms and the Growth of Knowledge, ed.
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musqrave (Cambridqe: Cambridqe
University Press, 1970), 197-230.

CHAPTER THREE

PROPER BASICALITY
A MODEST RATIONALISM
One of the more intriquinq, innovative and
controversial contributions to the rationality of reliqious
belief is found in the Reformed (or calvinist) epistemoloqy of
Alvin Plantinqa. 1

Plantinqa champions an approach to the

rationality of reliqious belief in which he contends that one
is entirely rational and within one's epistemic riqhts in
holdinq to the belief that God exists even thouqh that belief
is not based on prior evidence.

Crucial to understandinq

Plantinqa's epistemoloqy is the realization that his approach
IThe basic features of Plantinqa's epistemoloqy are
set forth in a series of articles articulatinq and restatinq
the Reformed system in the lanquaqe of contemporary
philosophy. See, for example, "Is Belief in God Rational?" in
Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre
Dame Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); "The
Reformed Objection to Natural Theoloqy," Christian Scholar's
Review 11, no. 3 (1982); "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?"
Nous 15, no.l (March 1981); and "On Reformed Epistemoloqy,"
The Reformed Journal 32, no. 1 (1982). Perhaps his most widely
read article is "Reason and Belief in God," in Faith and
Rationality, ed. Alvin Plantinqa and Nicholas Wolterstorff
(Notre Dame Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). For a
similar position see Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Can 8elief in God
be Rational If It Has No Foundations?" in Faith and
Rationality, ed. Alvin Plantinqa and Nicholas Wolterstorff
(Notre Dame Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); and
idem, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2d ed. (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishinq Co., 1984).
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to rationality applies to only ona belief, namely, the belief
that God exists.

This is particularly significant, given that

Plantinga's model of rationality allows for the use of
evidence (in the form of arquments and experience) on a wide
range of other religious beliefs, other than the belief that
God exists.

Having stated this, however, it will be arqued

that certain features in Planting.'s system do represent a
significant and necessary move away from Murphy's conceptions
of rationality, and ultimately bring us closer to what will be
proposed in chapter five as a more adequate model of
rationality for one's beliefs (philosophical, theistic, or
otherwise) based on a moderate form of foundational ism in
epistemoloqy.

We will see, for example, that Plantinga's

system retains a foundationalist structure to the
justification of religious belief.

And while his

justification for belief in God is ultimately a
non-evidentialist appeal to certain conditions (including an
implicit notion of truth as some form of correspondence) in
the construction of beliefs in qeneral, his insights on the
criteria for distinquishinq basic from non-basic beliefs in
classical foundationalism are useful to the moderate form of
foundationalism critical to the model of rationality that will
be suggested in chapter five.
Rejecting the stronger forms of rationality which
contend that belief in God is irrational when it is held in
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the absence of qood arguments or eVidence,2 Plantinqa
concludes that the theist is rationally justified in believinq
in God without havinq to provide evidential arguments or
reasons for that belief.

Tbe result of Plantinqa's work is a

theory for theistic belief (i.e., belief that God exists)
which seeks to offer a mediatinq position between the inherent
difficulties of evidentialism (i.e., constantly proportioninq
belief to the evidence) and the seeminqly frail coqnitive
deliverances of fideism (i.e., that belief in God is based on
faith alone, in the absence of, or contrary to reason).3
On Plantinqa's mode1 of rationality, one is considered
rational if one holds those beliefs which naturally arise in
certain conditions, and if one holds other beliefs that stem
from such basic beliefs.

Beliefs that naturally arise in

certain circumstances or conditions are considered properly
basic beliefs.

Rejectinq the classical foundationalist notion

that one's basic beliefs (foundational) and non-basic beliefs
2For example, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,
trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, revised ed. (New York: Willey Book
Co., 1943); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Briqqe (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1902). See also, Antony Flew, The presumption of
Atheism (London: PembertonPublishinq Co., 1976), 22.
3For a qood analysis of the notion that Plantinqa's
epistemoloqy, notwithstanding his own objections to the
contrary, represents a form of philosophical fideism, see
William J. Abraham, An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion (Enqlewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 87-97.
See also, Louis P. pojman, "The Contemporary Debate on Faith
and Reason: Fideism and Rationality," in Religious Belief and
the will (London and New York: Routledqe & Keqan Paul, 1986),
129-39.
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(inferential beliefs) can be justified only if one provides
sufficient evidence for them (i.e., in terms of certainty),
Plantinga argues that a person is within his epistemic rights
(i.e., is warranted, justified, and rational) in holding
properly basic beliefs without an appeal to evidence in the
form of arguments, proofs, or other propositions that one is
rational in believing. 4
On this model, then, one is not required to meet
evidentialist requirements of sufficient evidence (as defined
in chapter one) for one's properly basic beliefs to be
rational.

Rather, one's justification for a properly basic

belief can be an appeal to the right conditions and
circumstances in which those beliefs are formed.

And for some

people, argues Plantinga, belief in God can be a belief that
does in fact satisfy those conditions and is consequently
rational to hold.

Plantinga refers to this as the grounds of

a belief, rather than the evidence for a belief.

Such

grounds, however, constitute the reasons for one's beliefs.
The basis for accepting one's beliefs as properly basic is the
4 Nicholas wolterstroff, another Reformed
epistemologist who advocates many of the same tenets as
Plantinga does, writes that the type of evidentialism that he
and Plantinga are countering is an approach in which it is
rational to believe a proposition (scientific, theistic, or
otherwise) only if that proposition is believed on the basis
of others of one's beliefs that constitute good evidence for
it. See, for example, Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Migration of
the Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to Evidentialist
Apologetics," in Rationality, Religious Belie~, and Horal
commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy o~ Religion, ed.
Robert Audi and Wlliam J. Wainwright (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1986), 38-9, n. 2.
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prima facie assumption that one's cognitive (noetic) faculties
are functioning properly in environments suitably designed for
those faculties to function as they were intended.

Belief in God as Properly Basic
The central tenet of Plantinga's thinking is his claim
that a person's belief in God can be a properly basic belief
(i.e., that one is within one's epistemic rights to hold a
belief without an appeal to arquments or evidence).S

By

belief in God Plantinga means "belief that God exists,
distinquishing this notion from aspect of God's character or
attributes (e.g., to trust God in some way).6

Furthermore,

Plantinga's system is directed in part against theists (e.g.,
natural theologians) who aqree with the evidentialist
assumption that theistic belief is rational for a person only
if that person has sufficient evidence or arquments or reasons
for that belief.

Both non-theists and theists, it is arqued,

self-consciously attempt to use premises that all rational
beings are obliged to accept.'

Plantinga, however, proposes

a theory of knowledge, belief, and rationality that rejects
Seewey J. Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to
Plantinga (Albany: state University of New York Press, 1991),
176. Hoitenga further notes that Plantinga's notion of belief
in God as a properly basic belief is the central feature in
his thinking that reflects the influence of Reformed
theological thought.
6Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 18.
'Clark, 4. Cf., Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly
Basic," 41.
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the evidentialist objector's first principle that it is
irrational to maintain belief in God without the support of
evidence or argument.

As we will see, Plantinqa's position

requires a complete rethinkinq of the very concept of
rationality.

It further arques that there are "qrounds" for

belief in God, althouqh not in the sense that would be
acceptable either for the evidentialist objector or
necessarily for the natural theoloqian. 8
Rationality and Classical Foundationalism
critical to Plantinqa's model of rationality is his
argument that individuals reqularly hold a wide ranqe of
everyday beliefs which they have never attempted to support
with evidence or arguments.
for them.

Such beliefs are properly basic

They are rational in holdinq those beliefs without

evidence, and they are probably riqht about their beliefs.
Furthermore, arques Plantinqa, one can be rational in holdinq
other beliefs that stem from one's properly basic beliefs.
This follows an essentially foundationalist structure, and if
Plantinqa can successfully make the case that some people come
8Alvin Plantinqa, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?"
Nous 15 (1981): 41. Plantinqa suqqests, for example, Brand
Blanshard, Reason and Belief (London: Allen ~ Unwin, 1974);
w. K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures and
Essays, ed. Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock, 2d ed.
(London: Macmillan, 1886); Antony Flew, ~he Presumption of
Atheism (New York: Harper ~ Row Publishers, 1976); Bertrand
Russell, "Why I am Not a Christian," in Why I am Not a
Christian, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1957); and Michael Scrivin, Primary Philosophy (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1966).
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to hold belief in God as a properly basic belief (and are
rational in doing so), then the evidentialist requirements of
sufficient evidence do not apply to them.

In order to make

this point, Plantinga questions the way in which
evidentialists within a classical foundationalist epistemology
typically attempt to make the distinction between basic and
non-basic beliefs on the basis of evidence.

He does this

first by introducing the idea of a noetic structure:
A person's noetic structure is the set of propositions he
believes together with certain episteaic relations that
hold among him and these propositions. Thus some of his
beliefs may be based on other things he believes; it may
be that there are a pair of propositions A and B such that
he believes A on the basis o~ B.9
But a proper understanding of noetic structures, argues
Plantinga, must go beyond the simple distinction between basic
and non-basic beliefs. lO

There are three ways of

classifying the contents of our noetic structure if one is to
have an accurate account of rationality in classical
foundationalism: first, a person's noetic structure typically
includes a specification of which of his beliefs are basic and
which are non-basic.
identifiable.

This, to be sure, is not always easily

Plantinga admits that it is abstractly possible

that none of one's beliefs are basic (e.g., a person might
hold just three beliefs, A, B, and C, and believe each of them
on the basis of the other two).

While this might appear

9 P l ant inga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural
Theology," 191.

lOIbid.
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irrational or unlikely, that is not to say that it couldn't be
done. ll

Likewise, it's also possible that all of one's

beliefs are basic (e.q., a person may hold many propositions,
but believe none of them on the basis of any others).l2
Secondly, a noetic structure will include an index of degree

of belief.
others.

A person may hold some beliefs more firmly than

For example, I hold the belief that 1 + 2 = 3 more

firmly than I believe that there are polar bears in Alaska.
Thirdly, an account of a person's noetic structure will also
include somethinq like an index of depth of regression.

Some

beliefs are on the periphery of one's noetic structure, that
is, they are not crucial or necessary to one's belief
structure; one's noetic structure would not collapse if such
beliefs were found to be wronq.

I may, for example, accept

certain beliefs, and may even hold them firmly (e.q., there
are some larqe boulders on the top of the Grand Teton), but if
I were to qive them up, the essential makeup of my noetic
structure would remain the same. l3
ll I bid., 192.
l2 I bid.
13I bid., 192. See also, Louis P. Pojman, "The
Contemporary Debate on Faith and Reason: Fideism and
Rationality," 131. Pojman notes that in Plantinqa's system,
the beliefs within one's noetic structure are not all the same
in terms of their roles or level of importance. Some beliefs
are more central to our doxastic system than others, so that
the falsification of some beliefs will have a more critical
effect on one's rational system than the falsification of
others.
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The concept and analysis of noetic structures serves
at least two critical functions in the development of
Plantinga's model of rationality:

(1) it provides a lucid

awareness of the primary characteristics and going standards
of rationality that comprise a traditionally evidentialistic
program of epistemology; and (2) it provides the necessary
features of rationality that Plantinga salvages en route to
his own model of rationality.14

But Plantinga's primary

concern at this point is whether the classical foundationalist
has made a good case for how he knows that a given proposition

is self-evident and belongs to the category of basic
beliefs. 1S

The classical foundationalist will insist that a

basic belief can't properly be accepted on the basis of any
other belief.

And as Plantinga remarks, "in a rational noetic

structure, A will be accepted on the basis of B only if B

supports A, or is a member of a set of beliefs that together
support A."16
Plantinga's model of rationality rejects the approach
of both natural theologians and atheists who tend to rely on
classical foundational ism as a means of establishing the
rationality of belief through arguments, proof, and
14 P l ant inga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural
Theology, " 191. See also, Gary Gutting, Religious Belief and
Religious Skepticism (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1982), 80.

1SP l antinga, "Is Belief in God Rational?" 21.
16P l antinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural
Theology," 193.
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evidence. l7

The epistemic notions that underlie these

objections are put forth by Plantinga in the following terms:
The reformers mean to say, fundamentally, that belief in
God can properly be taken as basic. That is, a person is
entirely within his epistemic rights, entirely rational,
in believing in God, even if he has no argument for this
belief and does not believe it on the basis of any other
beliefs he holds. l8
Plantinga argues that the classical foundationalist criteria
for proper basicality (i.e., a proposition is either
self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses) are
not necessary conditions for proper basicality.

This does not

mean, however, that asserting the proper basicality of belief
in God means that such a belief is either qroundless or
irrational.

Instead, belief in God is "warranted" by virtue

of its being basic to one's noetic structure (i.e., it is
produced under the right circumstances or proper conditions).
Foundationalist theories in general (e.g., the
epistemological theory found in Aquinas, Descartes, Locke and
others) teache that our beliefs may be divided into two
categories: (1) beliefs that depend on other beliefs (i.e.,
inferential or non-basic beliefs) and (2) beliefs that do not
depend on other beliefs and which therefore can be called

basic or foundational.

Respected epistemologist, John L.

Pollock, provides the following characteristics of
foundational ism:
17 I bid., 187. Plantinga defines natural theology as
the attempt to prove or demonstrate the existence of God.
18 I bid.,

191.
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Foundations theories • • • take a limited class of
"epistemologically basic" beliefs to have a privileqed
epistemic status.
It is supposed that basic be1iefs
do not stand in need of justification--they are
"self-justifyinq." Nonbasic beliefs, on the other hand,
are all supposed to be justified by appea1 to basic
beliefs. Thus the basic beliefs provide a foundation for
epistemic justification. 19
Non-basic beliefs are justified by the epistemic re1ation they
hold to basic beliefs; that is, in order for a non-basic
belief to be rational, it must be inferred from or rendered
probable by a basic belief.

Evidential ism
In classical foundational ism, the beliefs of one's
noetic structure are justified only when considered properly
basic as a result of fulfillinq certain non-inferential
criteria, or when they are based on other beliefs which are
ultimately inferred from properly basic beliefs found at the
bottom of a tree-like construction of beliefs.

Plantinqa

expresses classical foundational ism in the fo1lowinq terms:
A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and
only if p is either self-evident to S or incorriqible for
s or evident to the senses for S.20
But as Plantinqa qoes on to say, classical foundational ism
typically takes theistic belief as beinq routinely excluded
from the foundation, since it is thouqht to lack the certainty
that is usually associated with other types of foundational
19 Jo hn L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge
(Savage, Md.: Rowman 5 Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1986),

26.
20 P l

antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 59.
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beliefs.

Plantinga puts this in terms of the close connection

between evidence and classical foundational ism:
Aquinas and the evidentialist objector concur, then, in
holding that belief in God is rationally acceptable only
if there is evidence for it--only if, that is, it is
probable with respect to some body of propositions that
constitutes the evidence. • • • This is a picture or total
way of looking at faith, knowledge, justified belief,
rationality, and allied topics. 2r
If theistic belief is not basic then it must be rendered or
demonstrated probable by beliefs that are properly basic.

The

argument, then, is theistic belief (as opposed to a basic
belief) requires evidence, proof, or argument if it is thought
to be rational. 22
Plantinqa is responding to a particular brand of
classical foundational ism articulated in the nineteenth
century evidentialist epistemology of W. K. Clifford.

Taking

the evidentialist notion of rationality which preceded him
(e.g., Locke and Hume) to even greater lengths, Clifford adds
an ethical component to, as Plantinga states it, lithe idea
that the strength of one's belief ought always to be
21 I bid., 47-48.
22S ee , for example, John M. Frame's analysis of
Plantinga's position in ~be Doctrine of the Knowledge of God
(Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co.,
1987), 386. While classical foundationalism requires
evidentialism, Frame's point may be to show that in
Plantinga's model of rationality, the converse is also true,
that, at least from a historical perspective, evidentialism
tends to presuppose some form of foundational ism. From a
conceptual point of view, however, evidential ism can also
follow a coherentist or a reliabilist system as well.
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proportional to the strength of the evidence for that
belief. ,,23

Clifford argues that one is not rational in

holdinq a belief that bas been accepted on insufficient
evidence. 24

FUrthermore, we have an ethical duty not to

accept a belief in the absence of qood evidence:
That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from
pestilence, which may shortly master our own body and then
spread to the rest of the town. • • • To sum up: it is
wronq always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe
anythinq upon insufficient evidence. 25
With respect to theistic belief, then, every person possesses
a set of propositions (one's noetic structure) such that a
person's belief in God is rational if and only if it is
evident with respect to those beliefs.

Such an assemblaqe of

beliefs is divided into basic and non-basic beliefs.

There

are various loqical and epistemic relations that bold amonq
the two cateqories of beliefs in one's noetic structure, and
all non-basic beliefs are said to be properly inferred from
basic beliefs.

The Collapse of Classical Foundationalism
As stated above, a crucial feature of Plantinqa's
model of rationality is the notion that we have wide ranqe of
everyday beliefs (e.q., beliefs of memory, observation,
23 P l

antinqa, "Reason and Belief in God," 24.

24w. K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures
and Essays, ed. Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock, 2d. ed.
(London: Macmillan, 1886), 343.
25 I bid.,

344 and 346.
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testimony, etc.) for which we have not aarshalled evidence.
We are rational in holdinq them, and it is hiqhly probable
that we are riqht in holdinq them.

If this is the case (and

it usually is), then why is it so difficult to consider the
possibility that one can be rational if one comes to hold
belief in God in the same way?

Such a belief, accordinq to

Plantinqa, would qualify as properly basic belief, and as
such, it would also be amonq the foundations of one's noetic
structure. 26

Plantinqa first responds to this notion from

the classical foundationalist perspective:
The answer, on the part of the classical foundationalist,
was that even if this belief is ~rue, it does not have the
characteristics a proposition must have to deserve a place
in the foundations. There is no room in the foundations
for a proposition that can be rationally accepted only on
the basis of other propositions. The only properly basic
propositions are those that are self-evident or
incorriqible or evident to the senses. Since the
proposition that God exists is none of the above, it is
not properly basic for anyone; that is, no well-formed,
rational noetic structure contains this proposition in its
foundations. 27
But it is precisely the classical foundationalist form of
evidential ism that is rejected by Plantinqa and other Reformed
epistemoloqists.

And as Wolterstorff arques, for example, it

is impossible to derive all human knowledqe from classical
foundationalist notions of basic belief.

That is, one cannot

find enouqh basic propositions to make up the foundation and
26 P l antinqa,
27 I bid.

"Reason and Belief in God," 59.
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then go on from there to derive the sum-total of one's
knowledge. 28
It is through a closer look at the principle of
classical foundational ism that Plantinga is able to determine
whether belief in God is indeed properly basic and should be
included within the foundations of one's noetic structure.
This principle, argues Plantinga, contains two claims:
first, a proposition is properly basic i f it is
self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses,
and, second, a proposition is properly basic only i f it
meets this condition. 29
While we might concede the first claim, it is Plantinga's
contention that the second claim reduces many of our beliefs
to the level of the irrational.

It does so because, with

respect to propositions that are self-evident and
incorrigible, most of the beliefs that, as Plantinqa puts it,
"form the stock in trade of ordinary everyday life are not
probable. 30
Plantinga points out that many of our everyday
beliefs, for example, beliefs of memory (e.g., the belief that
28Wolterstorff's critique of classical foundationalism
can be found in his, Reason within the Bounds of Reigion, 2d,
ed. (Grand Rapids. Mich.: W. B. Eerdaans Publishinq Co., 1976
and 1984), 28-62. See also, Wolterstorff's "Can Belief in God
Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?" in Faith and
Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, 135-86; and John M.
Frame's analysis of Wolterstorff's epistemology in his The
Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg, N.J.:
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1987), 382-400.
29P l antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 59.
30 I

bid.
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I had breakfast this morninq), perceptual beliefs (e.q., the
belief that I am presently sittinq in front of my computer),
and beliefs in other minds (e.q., the belief that my wife is
not merely some sophisticated humanoid form, but a person
possessinq a mind similar in essence to my own) cannot
plausibly be shown to be derivable from self-evident or
incorriqible propositions.

Plantinqa writes:

But many propositions that do not meet these conditions
are properly basic for me. I believe, for example, that I
had lunch this noon. I do not believe this proposition on
the basis of other propositions; I take it as basic; it is
in the foundations of my noetic structure. Furthermore, I
am entirely rational in so takinq it, even thouqh this
proposition is neither self-evident nor evident to the
senses nor incorriqible for me. 31
Further, arques Plantinqa, the qrounds for classical
foundationalism's criteria for proper basicality is itself
self-referentially flawed.

The reason for excludinq reliqious

beliefs from the foundation (i.e., proper basicality) cannot
itself be justified on a foundational basis.
The foundationalist criteria for proper basicality
cannot itself be justified on a foundational basis; it is
neither a basic proposition, nor is it plausibly derivable
from basic propositions.

Quite simply, arques Plantinqa,

the criterion is neither self-evident or evident to the senses
or incorriqible.

Nor does it seem that one will be able to

provide qood arquments for it (deductive, inductive,
probabilistic or whatever) whose premises are self-evident or
31 I b'd
1 . , 60.
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evident to the senses or incorrigible and whose conclusion is
the very criterion of proper basicality.

So one can not be

rational in accepting it. 32
The classical foundationalist approach to the
justification of beliefs, then, is a self-defeating position,
since the theory cannot justify its key criteria for proper
basicality.

This being the case, then, the evidentialist

objection lacks force.

As such, there is no reason why belief

in God should not itself be properly basic, that is, included
in the foundation of our noetic structure.

It is argued by

Plantinga that such a position places us within our epistemic
rights to hold belief in God without any evidence or reasons
along the lines of traditional evidentialism.
Reformed Foundationalism

Plantinga makes the strong contention that the
difference between classical foundational ism and the form of
weak foundationalism for which he argues has much to do with
the different conceptions of reason which appear to govern the
thinking patterns of the theist and the non-theist.

For

Plantinga, this is the conviction that the two groups disagree
32 I bid., 60-61. Plantinga's assessment is similar to
the argument that has often been employed against the logical
positivists' verification principle (i.e., that the principle
itself is essentially neither a proposition that is true by
definition, nor empirically verifiable). Cf., John M. Frame,
The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, 387, n. 19.
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as to what are the deliverances of reason. 33

Since the

rationality for theistic belief is not derived from classical
foundationalism's unworkable criteria for proper basicality
(and indeed neither are many other beliefs that we take as
basic), Plantinga claims that it is "entirely acceptable,
desirable, right, proper, and rational to accept belief in God
(i.e., belief that God exists) without any argument or
evidence whatever."34

Theistic belief in God, according to

Plantinga, is no less a deliverance of reason

than we find to

be the case with perceptual truths, self-evident truths and
truths of memory.
Plantinga's claim that theistic belief in God is
properly basic represents what Hoitenga calls the heart of
Reformed foundationalism. 35 The very nature of the claim is
what distinguishes Plantinga's position from a long and lofty
epistemic tradition.

Foundationalism, as Plantinga observes,

has been the epistemic staple among such fabled philosophical
minds as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke,
and the contemporary epistemologist, Roderick Chisholm. 36
33Pl antinga, Reason and Belief in God," 90. Plantinqa
provides an excellent autobiographical sketch of his
philsophical studies under William Harry Jellema of Calvin
College in his "Self-Profile," in ~vin Plantinga, ed. J. E.
Tomberlin and P. Van Inwagen (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reide1,
1985), 3-36.
34Pl antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 39.
35Hoitenga, 180.
36Pl antinga, "Is Belief in God Rational?" 13.
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But as Hoitenga remarks, Auqustine is conspicuously absent
from Plantinga's list, since (unlike a traditional
foundationalist) Auqustine teaches that belief in God is an
immediate deliverance of reason. 37

Thus, while Plantinga

views some form of foundationalism as a normative thesis about
the nature of rational noetic structures, he ultimately
embraces a form of weak foundationalism which essentially
involves two claims:
Suppose we say that weak foundational ism is the view that
(1) every rational noetic structure has a foundation, and
(2) in a rational noetic structure, non-basic belief is
proportional in strength to support from the foundations.
When I say that Reformed thinkers have meant to reject
foundational ism , I do not mean to say that they intended
to reject weak foundationalism. On the contrary; the
thought of many of them tends to support or endorse weak
foundationalism. 38
But the distinction between the two versions, as indicated
earlier, is found in the criteria set forth for proper
basicality.

The assumption on the part of some is that, once

a cognizer accepts a weak form of foundationalism, strong
37 Ho intenga,

180.

38Al v in Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural
Theology," 193. See also, Gary Gutting, Religious Belief and
Religious Skepticism (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1982), 80-1. Gutting seems to take Plantinga's
weak foundational ism as being a favorable position amonq those
who tend to hold some form of anti-foundationalism. (e.g.,
Sellars and Quine). Plantinga's weak foundationalism might be
misconstrued as a form of coherent ism , a view which requires
the justification of every belief in a rational noetic
structure by its coherence with the totality of the
structure's beliefs. Plantinga's version of weak
foundationalism, however, only requires a non-evidential
justification (or grounding) of its properly basic beliefs,
and as such, cannot be regarded as a fora of coherentism. This
will be treated more fully at a later point.
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foundationalism seems a necessary further step, since without
criteria for what may be taken as basic there could be
rational noetic structures that took almost any absurd set of
beliefs as basic. 39

But, as we will further see, it is this

kind of thinking that betrays the very notion of rationality
that Plantinga so adamantly rejects.

For it is precisely the

criteria for proper basicality set forth in the strong
versions of foundationalism that Plantinga, as a Reformed
epistemologist, finds objectionable and problematic.

The Problem oL a criterion Lor Proper Basicality:
The Great Pumpkin Objection
Plantinga's program for the rationality of religious
belief draws heavily upon the Reformed tradition in its
attempt to demonstrate that theistic belief clearly falls
outside the unworkable criteria for proper basicality in
classical foundationalism. 40

Plantinga's contention is that

the evidentialist objection to theistic belief can be voiced
only in the context of an unworkable criterion for basic
belief as it is originally set forth in classical
foundational ism.

Even attempts by evidentialist objectors to

modify the classical foundationalist criteria for basic
39 Gary Gutting, Religious BelieL and Religious
Skepticism, 81. Gutting argues that it is precisely this
version of weak foundational ism (and its correlative dismissal
of classical foundationalism) that tends to fuel the arguments
of many contemporary antifoundationalists.

40See, for example, Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of
God, trans. and ed. William Hendriksen (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 1951), 41-80.
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belief, argues Plantinga, do not give us a workable criterion.
For example, some think that the criterion is salvaged if,
along with the notion of a belief being self-evident, evident
to the senses, or incorrigible for a person, the belief in
question is also accepted as basic by nearly everyone. 41
But Plantinga says of this modified version of the criteria:
Not nearly everyone takes (the belief] as basic; I do not,
for example. Nor is it self-evident, incorrigible, or
evident to the senses. So unless we can find an argument
for it from propositions that meet the conditions it lays
down, we shall, if we believe it, be believing a
proposition that is probably either false or such that we
ought not believe it. Therefore we ought not believe it,
at least until someone produces such an argument for
it. 42
So an appeal to agreement (i.e., that a belief can be basic if
it is accepted by nearly everyone), then, cannot successfully
modify classical foundationalism's criteria for proper
basicality, since it is not clear that everyone takes even the
modified criteria as basic.

Rather, what is needed, in

Plantinga's estimation, are epistemic notions that go beyond
classical criteria for the rationality and justification of
our beliefs.
In a highly criticized move (appearinq to many as an
uncomfortably close form of relativism),43

Plantinga

41Pl antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 62.
42 Ib id.

43Pl antinqa has received a good deal of criticism on
this matter. See, for exaaple, C. Stephen Evans, "Kierkeqaard
and Plantinga on Belief in God: Subjectivity as the Ground of
Properly Basic Religious Beliefs," Faith and Philosophy 5,
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attempts to answer the problem of arriving at criteria for
proper basicality by suggesting an inductive approach to
religious experience.

Louis P. Pojman has observed that

Plantinga's view of proper basicality is subject to the
criticism that it opens the door to all sorts of irrationality
in the foundations of our noetic structure.

But the reason

why belief in the Great Pumpkin cannot be considered properly
basic, argues Plantinga is that (in keeping with Reformed
epistemologists agreement with Calvin) "God has implanted in
us a natural tendency to see his hand in the world around us;
the same cannot be said for the Great Pumpkin, there being no
Great Pumpkin and no natural tendency to accept belief about
the Great Pumpkin. n44
The point is that Plantinga does not believe we can
arrive at deductive criteria for what count as the basic
beliefs of one's noetic structure Which, as Gutting remarks,
allows for belief in God but

exc~udes

Pumpkin and other absurdities. 45

belief in the Great

Since Plantinga believes

no. 1 (1988): 25-39; Joseph Runzo, "World-Views and the
Epistemic Foundations of Theism,· Religious Studies 25 (March
1989): 31-51; Richard Grigg, "Theism and Proper basicality: A
Response to Plantinga," International Journal ror Philosophy
or Religion 14 (1983): 123-27; J. Wesley Robbins, "Is Belief
in God Properly Basic?" International Journal ror the
Philosophy or Religion 14 (1983): 241-48; and Richard Askew,
liOn Fideism and Alvin Plantinga,· Philosophy or Religion 23
(1988): 3-16.
44Louis P. Pojman, Religious Belier and the Will,
132-33. Cf., Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God,n 78.
45Gutting, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism,
82.
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that establishinq criteria for proper basicality alonq
evidentialist lines is both difficult and unnecessary, he
contends that theistic belief is properly basic and therefore
rational by virtue of its beinq grounded in the proper
conditions.

An absurdity such as belief in the Great Pumpkin,

on the other hand, is groundless and consequently lackinq the
necessary conditions for proper basicality.
Now similar thinqs may be said about belief in God. When
the Reformers claim that this belief is properly basic,
they do not mean to say, of course, that there are no
justifyinq circumstances for it, or that it is in that
sense qroundless or qratuitous. 6
So we see justification for a properly basic belief in
Plantinqa's model of rationality as restinq on certain
conditions other than a coqnizer's other beliefs.

One can

point to the qrounds for theistic belief, arques Plantinqa, in
much the same way we can point to the qrounds of our memory
beliefs, our beliefs in physical objects, and our beliefs in
other persons.
Hoitenqa has stated that the arqument for the
resemblance between the qrounds for theistic belief and the
grounds for other properly basic beliefs involves the matter
of whether theistic belief is "similar to other properly basic
beliefs that fall outside the criterion of classical
foundationalis., and the objection that belief in God is too
46 P l

ant inqa, "Reason and Belief in God," 80.
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close for comfort to irrational beliefs like belief in the
Great Pumpkin."C'
But it is precisely the grounds for properly basic
beliefs (whether theistic or otherwise) that Plantinqa thinks
constitute their justification and consequently provides a
link, as Hoitenqa notes, "between the idea of properly basic
beliefs and a theory of knovledqe as justified true
belief. nCs

The evidentialist who relies on the classical

foundationalist criteria for proper basicality, therefore,
cannot deny the justification (and thereby the proper
basicality) of theistic belief simply because the theist
appeals to the grounds for justification rather than the

criterion for justification.

Plantinqa contends:

Must one have such a criterion before one can sensibly
make any judqments--positive or neqative--about proper
basicality? Surely not. Suppose I don't know of a
satisfactory SUbstitute for the criteria proposed by
classical foundational ism; I am nevertheless entirely
within my riqhts in holdinq that certain propositions are
not properly basic in certain conditions.~9
Plantinqa's conclusion, then, is that the criteria set forth
by modern foundationalists for wbat counts as a necessary and
sufficient condition for proper basicality does not follow
from obviously self-evident premises by obviously acceptable
4'Hoitenqa, 186.
4S I bid.
49P l antinqa, "The Reformed Objection to Natural
Theology," 196.
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arguments. 50

And it is precisely this point that paves the

way for Plantinqa to argue that theistic belief is qrounded
(and thereby justified) on conditions other than the evidence
from other beliefs.

In some ways his position is similar to

William Alston's arqument that rational belief in theism is
similar to rational belief in physical objects.

In other

words, argues Alston, we have certain kinds of experiences
(call them reliqious) that tend to confirm theistic belief,
and this is no less rational than it is for one to believe in
physical objects on the basis of sense perception. 51
While there may not be any clear criteria for
distinguishinq between unacceptable and acceptable candidates
for proper basicality, Plantinqa believes his suqqestion of a
broadly inductive methodoloqy serves to establish the required
moorings that work against extreme forms of relativism:
We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such
that the former are obviously properly basic in the
latter, and examples of beliefs and conditions such that
the former are obviously not properly basic in the latter.
We must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and
SOIbid., 197.
SlWilliam P. Alston, "Christian Experience and
Christian Belief," in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief
in God (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1983), 103-34. Alston comments, for example, "I take as my
starting point the conviction that somehow what qoes on in the
experience of leadinq the Christian life provides some qrounds
for Christian belief, makes some contribution to the
rationality of Christian belief • • • • I am not suqgestinq
that this is the whole qround or that it can do the whole job"
(103) •
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sufficient conditions of proper basicality and test these
hypotheses by reference to those examples. 52
Plantinga is clearly aware that, as Pojman expresses it, "each
community will assemble a different set of examples of beliefs
and accompanying conditons, so that there is no reason to
assume that everyone will agree on the examples."53

The

point that Plantinga wants to make is that theists will likely
consider theistic belief to be entirely proper and rational,
most likely not on the basis of other propositions they hold,
but simply because it is basic for them and properly so (given
the conditions or circumstances in which they arise).

The

fact that other non-theists may disagree with theistic
criteria for proper basicality (based on inductive factors)
inconsequential to Plantinga.

is

He argues that theists are

responsible only to their own set of examples. 54

The

criteria for proper basicality, then, are in Plantinga's
estimation "reached from below rather than above; they should
not be presented ex cathedra, but argued to and tested by a
relevant set of examples."55
52 P l ant inga,

"Reason and Belief in God," 76.

53Po jman, Religious Belief and the Will, 133.
54P l antinga, "Reason and Belief in God,· 77.
55Ibid. Cf., Gutting, Religious Belief and Religious
Skepticism, 83. Gutting remarks: "In sum, then, Plantinqa's
defense of the claim that 'God exists' may be properly basic
for the Christian is as follows: there are no obviously
correct criteria for proper basicality; therefore, we must
develop such criteria inductively on the basis of obvious
examples (clear cases) of properly basic propositions. For the
Christian (at least one whose belief in God does not rest on
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Conditions and Basic Belief in God:
The Grounds for Theistic Belief
Plantinqa has arqued up to this point that one can be
rational in believinq in God (as a properly basic belief) even
if one does not hold that belief on the basis of evidence.
Furthermore, one can maintain properly basic belief in God
even thouqh one cannot provide criteria for what counts as
evidence for or aqainst a belief's truth.

But while one does

not have to supply evidentialist requirements of sufficient
evidence in order to be rational in holdinq a properly basic
belief, Plantinqa contends that such beliefs are rational only
when formed under conditions that confer justification on the
one who accepts them as basic. 56

Plantinqa means by qrounds

or conditions, the non-evidential reasons or circumstances
that qive rise to a properly basic belief.

Thus, a properly

basic belief in Plantinqa's estimation, is not necessarily one
that is infallible or even incorriqible.

The justification

accorded to the basic beliefs in one's noetic structure is
only a prima facie or defeasible justification.

One is

rationally justified in qivinq up a basic belief (includinq
belief in God) if one finds some qood reasons for
inferences from other propositions)
those examples."
56 P l

'God exists' is one of

antinqa, "Reason and Belief in God," 82.
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disbelieving.

There well may be good reasons for disbelieving

properly basic beliefs. 57
But as Plantinga further remarks, while one is not
rationally required to accept theistic belief exclusively on
the basis of arquments and evidence, it does not follow that
arguments are irrelevant to the proper basicality of theistic
belief.

Nor does it follow that arquments based on other

propositions a coqnizer holds as basic could not show theistic
belief to be false.

One who accepts theistic belief as basic

can still be open to the possibility of giving up that belief
if one is offered arquments from other propositions one
already holds as true.
But it is also rational to consider the possibility
that an arqument against the proper basicality of theistic
belief may in fact show that there is a problem somewhere else
in onels noetic structure. 58

So with respect to the

rationality of theistic belief, one is not committed in
advance to hold it in the teeth of any evidence or arqument
that could count against it.

One can then accept belief in

God as basic without accepting it dogmatically; that is, the
proper basicality of theistic belief need not be embraced in
such a way that ignores any contrary evidence or argument. 59
57 See Hoitenga, Faith and reason from Plato to
Plantinga, 187. See also, Plantinga, "On Reformed
Epistemology," The Reformed Journal 32 (January 1982): 14.
58 P l
59 I

antinga, Reason and Belief in God," 82-83.

bid., 83.
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The reason for this is because of what Plantinqa refers to as
the "justification-conferrinq conditions· of properly basic
beliefs.

Plantinqa's contention is that such

justification-conferrinq conditions can provide only prima
facie rather than all-thinqs-considered, or ultima racie
justification:
My beinq appeared to treely qives me a prima facie riqht
to take as basic the proposition I see a tree. But of
course this riqht can be overridden; X miqht know, for
example, that X suffer from the dreaded dendroloqical
disorder, whose victims are appeared to treely only when
there are no trees present. Xf X do know that, then X am
not within my riqhts in takinq as basic the proposition I
see a tree when X am appeared to treely.60
The purpose of Plantinqa's distinction is to indicate the
intended rational deliverances associated with these two forms
of justification.

Prima facie justification, arques

Plantinqa, places one in a rational structure in which one is
within one's epistemic rights in acceptinq a proposition.
Ultima facie justification, on the other hand, provides the
truth-conferring conditions in which it is rational for one to
accept a proposition in a manner equated with knowledge. 61
This beinq the case, then, it is necessary to see that
the terms grounds and evidence express entirely different
60 Xbid.
61 Xbid., 84. Plantinqa states that a condition that
overrides a coqnizer's prima racie justification for p is a
defeating condition or dereater for p for that coqnizer. Also,
defeaters are initially prima facie defeaters, qiven the
possibility that the defeater can always be defeated. See
also, John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories or Knowledge,
37-39.
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epistemic notions in Plantinqa's thinkinq.

While one may

claim justification for a belief on the basis of either
grounds or evidence, one does so, as Hoitenqa points out, in
substantially different ways:
The difference is that evidence consists of beliefs on the
basis of which other, nonbasic beliefs are held (and
thereby justified), whereas grounds are not beliefs at
all, but conditions or circumstances that occasion
properly basic beliefs, and thereby justify thea without
being formulated as beliefs. 62
If one hopes to provide justification for a belief alonq
evidential lines, then, one does so on the basis of one's

doxastic state; that is, as John Pollock states, "the
justifiability of a belief is a function exclusively of what
beliefs one holds."63

Pollock writes:

It seems that in deciding what to believe, we cannot take
account of anythinq except insofar as we have beliefs
about it. Consequently, nothing can enter into the
determination of epistemic justification except our
beliefs. Thus all an epistemological theory can do is
tell us how our overall doxastic state determines which of
our beliefs can be justified. 64
Doxastic theories, as Pollock notes, are exhausted by two
mutually exclusive subcateqories, foundations theories and
coherence theories. 65
To provide justification for a belief in terms of
evidence, then, is to agree that both one's non-basic and
62Hoitenga, 189.
63poll ock, 19.
64 I bid.
65 I bid.
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basic beliefs require evidence.

But Plantinga's model of weak

foundationalism differs from stronger versions in that, while
non-basic beliefs are justified on the basis of their relation
to the basic beliefs of one's noetic structure, basic beliefs
receive their justification on the basis of the qrounds that
give rise to the belief in question.

Hoitenga expresses this

epistemic relation in the following manner:
To have grounds for a belief • • • is to hold it in such a
way that there are conditions in which it arises and that
justify it, even though the believer may typical1y be
unaware at the moment of what those conditions are. Being
unaware of them, one does not formulate beliefs about them
on the basis of which he holds the belief, which is
precisely what makes that belief a basic belief.
One may,
of course, be able to point to some of the qrounds for
one's basic beliefs if asked, but that is a different
matter. 66
So, then, to have evidence for a belief is to be consciously
aware of the other beliefs one holds in support of that
belief.

In contrast, to have grounds for a belief is to hold

that belief as a result of the conditions in which the belief
arises, whether or not one is consciously aware of those
conditions at the time that they give rise to the belief in
question.
Plantinqa arques that when we consider perceptual
beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs ascribing mental states
to other persons (e.g., "I see a tree"; "I had breakfast this
morning"; and "That person is in pain"), we have beliefs that
66 Ho itenga,

188.
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are typically taken as basic; but such beliefs, Plantinga
suggests, are far from groundless. 67

Plantinga writes:

Upon having experience of a certain sort, I believe I am
perceiving a tree. In the typical case I do not hold this
belief on the basis of other beliefs; it is nonetheless
not groundless. My having that characteristic sort of
experience--to use Professor Chisholm's language, my being
appeared treely to--plays a crucial role in the formation
of that belief. It also plays a crucial role in its
justification. 68
Justification for a belief on the basis of grounds, then, does
not involve an appeal to other beliefs but some characteristic
experience that accounts for the conditions in which the
belief arises.

As will become more clear, it is the

experience itself (of which one may be quite unaware) that, as
Hoitenga observes, "constitues the ground of the basic belief
by contrast with one's (consciously) having or giving evidence
for it." 69

And as Plantinga further remarks, "being

appropriately appeared to • • • is not sufficient for
justification; some further condition--a condition hard to
state in detail--is clearly necessary."70
67P l ant inga, "Reason and Belief in God," 78-79.
68I bid., 79. In the case of ascribing mental states to
other persons, for example, Plantinga states that if one sees
someone displaying typical pain behavior, then that is good
reason to think that person is in pain. But one does not take
the displayed behavior as evidence for that belief. One does
not infer that belief on the basis of other beliefs one holds.
But one's perceiving the pain behavior forms the ground of
one's justification for the belief in question.
69 Ho i tenga, 188.
70P l ant inga, "Reason and belief in God," 80.
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A belief, then, is properly basic, justified and
rational only in certain conditions that can account for its
justification and the ground of the belief itself. 7l

We,

therefore, arques Plantinga, may apply the same concept to
theistic belief.

One reason for this is found in Plantinga's

appeal to Calvin's idea that God daily discloses and reveals
to us innumerable conditions that create in us the disposition
to take theistic belief as properly basic. 72

Plantinga goes

on to contend that, indeed, there may be many circumstances
(i.e., religious experiences) that one might count as grounds
for the proper basicality of theistic belief:
There are therefore many conditions and circumstances that
call forth belief in God: quilt, gratitude, danger, a
sense of God's presence, a sense that he speaks,
perception of various parts of the universe. A complete
job would explore the phenomenol99Y of all these
conditions and of more besides. 73
Plantinqa, however, is quick to point out that in actuality
one comes to accept the simple belief that God exists more
specifically as a result of a number of other basic types of
propositions that are formed through these conditions and
circumstances.

Such beliefs as: "God is speaking to me"; "God

has created all this"; "God disapproves of what I have done";
71 I bid.
72Ibid. See, for example, John Calvin, Institutes or
the Christian Religion, vol. 20, Library of Christian
Classics, ed. by John T. McNeill and trans. and indexed by
Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1960), 43-44.
73Ibid., 81.
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"God forqives me"; and "God is to be thanked and praised,"
arques Plantinqa, are all propositions that are only properly
basic in the riqht circumstances.

The conclusion in

Plantinqa's thinkinq, then, is that since these propositions
are properly basic, they each self-evidently entail that God
exists.
Plantinqa's conception of the grounds of religious
belief, then, is largely contingent upon his idea of the
nature of religious experience.

What constitutes rational and

justified theistic belief is the qrounds in which the belief
arises; the qrounds themselves must take place under proper
conditions.

These proper conditions are, as Plantinqa has

already indicated, conditions in which the details are
difficult to state.

To gain an indication of what these

conditions might be, it is necessary to briefly turn our
attention to the basic features of Plantinga's more complete
theory of justification set forth in his notion of the proper
function of our coqnitive faculties and the warrant for
theistic belief. 74
74see C. stephen Evans, "Kierkegaard and Plantinqa on
Belief in God: Subjectivity as the Ground of Properly Basic
Religious Beliefs," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the
Society of Christian Philosophers 35, no. 3 (1994): 34. See
also, William Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian
Belief," in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God,
ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983): 103-134; idem,
"The Autonomy of Religious Experience," International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion 31, no. 2-3 (1992): 67-87; idem,
"Religious Experience and Religious Belief," Nous 16 (March
1982): 3-12; and idem, "Plantinga's Epistemology of Reliqious
Belief," in Alvin Plantinga, Profiles, vol. 5, ed. James E.
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The Warrant ror Theistic Belier
If one is not required to marshall evidence in order
to be rational in holdinq a properly basic belief, what must
be the case if one is not to be arbitrary or irrational in
determininq what riqhtfully belonqs in the foundation of one's
noetic structure?

Plantinqa has argued that a person is not

required to supply evidence for one's properly basic beliefs,
since we regularly form such beliefs without it, and we are
considered rational and probably right in doinq so.

His

arguments for warrant, proper function, and design plan, then,
are all part of a model of rationality which attempts to argue
that the rationality for one's properly basic beliefs still
involves the matter of justification (or the non-evidentialist
notion of warrant), even if that justification is
non-evidential in nature.

That is, one can have reasons for

why one is considered rational in holdinq a properly basic
belief, but those reasons are not required to conform to
evidentialist notions of sufficient evidence.

Sufficient

evidence, accordinq to evidentialist standards, is typically
an appeal to arquments and one's other beliefs.

The point of

warrant, proper function, and design plan, accordinq to
Plantinqa, is that they are non-evidential in nature.

Thus,

if it can be shown that one can have a model of rationality in
which the justification of one's properly basic beliefs do not
Tomberlin and Peter van Inwaqen (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel
Publishinq Company, 1985): 289-311.
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require evidential reasons, then Plantinga is one step closer
to making his case.
Furthermore, Plantinqa realizes that his criteria for
being rational do not quarantee that one is right.

But if it

can be shown that one's properly basic beliefs are formed
under the proper conditions, then being rational about one's
properly basic beliefs does not require that one verify one's
beliefs as true along evidentialist lines of verification.
What is required for rationality, according to Plantinga, is
that a cognizer's reasons for holding a properly basic belief
(e.g., belief in God) are consistent with the circumstances
which warrant that belief. 7S

On Plantinga's model of

rationality, there is a high probability that one is right
about one's beliefs without the need to verify them as true.
Thus, the warrant (and consequent rationality) for a properly
basic belief exhibits certain characteristics that set it
apart from the form of rationality typically allied with the
evidentialist notions of the criteria for proper basicality in
classical foundationalism.
7S Hoitenga, 189. Hoitenga has arqued that Plantinga
at this point is attempting to satisfy Plato's account of
justified true belief in the Theaetetus (i.e., that knowledge
is more than direct acquaintance with an object, or accepting
a proposition on testimony, as are suggested in the approaches
to knowledge in Plato's Republic and the Meno, respectively).
However, rather than following a classical foundationalist
(and internalist) model for justification, Plantinga will
suggest an externalist model of warrant as a more rational and
acceptable system of justified true belief. See also, William
Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," Monist 68,
no. 1 (January 1985): 58.
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As we have seen, Plantinga makes a distinction between

evidence for a belief (i.e., the reasons a cognizer offers for
a given belief in terms of other beliefs or arguments he
accepts, and of which he is typically aware) and grounds for a
belief (i.e., the conditions that make a belief warranted and
rational, even if the cognizer is not aware of those
conditions at any given time).

Giving evidence for a belief

consists of the cognizer's conscious access to the other
beliefs in onels noetic structure that are used in support of
a given belief.

This type of evidentialist approach to the

rational justification of one's beliefs is typically allied
with an internalistic account of the epistemic relation among
beliefs in one's noetic structure (i.e., the notion that onels
beliefs and perceptual states are states to which the cognizer
has direct access and of which he is aware at some level).76
The grounds for a basic belief, on the other hand, take on an
externalistic justification (i.e., more than just the internal
76see , for example, John Pollock, Contemporary
Theories of Knowledge, 22. A good example of an internalist
approach to theistic belief can be found in the natural
theology of William Paley (1743-1805). In Paley's argument for
the design of the universe (the teleological argument), Paley
formulates beliefs about the orderliness of the universe (e.g,
the analogy that the universes I complex design presumes a
divine intelligence in much the same manner as a watch's
complex design presumes a finite intelligence) and infers the
existence of God from these beliefs. For a brief introduction
to Paley's argument, see John H. Hick, Philosophy of Religion,
4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990),
23-26. For a more extended treatment, see Robert E. D. Clark,
The Universe--Plan or Accident? (Philadelphia: Muhlenburg
Press, 1961). See also, Norman L. Geisler and Winfried
Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, 2d. ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Baker Book House, 1988).
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states of a cognizer enter into the
beliefs).77

justi~ication

of

But what remains problematic for Plantinga and

epistemological theories in general is that, as Plantinga
laments, "It is widely agreed that belief, while necessary for
knowledge, is not sufficient for it.,,78
required?

What else is

Whatever this further element may be, arques

Plantinga, "it is either epistemic justification or something
intimately connected with it."79
Another characteristic of Plantinga's theory of
knowledge as justified true belief is, as previously stated,
found in his distinction between prima facie and ultima facie
(or "all-things-considered") justification.

Plantinga's

example of the "dreaded dendroloqical disorder" mentioned
above, serves as ultima facie evidence which may override his
prima facie evidence that "being appeared to treely" gives him
the right to take as basic the proposition I see a tree. 80
77pollock, 23; and Hoitenga, 190. See also, John
Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1939). Hoitenga suggests that Baillie's understanding of
our knowledge of God through the order of nature as a mediated
immediacy (e.g., an experience of observing the starry heavens
above mediates my immediate awareness of God) is a good
example of Plantinga's notion of grounds.
78Al v in Plantinga, "Justification and Theism," Faith
and Philosophy 4, no. 4 (October 1987): 404.
79 I bid.
80Hoitenga, 190. Plantinga goes on to argue, however,
that properly basic beliefs are regarded as having more
epistemic warrant (i.e., non-evidential justification) for
belief since a cognizer holds such beliefs on the basis of the
circumstances or conditions which give rise to them, rather
than on the basis of arguments or evidence. See, for example,

121

On a prima facie level, then, there is nothing
intrinsic about properly basic beliefs that keep them from
being false, and on this basis, they cannot be equated with
knowledge.

It is only on the basis of "all-things-considered"

(or ultima facie) evidence that a properly basic belief can
constitute knowledge.

This is further illustrated in

Plantinga's distinction between weak and strong forms of
justification.

Plantinga once again bears this out in the

example of being appeared to treely:

Being appeared to treely may confer on me, not merely the
prima facie right to believe that there is a tree present,
but the more impressive epistemic condition of being such
that if the belief in question is true, then I know it.
Call that condition strong justification. Being thus
appeared to may perhaps also lay obligations on me;
perhaps in those conditions I am not merely within my
rights in believing that there is a tree present; perhaps
I have a prima facie obligation to do so.81
Hoitenga believes that Plantinga's remarks at this point are
indicative of his attempt to establish a theory of knowledge
as justified true belief, even though an initial glance at
Plantinga's notion of the grounds for proper basicality may
seem to make justification superfluous to his theory.

In

addition to the grounds that confer on someone the right to
believe there is a tree present, for example, there are also
the further conditions of knowledge that the belief is true

and that there is an obligation for the cognizer to believe
Alvin Plantinga, "The Foundations of Theism: A Reply," Faith
and Philosophy 3 (1986): 304-6.
81Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 85.
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it. 82

Apart from Plantinga's qualified notion of warrant

(and the externalism in which it is based), the grounds that
constitute a properly basic belief do not provide a sufficient
reason for taking such a belief as knowledge.

That such

beliefs may ultimately constitute knowledge is a matter
altogether different from a theory that can explain the
circumstances which legitimate it as knowledge.
Plantinga's model of rationality at this point appears
to follow, as Louis Pojman remarks, "a version of naturalized
epistemology, which, if it succeeds, solves most of the
puzzles of a theory of knowledge, and so wins out as the most
comprehensive (though admittedly still incomplete) system
available. "83

In its most basic form, naturalized

epistemology is directed against all forms of epistemology
that focus on the normative notion of justification.
by the philosophy of W. V.

o.

Inspired

Quine, naturalized epistemology

argues that classical foundationalism's quest for certainty is
82 Hoitenga,

191.

83 Louis Pojman, What Can We Know?: An Introduction to
the Theory of Knowledge (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1995),
149. The most complete statement of Plantinga's theory can be
found in the first two volumes of his projected three-volume
work on epistemology: Warrant: The CUrrent Debate (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993) and Warrant and Proper FUnction
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Earlier versions of
the material contained in these volumes can be found in his
article "Positive Epistemic status and Proper Function," in
Philosophical Perspectives 2. Epistemology, ed. James E.
Tomberlin (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Pubishing Company,
1988), 1-50. Additional versions of the material are found in
"Justification and Theism," Faith and Philosophy 4, no. 4
(1987): 403-26; and "Epistemic Justification," Nous 20 (1986):

3-18.
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a fundamentally flawed method that has failed in its attempts
to qround our clai. . to knowledge. 84

Quine contends that we

must give up traditional a priori epistemology (i.e., setting
forth conceptual criteria for knowledge and then applying them
to science) and embrace instead a form of empirical or
cognitive psychology.

Such a cognitive process reduces

epistemology to simply a descriptive examination of the
relation between the small amounts of sensory stimUlation
which constitute our empirical observations and the vast
measure of conceptual conclusions we draw from them.

We do

not have epistemic access to the world as it is in itself; we
have only the reports of our sensory evidence from which we
form a behavorist naturalism through prediction and
verification. 8S
Plantinga's theory of proper function, then, is an
externalist account of naturalized epistemology (i.e., an
account of knowledge in which a coqnizer is rational in
holding a belief in terms of the conditions or circumstances
which warrant that belief).

Whatever is specifically meant by

84 see , for example, W. v. o. Quine, "Epistemology
Naturalized," in The Theory of Knowledge, ed. Louis Pojman
(Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1993), 322.
85 po jman, What Can We Know? 170-171. Cf., W. v. o.
Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," 325. Pojman notes three
central theses to Quine's epistemology: (1) The attempt to
ground knowledge through a priori criteria has failed; (2)
skepticism's program to undermine classical epistemology
becomes a pseudoproblem in naturalized epistemology; and (3)
epistemology (and true belief) is subsumed under the aeqis of
science, which is itself merely an extension of common sense
and based on the method of verification (171).
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the property of warrant, Plantinqa states that when i t is
combined with true belief (and settinq aside Gettier
problems), it results in knowledqe.
Plantinqa admits at the outset that there are many
cases in which our beliefs, thouqh true, cannot have warrant.
One reason for this is that many true beliefs are formed in
the context of some sort of malfunction of the coqnitive
faculties.

A belief is warranted only in conditions or

circumstances in which one's coqnitive faculties are
functioninq according to a design plan in an environment for
which it was intended. 86

In addition, Plantinqa's theory of

proper function is set in contrast with internalist,
coherentist, and reliabilist theories of warrant, all of
which, as William Hasker remarks, "he criticizes on the
qrounds that they would ascribe warrant to certain beliefs
which we can readily see, intuitively, to be unwarranted."87
86Plantinqa, warrant and Proper Function, 32-40.
Plantinqa qualifies this notion of warrant by statinq that
it requires setting aside the epistemic problems oriqinally
brouqht to our attention in Edmund Gettier's famous article,
"Is Justified True Belief Knowledqe?" Analysis 23, no. 6
(1963): 121-3. Gettier's main contention is that we often hold
many beliefs that turn out to be true entirely by accident,
and in such cases, it seeas difficult to accept these beliefs
as constituting knowledge. Plantinga's point is to show that
Gettier problems actually afflict internalist epistemoloqies
to a far qreater extent than they afflict externalist
epistemoloqies.
87William Hasker, "Proper Function, Reliabilism, and
Reliqious Knowledge: A Critique of Plantinga's Epistemoloqy,"
in Christian perspectives on Religious Knowledge, ed. C.
stephen Evans and Merold Westphal (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 1993), 66.
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William Hasker's summary of Plantinga's theory is particularly
helpful:
A belief is warranted if it is produced by our epistemic
faculties when they are functioning properly--that is, in
accordance with their design plan--in an appropriate
epistemic environment. Thus, the notion of "functioning
properly" is understood in terms of "design plan," where
the latter idea may be initially understood on analogy
with the design of a manufactured object such as a camera
or a computer. For a theist such as Plantinga, the idea
of a design plan can be taken quite straightforwardly to
refer to the way in which God, in creating human beings,
intended for their cognitive faculties to function. 88
In setting forth the features of this system, Plantinga is
attacking what he considers to be unworkable theories of
epistemic dutifulness, coherence, and reliablity.89

A brief

examination of the main features of Plantinga's notion of
proper function, then, should provide the final step for
obtaining a sufficient insight into his argument for the
rationality of theistic belief.
Plantinga argues that warrant associated with
internalist notions of justification is conceived in terms of
epistemic duty fulfillment or deontological internalism. 90
Such deontoloqical notions of justification typically involve
classical and modern forms of foundational ism, but they will
88 I

bid., 66-67.

89 P l

antinga, "Justification and Theism," 403.

90 P l antinga, Warrant: The current Debate, 11-25 and
162. Cf., idem "Positive Episteaic Practice and Proper
Function, " 2-12.
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also include versions of coherentism as well. 91

On the

externalist side of things, Plantinga is claiming to go beyond

reliabilism which, while being a close approximation to the
true theory, is ultimately unable to deliver warrant due to
problems of generality and defeating counterexamples. 92
In the dispute over the proper analysis of the concept
of epistemic justification, Roderick Chisholm states that both
internalists and externalists are agreed that the issue of
justification is one that "distinguishes knowledge from true
belief that is not knowledge."93

As indicated earlier,

Plantinga is responding to internalist epistemologies which
hold that justification of one's beliefs entails accessibility
to the reasons for those beliefs. 94

Plantinga argues that

91 P l antinga, warrant: 'l'he CUrrent Debate, 162. See
also, Roderick Chisholm, 'l'he Foundations of Knowing
(Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1982)
and 'l'heory of Knowledge, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1989). In his article, "Positive Epistemic
status and Proper Function," 3, Plantinga notes that there is
more than one important internalist tradition, but according
to the dominant tradition (as represented in the previously
cited volumes by Chisholm), it is the Cartesian tradition of
positive epistemic status that is essentially connected with
the fulfillment of epistemic duty and the satisfaction of our
noetic obligation. When we think of justification for positive
epistemic status, i t is this Cartesian traditon which
epistemizes true belief in terms of duty fulfillment. See, for
example, Richard Foley, 'l'he 'l'heory of Epistemic Rationality
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). Plantinga also
includes among internalist traditions, John Pollock's
"Epistemic Norms," Synthesis 71 (April 1987): 61-95 and
Pollock's contemporary 'l'heories of Knowledge, 123-79.
92P l antinga, Warrant: 'l'he CUrrent Debate, 182-210.
93Chisholm, 'l'heory of Knowledge, 75.
94Plantinga, Warrant: 'l'he CUrrent Debate, 5.
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all forms of internal ism fail on the grounds that the
accessibility requirement is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for positive epistemic status, nor is
positive epistemic status merely a matter of one's ability to
fulfill one's epistemic duty or obligation. 9S Evidence
alone is not a sufficient condition for warrant (or positive
epistemic status) because we might imagine a context in which
a person has evidence for a particular belief while
experiencing a malfunctioning of his or her coqnitive
faculties, resulting in a lack of warrant for belief (e.g.,
the famous cartesian demon or brain-in-the-vat scenarios).96
In an example closer to home, Plantinga tells of a
incident his father had in meeting a man in a Grand Rapids
psychiatric hospital who complained that he wasn't getting the
credit he deserved for inventing a new form of human
reproduction, "rotational reproduction," as the man called it.
This novel method of reproduction eliminates the need for sex.
Instead, you simply suspend a woman from the ceiling with a
95The main stock of Plantinga's Warrant: The CUrrent
Debate is given to the inherent difficulties of the various
forms of internalism in providing the justifying connection
between true beliefs and knowledge. The basic import behind
his criticisms is to show that positive epistemic status is
not simply a matter of aptness for fulfillment of one's
epistemic duty or obligation, nor is having accessbility to
the reasons for one's beliefs a necessary nor sufficient
condition for positive epistemic status. The few examples
provided below should be adequate to illustrate Plantinga's
problems with internalist epistemoloqies. See, for example,
Plantinqa's, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function,·
12.

96Pl antinqa, Warrant: The CUrrent Debate, 15-29.
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rope and rotate her at a hiqh rate of speed.

Tbe result of

the rotational process is a larqe number of children, enouqh
to populate a city the size of Chicaqo.

That, said the man,

is in fact precisely how the city of Chicaqo was populated,
and he was simply lookinq for the recognition he was due for
this important discovery.97
Plantinqa uses this case to show that there are many
times when havinq evidence does not imply warrant.

Even if

the man's beliefs fit his evidence (perhaps he remembers
reading about rotational reproduction in a Chicaqo paper and
recalling that the writer neqlected to qive him credit for
having invented it), it is clear they have little or no
warrant.

His beliefs, arques Plantinqa, do not have "the

property • • • of which is sufficient, together with true
belief, for warrant. n98

So the problem lies not with a

failure of fit between the man's beliefs and what he finds
internally available to him: the problem is that his coqnitive
faculties are not functioninq properly; he is insane. 99
Plantinqa's rejection of internalist notions of
justification (i.e., the volitional normativity of epistemic
deontology) is what leads him to embrace some form of
externalism.

If external conditions yield the correct

97Alvin Plantinqa, "Why We Need Proper Function," Nous
27, no. 1

(1993): 68-9.

98Ibid.
99Ibid.
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results, then one is warranted in holdinq the belief in
question and has knowledqe.

Pollock remarks of this approach:

The reliability of a coqnitive process is a continqent
matter. For example, a coqnitive process on which we
place qreat reliance is color vision. Color vision is
reasonably reliable in the normal environment of
earth-bound human beinqs. But if we lived in an
environment in which the colors of our llqht sources
varied erratically, color vision would be unreliable.
The reliabiity of a coqnitive process cannot be assessed
a priori. It depends upon continqent matters of fact.
Thus reliabilism makes epistemic justification turn on
continqent matters of fact. Coqnitive essentialism is
false on this view. lOO
It is Chisholm's contention, however, that externalist systems
can be made to work only if they are supplemented by internal
justification concepts.

If such is the case, then Plantinqa

has not yet established that internal concepts must be
replaced by external ones. lOl
Plantinqa arques that reliablism (a form of
externalism) is closest to his own theory, but like
internallism and coherentism, it must ultimately be rejected
on the qrounds that it would ascribe warrant to beliefs that
are clearly lackinq in warrant.

A belief has warrant in

reliabilism to the extent that it is the product of reliable
belief-forminq processes. 102

There is no warrant where the

external conditions are not present, and this is the case
lOOpollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 23.
lOlChisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 77.
l02 Hasker, "Proper Function, Reliabilism, and
Reliqious Knowledqe," 69-70. See also, Chisholm, Theory of
Knowledge, 77-81.
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regardless of how hard we attempt to fulfill our epistemic
duty.

But beliefs having little or no warrant can be formed

by reliable belief-forming processes.

One reason for this is

that reliabilism cannot solve the problem of generality in
which belief-forming processes can be either too specific or
too generic.
Despite reliabilism's ability to bypass many of the
problems associated with internalism, and despite the fact
that it explains the features of justified belief in the light
of natural processes determined by or reduced to psychological
or physicalist characteristics, it has difficulties explaining
exactly what is to count as a reliable process. 103

In its

broadest sense, a reliable process is a series of activities
that results in one's acquiring or retaining that belief. 104
But there are problems with this approach.
For one thing, it is difficult to know what percentage
of true beliefs the process must be able to produce in order
to be considered reliable.

For example, one could not be

considered justified the first time one comes to have a true
belief as the result of a reliable process, since a successful
track record has not yet been established. lOS

In addition,

the problem of generality leads to difficulties in determining
what is a natural process.

At any point in which I form a

l03Po jman, What Can We Know? 132.
l04Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 78.
lOSPojman, What Can We Know? 132.
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belief, there are many different process types that are
contributing to that belief.

The process activities that lead

to my current belief that it is cloudy today are brought about
by such factors as the perceptual process, the visual process,
processes that occur on Thursday, processes that lead to true
beliefs, etc.

To what extent such factors represent natural

processes is difficult to state.

Design and Proper Function
Plantinga's arqument for the rationality of theistic
belief, as we have seen, gains its force from externalist
epistemic practices that go beyond the difficulties of
internalism, coherence, and reliabilism.

Plantinga describes

his externalism in the following terms:

Design plan and proper function are interdefinable
notions: a thing (organism, organ, system, artifact) is
functioning properly when it functions in accord with its
design plan, and the design plan of a thing is a
specification of the way in which a thing functions when
it is functioning properly. • • • The first condition for
a belief's having warrant, as I see it, is that it be
produced by faculties functioning properly. But this is
by no means sufficient. A second condition is that the
cognitive environment in which the belief is produced must
be the one or like the one for which i t was designed. 106
So even if one's epistemic faculties are functioninq properly
(i.e., in accord with its design plan), if one should suddenly
be transported to a wholly different and alien coqnitive
environment, one's beliefs may have litte or no warrant.
Thus, for Plantinga, a belief is warranted (including a
l06 P l antinga, warrant: ~he

CUrrent Debate, 213-14.
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properly basic theistic belief) only if the cognitive
faculties involved in its production are functioning properly
according to a desiqn plan and environment aimed at the
production of true beliefs.
Pojman indicates that Plantinga's requirement of an
appropriate coqnitive environment allows him to circumvent
Gettier-type counterexamples.

The cognitive mechanism

desiqned to pick out middle-sized objects, notes Pojman, was
not meant to pick out facade barns at a distance. 107

Proper

function according to a desiqn plan is said by Plantinga to
follow certain parameters:
In exploring the notion of desiqn plan, therefore, we must
keep close to the front of our minds the way things go in
these central and paradiqm cases. We must therefore bear
in mind the way in which a radio, say, or a rope, or an
airplane, or some other kind of artifact can be said to
function properly, and what the connection in those cases
is with a desiqn plan. lOS
Design and proper function, Plantinga observes, "is not a
description of how things work under just those circumstances
(as in the paradigm cases) the desiqner plans for or takes
into account; it includes a much broader set of
circumstances. nl09

What this essentially involves is how a

thing will work so long as it retains its approximate present
structure in circumstances operating in conjunction with the
natural laws that do in fact obtain.

Plantinga defends his

l07 po jman, What Can We Know? 154.
lOSPlantinga, Warrant and Proper FUnction, 21-22.
l09 I bid., 23.
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version of the design plan against such anomalies and places
it instead in the context of the proper cognitive environment.
Proper function, then, is necessary for warranted
belief, but as Plantinga argues, it is not sufficient.

There

are possible situations in which our cognitive faculties are
functioning according to a design plan, yet still result in
beliefs with little or no warrant.

Plantinga explains this in

terms of a visit to the distant planet of Alpha Centauri:
Conditions there are much like they are on earth; indeed
some of the inhabitants of the planet are (physiologically
speaking) surprisingly similar to human beings.
Conditions there are propitious for human life; still
there are subtle epistemic differences.
Cats (or their
Alpha Centaur ian counterparts) are invisible to human
beings; but they emit a sort of radiation unknown on
earth, a radiation which works directly on the appropriate
portion of a human brain, causing its owner to form the
belief that a dog is barking nearby. An Alpha Centaur ian
cat slinks by; you form the belief that a dog is barking
nearby.
There is nothing the matter with your noetic
faculties, but the belief in question has very little
positive epistemic status for you. • • • The problem is
that your cognitive faculties and the environment in which
you find yourself are not properly attuned. The problem
is not with you cognitive faculties; they are in good
working order; the problem is with the environment. 110
Plantinga's point is that our human cognitive faculties are
not designed to function properly under every conceivable kind
of circumstances.

Thus in order for our cognitive faculties

to function properly, they require an appropriate cognitive
environment in which they were designed to function.
But even these requirements, while necessary for
warrant, are still not sufficient.

There are still instances

llOPlantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper
Function," 33.
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when our beliefs are not warranted, even though our cognitive
faculties are functioning properly in an appropriate
environment.

Some beliefs, argues Plantinga, have purely

pragmatic value despite the evidence:
Someone may remember a painful experience as less painful
than it really was, as is sometimes said to be the case
with childbirth. You may continue to believe in your
friend's honesty long after evidence and objective
judgment would have dictated a reluctant chanqe of mind.
I may believe that I will recover from a dread disease
much more strongly than the statistics justify.
In these
cases, the relevant faculties may be functioninq properly,
functioning just as they ought to, but nevertheless not in
a way that leads to truth, to the formation of true
beliefs. But then how can I say that a belief has
positive epistemic status if it is produced by one's
faculties functioning properly?lll
In these kinds of cases, there are obvious benefits in holding
beliefs that are inconsistent with the available evidence.
Plantinga seems to indicate that this is factored into our
design plan, and in the appropriate cirumstances, we tend to
form beliefs that are deficient in warrant. 112

positive

epistemic status, then, requires an additional element in
order to be sufficient for warrant.

Plantinga contends that,

to have warrant, a belief must be formed out of conditions in
which the "segment of the design plan is aimed at producing
true beliefs."lll
I11Plantinga, "positive Epistemic Status and Proper
Function," 39.
112Hasker, "Proper Function, Reliabilism, and
Religious Knowledge," 69.
lll I bid. See, for example, Plantinga, warrant: The
CUrrent Debate, 214. Plantinga writes, "Another way to put it:
the belief has warrant only if the segment of the design plan
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There is also the further stipulation that the design
plan of our cognitive faculties must be a good one.

Not all

design plans are the same, argues Plantinga:
An angel might design my faculties,

aiming at producing a
rational creature whose beliefs were for the most part
true.
If this angel is one of Hume's lazy or incompetent
or immature angels, however, then the fact that my beliefs
are produced by faculties functioning properly • • • in
the environment for which they were designed, and
according to a design plan aimed at truth--that fact will
not be sufficient for warrant.
It is also necessary that
the design in question be a good design: that is, that
there be a substantial objective probability that a belief
of that sort produced under those conditions is true. We
might call this the presupposition of reliability; it is
the condition of warrant the reliabilist seizes upon. 114
This will include with it the element of the degree of
warrant.

Plantinga argues that the degree of warrant a belief

has for a person is just the degree to which that person is

inclined to accept the belief in question, provided that the
belief is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly
in an appropriate epistemic environment and that the relevant
segment of the design plan is aimed at the production of true
beliefs. 11S
governing its production is aimed at truth, at the production
of true beliefs."
114P l antinga, Warrant: ~he current Debate, 214.
11SPlantinga's notion of degrees of probability is a
modification of Goldman's version of reliabilism. Goldman's
notion that the justification of a belief is a function of the
reliability of the process or processes that caused it (where
reliability is the tendency of a process to produce beliefs
that are true rather than false), if understood not in terms
of types of processes, but rather in the specific cognitive
functions that perceive the process or processes, is no longer
a theory of reliabilism, argues Plantinga, but rather his
theory of proper function. See, for example, Plantinga,
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A further qualification of Plantinqa's system must be
stated at this point.

Plantinqa has referred to the design

plan as the "specifications, or blueprints" of the organism,
which has a function or purpose, or, as Plantinga puts it,
"several functions or purposes, including both proximate and
more remote purposes."

116

Althouqh it is the design plan

which causes our cognitive faculties to function properly, as
Plantinga intimates, it does not necessarily require a
theistic interpretation.

Rather, arques Plantinga, a given

organism possesses a certain design that is unique to it, and
evolution may well be the mechanism or process through which
an organism or faculty has received optimal design.

In other

words, says Plantinqa, it does not commit us to the position
that human beings have been literally designed by God. 117
It may be that either a theistic God or evolution (or both)
designed our cognitive faculties to function properly under
the appropriate circumstances or in environments favorable to
them. 118
warrant: The CUrrent Debate, 209-10; and idem, "Positive
Epistemic status and Proper Function," 24-31. See also, Alvin
Goldman, "What is Justified Belief?" in Justification and
Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, ed. George Pappas
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 10.
l16 P l
l17 I

antinqa, Warrant and Proper Function, 13.

bid.

l18 po jman, What Can We Know? 154-55. Pojman states
that Plantinqa's system of faculties functioning properly and
in accord to a desiqn plan incorporates the best of
reliabilism, but avoids its weaknesses. A cognizer's belief is
warranted only on the basis of: (~) a properly functioning
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Plantinga's theory of warrant and proper function is,
nevertheless, by his own admission, a version of radical
naturalism.

Claiming to follow Quine at a distance, Plantinga

views his theory as entering in on the discussion of an
ill-named Naturalistic epistemoloqy, since it is quite
compatible with supernaturalistic theis..

Plantinga states

that "the most plausible way to think of warrant, from a
theistic persepctive, is in terms of naturalistic
epistemoloqy.lIll9

To be sure, Plantinga entertains the idea

of whether a nontheist can easily "make use of this notion of
working properly."120

But his theory is ultimately in line

with theistic conceptions that our noetic faculties were
designed by a theistic God who is himself "an intellectual or

intellecting being who possesses the maximal degree of
knowledge. l2l
Plantinga's point, in Pojman's words, is that up to
the recent discussion, "the central thesis that knowledge
entails warrant and warrant entails proper function, which in
turn entails a design plan has been allowed to exist in a
cognitive faculty; (2) a cognitive environment that is fitting
for this kind of cognitive faculty; (3) the segment (module)
of the design plan governing the production of the belief is
aimed at the production of true beliefs; and (4) there is a
high statistical probability that beliefs produced in this way
will be true.
ll9P l antinga, Warrant and Proper FUnction, 46.
l20P l antinga, "Justification and Theism," 411.
l2l I bid., 405.
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metaphysically naturalist worldview.- 122

In the final

sections of his warrant and Proper FUnction, Plantinqa argues
that metaphysical naturalism ultimately lacks a coherent
notion of proper function in its evolutionary account of the
accidental development of conscious and rational beinqs.

If

this is the case, then, metaphysical naturalism cannot claim
warrant for its beliefs. 123

In the final analysis, argues

Plantinqa, if evolution is true and our cognitive faculties
are merely a product of chance and necessity, then, it may
account for the fact that we have belief-forminq mechanisms
that result in beiefs produced in order to maximize survival,
but not necessarily truth. 124
Plantinqa's critique of classical foundationalism's
criteria for basic belief, then, brinqs us closer to the
structure of justification essential to our proposed model of
rationality.

Since no one is obliqated to meet the classical

foundationalist criteria for basic beliefs, one is rational in
holdinq belief in God as a properly basic belief, apart from
the requirement to supply evidence and arguments.

Plantinqa

has attempted to answer the problem of classical
foundationalism on two levels: first, there is the replacement
of the classical foundationalist notion of justification
122 Po jman, What Can We Know? 156.
123 P l antinqa, Warrant and Proper FUnction,

211-15.
124 I bid.,

216-237.

199-201;
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(i.e., all non-basic beliefs are justified on the basis of
propositional evidence from arguments and other basic beliefs)
with an inductive appeal to the circumstances or conditions in
which i t is rational to hold theistic belief (i.e., one's
cognitive faculties performing according to their designed
purpose in environments suitably designed for those
faculties); and second, there is the sense in which
Plantinga's model assumes that a cognizer does in fact have
regular access to proper design and proper function.

It

seems, therefore, that an adequate response to Plantinga's
model of rationality concerns the question of what criteria
are being used to arrive at these two critical aspects of his
system.
Assessment of Plantinga's
Nodel of Rationality
Plantinga argues that the classical foundationalist
criterion for basic belief is self-referentially incoherent.
That is, it does not satisfy its own conditions for the
rationality of basic beliefs.

The proposition (i.e., a

proposition is properly basic for a person only if that
proposition is self-evident, or incorrigible or evident to
that person's senses) is not self-evident, incorrigible, or
evident to the senses, though it may be rationally acceptable
to some. 125

So while this no longer obligates us to the

125 see , for example, Paul Helm, Faith & Understanding
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 185.
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requirement for sufficient evidence as defined by
Enlightenment evidentialism, it does not lead Plantinga to
reject all forms of foundationalism.

The reason is that

Plantinga thinks our noetic structure does have a
foundationalist character. 126

Furthermore, the real issue

behind Plantinga's criticisms have to do with the sorts of
beliefs that can be properly basic. 127

So, once again, to

borrow an expression from Roderick Chisholm, this raises the
problem of the criterion. 128
Plantinga states that:

(1) belief in God is properly

basic; (2) not every belief is properly basic; and most
importantly (3) there is no infallible criterion that would be
acceptable to everyone for determining what kind of beliefs
qualify as properly basic.

The reason why there is no

infallible criterion, argues Plantinga, is that each group of
people is responsible for arriving at its own set of criteria
for properly basic beliefs, and not every group will agree.
What we see is that Plantinga notes the character of
particular examples of rational belief (i.e., everyday beliefs
in which it makes little sense to question the rationality of
holding them) and argues that no criterion for what counts as
rational belief is warranted if such everyday beliefs are
126 Xbid.
127See Stephen T. Davis, God, Reason & Theistic Proofs
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 86.
128see , for example, The Problem of the Criterion
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973).
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excluded. 129

Furthermore, it is not that we cannot provide

a justification for our everyday beliefs, it is just that we
are not required to do so in order to be considered rational.
The essence of Plantinqa's model of rationality is
that one can be rational in believing in God even if that
person does not offer evidence for his belief and cannot
provide criteria for what counts as evidence for or against a
that belief's truth.

But this raises a further and perhaps

more significant point.

rt seems that an adequate model of

rationality should be concerned with more than the question of
when one is rational in holdinq belief in God; it should also
be concerned with the question of whether one is right in
holding that belief because it is true.

Plantinqa's criteria

for being rational do not guarantee that one is right, and yet
it seems that being right is important and should be a factor
in an overall model of rationality.

This takes us beyond the

mere question of when one is rational in holding a belief (in
terms of being warranted on the basis of the right conditions)
and brings us to the matter of whether a more complete system
of rationality ought to include attempts, if possible, to
examine one's beliefs on evidence.

This seems to be precisely

what is at issue with respect to our more abstract beliefs
like belief in God.
Plantinqa contributes to the discussion of rational
belief pointing out that we are rational in holdinq many of
129He l m, Faith

& Understanding, 186.
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our everyday beliefs as properly basic, even thouqh we have
never made an evidential case for them.

But even if it can be

arqued that belief in God can be amonq one's set of properly
basic beliefs, it is difficult to see how this approach can be
developed into a model of rationality that applies to all
beliefs.

One reason for this is because, as we will see in

Swinburne's model in chapter four, there are many other
propositions of reliqion and theology which Plantinqa would
agree are rationally argued for on the basis of evidential
reasons.

That is, Plantinqa's argument for the proper

basicality of belief in God does not seem applicable to other
reliqious beliefs where he would agree on the need for
deductive and inductive arquments, empirical evidence, and so
forth in order to make a rational case.

In this sense, it is

difficult to see how Plantinqa's model of rationality would
differ from a more evidentialist approach (e.q., Swinburne)
with respect to any other reliqious belief, other than the
belief that God exists.
On yet another level, if Plantinqa is riqht about the
notion that belief in God is a properly basic belief similar
to many of our everyday beliefs, then perhaps the only riqht
response is to say that it just seems possible that we can
take an evidentialist position on any kind of belief, one in
which we could offer evidential reasons (at some level) for or
aqainst any of our beliefs if necessary.

On the other hand,

it seems much more difficult a task to show that Plantinqa is
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simply wrong in saying that belief in God is a properly basic
belief similar to many of our everyday beliefs. It may be
suggested that Plantinga seems to make too simple a parallel
between our everyday properly basic beliefs and belief in God.
While he is essentially correct in sayinq that we apply the
same coqnitive apparatus to both cateqories of belief, the
fact of the matter is that people do not tend to challenqe
their everyday beliefs in the way that people can come to
doubt their own belief in God.

It could be said that if

enough people were to challenge their everyday perceptual
beliefs, beliefs of memory, or other mental states, it seems
that we would ultimately rise to the occassion and supply
better evidence for or aqainst holdinq those beliefs.
Furthermore, while it seems reasonable that one can be
within one's epistemic rights to hold everyday beliefs on the
basis of prima facie evidence, it seem a more difficult task
to show that the same applies to belief in God.

As indicated

earlier, while Plantinga's criteria for rationality do not
guarantee that one is right (or even require one to attempt to
verify one's properly basic beliefs as true), it is difficult
to imagine that being right about one's beliefs does not
factor in at some point.

So prima facie evidence about belief

in God may be a good place to start if one is to be considered
rational in holding that belief, but it still seem that a more
complete model of rationality will go beyond the question of
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when one is rational in holdinq a belief and attempt to offer
reasons for why one thinks one's belief is riqht.
It is also questionable whether Plantinqa's
distinction between havinq evidence for a belief and havinq
grounds for a belief eliminates the need to provide an
acceptable criterion for proper basicality that all rational
people can aqree on.

If the conditions or circumstances

relative to a person can constitute the qrounds for that
person's beliefs, it is difficult to see how beliefs (in terms
of propositions arisinq out of various perceptual and
religious experiences) would not be formed on the basis of
such experiences. 130

Such beliefs would constitute evidence

in the way that we have been usinq the term.

Plantinqa thinks

that this is not likely, since a coqnizer can be entirely
unaware of a belief that is qrounded on certain conditions.
Since the coqnizer may be unaware, such qrounds are not
formulated as beliefs.

But even if this is the case, it seems

that such conditions would at best have only a temporal or
limited influence.

Plantinqa so much as admits this when he

arques that our prima

~acie

beliefs can face at least prima

facie defeat by counter-evidence. 131
Another area in which there seems to be a need to
provide criteria for a rational and properly basic belief has
130He l m, 188.
131see, for example, Plantinqa, "The Foundations of
Theism: A Reply," in Faith and Philosophy 3 (1986): 298-313.

145

to do with Plantinga's views on proper design and proper
function.

What is it that gives us the epistemic right to

believe that we have proper function and proper design in the
first place?

Are we not required to use these very same

faculties to come to the conclusion that the design is
correct, that the faculties are indeed functioning properly,
and that the beliefs formed under these conditions are likely
true?

But if this is so, then how does this avoid being an

extended exercise in question-begging?132
If Plantinga is to argue that the conditions which
give rise to true beliefs do so, apart from one's being able
to determine this by having access to criteria outside of
those conditions, he would have to assume in advance that
one's cognitive faculties are in fact functioning as they
should.

Furthermore, he would also be assuming in advance the

proper design of the environment in which one's faculties are
said to be functioning properly.

That is, he is forced to use

his available faculties (and rely on the available
environment) to make the determination that they are in fact
giving one true access to the world.

Plantinga does not seem

to account for the need to get outside of those conditions to
judge whether they are in fact functioninq properly.
Plantinga may go on to argue that such conditions are
person-variant (i.e., that one need only account for the fact
1321 am here indebted to John Feinberq's thouqhtful
analysis of Plantinqa's thinking on this issue.
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that he has certain beliefs that arise out of those
conditions), but even if those conditions are person-variant,
it does not rule out the need to evaluate those conditions
(and their subsequent beliefs) on the basis of criteria that
are not person-variant.

The point is that, once again, even

if this allows for prima facie justification of those beliefs
(and one is hence rational on that account), it seems that
such rationality is short-lived.

It seems more likely that a

cognizer will eventually come to a point where he will want to
determine whether such beliefs can be evaluated on the basis
of evidence that is public and available at some
person-invariant level.

Such criteria seem to be the best

possible way in which one can have evidence that will not
simply confirm the psychological states of the cognizer.
Furthermore, Plantinga states that the conditions
which give rise to properly basic beliefs should be conditions
which aim at truth (presumably in some correspondence sense).
But if this is true, it seems that we have no better way of
evaluating whether a condition is aimed at the truth, apart
from attempts to verify on evidence the propositions arising
from those conditions.

It seems reasonable to suggest that

two people having similar conditions acting upon them (the
same cognitive functions and suitably designed evironment) can
have quite different beliefs arise out of those conditions.
This would seem to suggest that there are other criteria that
are outside of the cognizer's conditions (e.g., evidence in
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the form of other beliefs and propositions one holds as true)
which seem to inform them.

Two people havinq qhost-like

conditions acted upon them can draw different beliefs.

One

may accept the condition as warranting belief in qhosts.

The

other may have such a condition overridden by other beliefs
(in the form of public criteria) to which he holds, that is,
other beliefs that seem acceptable as common knowledqe.
In addition, it seems difficult to draw a parallel
between conditions that give rise to tree-like beliefs (beinq
appeared to treely) and conditions that give rise to other
forms of non-basic beliefs, such as belief in the Great
Pumpkin.

We do not tend to challenqe conditions that qive

rise to tree-like beliefs.

But we quite reqularly question

conditions which are said to qive rise to our more abstract
beliefs.

It is not just that the conditions do not warrant

belief in the Great Pumpkin, for example, but it is that the
public criteria of evidence does not allow for it.
Person-variant beliefs do not resolve this problem.

If

Plantinga appeals to the prima facie evidence that our
faculties are generally to be trusted, then he is (1) relyinq
on some deqree of evidence (e.g., inductive evidence
generalizations or statistical averaqes); (2) assuminq that
our faculties are functioning properly to make the judqment in
the first place; and (3) he is assuming that enough people
have properly functioning faculties to agree with his
judqment.

It is difficult to know what crieria this satisfies
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if not an appeal to some level of evidence outside of one's
psychological state.
It seems, then, that we can proceed with the caution
that Plantinga's notion of rationality appears to circumvent
one of the most critical aspects of rational belief,
specifically that one must make an evidential case for any
belief one holds in order to be considered rational in holding
that belief.

But it further seems that perhaps the next

logical step is to consider whether there are criteria that
account for reasons and evidence for rational belief that go
beyond the mere matter of when one is rational in holding a
belief.

For it would also seem that rational criteria which

aim at the truth of our beliefs are important factors in an
overall model of rationality, criteria that can be verified on
the basis of public evidence.
chapter.

Such is the aim of our next

CHAPTER FOUR
THE PROBABILITY OF BELIEF ON EVIDENCE
ctJMtJLATrvE CASE EVIDENTrALISM
We have argued in chapter three that Plantinga's model
of rationality is inadequate due to its lack of criteria for
what counts as a properly basic belief.

Furthermore, there

seems to be a need for a criterion that could provide enough
evidence to rationally convince a cognizer that the conditions
that give rise to one's beliefs are conditions that have
successfully aimed at the truth.

Our conclusion was that we

need a model of rationality which can supply such criteria.
We now turn to a model of rationality in which we come much
closer to the criteria for sufficient evidence, even though
that evidence need not satisfy the criteria of Enlightenment
evidentialism.

The Probability or Theistic Belier
A CUmulative Case
A common feature among non-theistic thinkers who hold
to the evidentalist assumption is the notion that there are
good evidential reasons for denying that there can be a
rational case for theism. l

So while theists attempt to offer

lsee, for example, J. L. Mackie, The Miracle or Theism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 4-6.
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coherent arguments and reasons in support of its cognitive
claims, in the final analysis, evidentialist objectors to
belief in God argue that it lacks sufficient evidence (either
of a directly verifiable empirical nature or of a self-evident
propositional nature in the form of deductive proofs) for its
rational defence.

One current and evidentialist response to

this objection is the model of rationality found in the
cumUlative case evidentialis. of Richard Swinburne. 2
Relying on models of rationality upon which we base
some of our best scientific theories, Swinburne argues that
there are evidences for theistic belief that make it more
probable than not that theism is the best hypothesis for
explaining the various phenomena of our world. Swinburne's
thinking is highly influenced by the philosophy of science,
and as such, his rational theories for theism are consistent
with his conclusion that "the great theories and predictions
of modern science concern matters far beyond our
observation. "3

He writes:

2The essential features of SWinburne's rational case
for theism are found in his The Existence of God (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979); and Faith and Reason (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981). Others who argue in a similar fashion
are Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief
(London: Macmillan, 1973); George Schlesinger, Religion and
Scientific Method (Boston: D. Reidel, 1977); and Hugo Meynell,
The Intelligible Universe: A cosmological Argument (Totowa,
N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1982).
3 Richard swinburne, "Intellectual Autobiography," in
Reason and the Christian Religion: Essays in Honor of Richard
SWinburne, ed. Alan G. Padgett (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 4.
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What makes scientific theories meaningful is not their
verifiability, but the fact that they describe their
entities (atoms) and their properties (velocity, spin)
with words used so.ewhat stailarly to words used for
describing ordinary .undane things.·
Unobservable entities such as atoms, for exa.ple, are commonly
described through fa.iliar exa.ples of analoqous lanquage
(e.g., that they are like very small billiard-balls and
somewhat like waves, only not waves in media 11ke water).

The

observable phenomena and additional background knowledge,
then, make it highly probable that a given hypothesis (e.g.,
atomic theory) is the best explanatory hypothesis of the
available evidence. s

So, while we may not be in a position

to observe these entities directly, Swinburne correctly
asserts that it is reasonable to conclude that we have
knowledge of them by virtue of the phenomena we actually do
observe.

Theistic theories, then, may work in a similar

fashion, and as SUCh, i t may be legitimate to postulate a
4 I bid., 4-5.

SIbid. See, for example, Michael Peterson and others,
Reason & Religious Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991), 165. Swinburne is not assuming that we have exhaustive
and indisputable knowledge of natural phenomenea, nor does he
assume that any specific theory is immune from revision.
Rather, he believes that our current scientific theories
(together with their level of confirmation) are adequate for
explaining the available evidence. Serious revisions of
accepted theories (in order to account for anomalies) would
appear ad hoc and likely upset the whole structure of
science. Swinburne's point is that there are some events
(e.q., the universe's existence and design) for which we could
justifiably argue there are no natural explanantions that
are ultimately satisfying. See also, Richard Swinburne,
The concept of Miracle (London: Macmillan, 1970), 29-32.
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theistic hypothesis as the best explanation of the available
phenomena.
We may briefly state Swinburne's model of rationality,
then, in the following terms:

In order to be rational in

holding a belief, one must hold it for what Swinburne calls
"good epistemological reasons," that is, for reasons one
thinks are true, given the total available evidence, even if
that belief cannot be verified as true.

Furthermore, to be

rational about one's belief is to judge that a belief on
evidence is more probable than not, that is, to think that one
has good reasons for believing that a belief is more likely
true than not, given the total evidence.

The total available

evidence is in part a relation among a person's beliefs (i.e.,
reasoning from basic to non-basic beliefs).

Total evidence

consists of the set of propositions (both basic and non-basic)
to which a person holds, that is, propositions that seem to be
true and which that person is inclined to believe (but not
solely on the basis of other propositions that one believes
(e.g., reports of perception, memory, and other mental states
that are forced on one by one's experience of the world).
Prior beliefs (i.e., beliefs a person may hold in
advance of an investigation of the reasons for holding it) or
basic beliefs are justified on both doxastic and non-doxastic
reasons (e.g., other mental states, including hunches and
intuitions, and other basic propositions of which a cognizer
is aware).

Justification on this model is a reason-based
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conception, in which a cognizer may appeal to evidence in the
form of other prior or basic beliefs, other .ental states
accepted on the basis of one's experience, or one's inductive
standards (i.e., beliefs based on experience, testimony,
authority, or even other factors that are not necessarily
articulated).

Justification follows an essentially

foundationalist structure, in which non-basic beliefs are
inferred from basic beliefs.
Basic beliefs are not necessarily incorriqible on
evidence (althouqh they may become incorriqible for
psycholoqical reasons).

They are held with varyinq deqrees of

confidence (i.e., the deqree to which one's experiences make
that belief seem more likely than not).

Basic propositions

formed out of one's experiences and evidence ultimately become
basic beliefs, unless rendered improbable by one's other basic
beliefs.

Basic beliefs report what a cognizer is initially

inclined to believe, toqether with the deqree of probability
or initial confidence one has in them, qiven the available
evidence.
On this model, there are deqrees of rationality,
dependinq on the extent to which one's evidence, arquments,
and procedures for evaluatinq the evidence suqqest that a
belief is more likely true than not.

One's calculations for a

belief's likelihood of truth are not very explicit, but one is
said to have certainty about one's belief in extreme cases of
the likelihood of truth, that is, when one has in fact
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verified one's belief as true on evidence.

This further

implies that the less likely a belief is thought to be true on
evidence, the more one is expected to provide additional
evidence for that belief if one is thought to be rational in
holding it (although one is not required to verify that belief
as true).
The Probability of Theories and Beliefs
One of the central features of Swinburne's rational
defence of theistic belief is his move from deductive to
inductive forms of arguments. 6

Whereas in a sound deductive

argument the premises make the conclusion certain, it is not
the case that all arguments need to be evaluated by such
deductive standards.'

Rather, it is Swinburne's suggestion

that there can be rational arguments for theistic belief
without necessarily appealing to deductive standards. 8
6Swinburne discusses the nature of inductive
arguments in The Existence of God, ch.1.
'See Merrie Bergman, James Moor, and Jack Nelson, The
Logic Book, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company,
1990), 10. Deductive arguments are valid if and only if it is
not possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
false (i.e., it is not possible consistently both to assert
the premise and to deny the conclusion ). Deductive arguments
are invalid if and only if it is not deductively valid. See
also, Irving Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 9th
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994), 206.
8 see , for example, Bergman, Moor, and Nelson, 11.
Deductively invalid arguments may still be considered good
arguments if they are evaluated by inductive standards. An
argument is said to be inductively strong if the premises
provide strong evidence for the truth of the conclusion. The
more probable the truth of the conclusion, given the premises,
the stronger the argument. An inductive argument is weak if
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stated differently, if the traditional evidence for theism
(e.g. , the theistic proofs) experiences a series of failures
due to its reliance on purely deductive arguments, the
evidence for theism can be inductively re-examined in light of
its contribution to a culmulative case argument from the
evidence.
While deductive arguments (assuming they are valid)
make formal attempts at being sound (i.e., true) and
consequently rational, Swinburne realizes that one can easily
agree to their soundness simply by granting the truthfulness
of the premises for the sake of the argument.
reasoning process begs the question.

But such a

It is not rational to

argue for the soundness of a valid deductive argument simply
by assuming the truthfulness of its premises.

Swinburne

intends to offer instead a system of rationality in which one
has good reasons to think that the evidence offered in support
of a given conclusion (or theory) makes that conclusion more
probable than not. 9
According to a cumulative case evidential argument for
theism, the hypothesis of theism is said to make better sense
and only if it is not inductively strong. Cf., Copi and Cohen,
452-455. As will become clear, Swinburne's arguments for the
probability of theism, while following the structure of
inductive arguments in general, nevertheless, invokes a form
of inductive reasoning in the form of Bayes' Theorem. Our
discussion will, as much as possible, consider the basic
features of the theorem and their application to the
rationality of belief.
9 swinburne,

The Existence of God, 7-8.
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of all the available evidence (e.q., a posteriori arquments
like the cosmological arquaent for God's existence, the
pattern of history and the existence of some evidence of
miracles, the occurrence of reliqious experiences, etc.) than
does any other alternative. 10

When each piece of evidence

is examined individually, the evidence is more to be expected
if God does exists than if he does not.

And taken toqether

Swinburne believes the evidence to suqqest that the existence
of God is more probable than not. 11

This is essentially the

way swinburne uses probability to rationally confirm that a
theory is likely true. 12

Swinburne attempts to show by the

application of Bayes' Theorem that the probability of theism
(i.e., prior and posterior probability) in relation to the
l~itchell, 39-40. See also, Michael C. Banner, The
Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious
Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 68; and Swinburne's,
The Existence of God, 290.

llBanner, The Justification of Science and the
Rationality of Religious Belief, 68.
12See John S. Feinberq, The Many Faces of Evil (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1979 and 1994), 165. See also,
Richard Swinburne, "Choosinq Between Confirmation Theories,"
Philosophy of Science 37 (1970): 603; idem, "Confirmability
and Factual Meaninqfulness," Analysis 33 (1972-3): 71-6; and
idem, An Introduction to Confirmation Theory (London: Methuen
Press, 1973). For similar forms of probability arquments, see
Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Foundations of Probability, 2d ed.
(London: Routledqe and Keqan Paul, 1962); Carl G. Hempel,
Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Macmillan, 1965);
and Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (London:
Routledqe and Keqan Paul, 1963); and Popper's The Logic of
Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper. ROW, 1965).
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evidences of the world is greater than one half. 13

A brief

review of the theorem is all that is necessary to consider the
degree to which Swinburne's arqument for the probability of
theories influences his thinking on the nature and rationality
of beliefs, both theistic and otherwise.
Swinburne states that the probability of any
hypothesis is essentially the extent to which one proposition
(or set of propositions) renders probable another proposition
(or set of propositions).

So the probability of a hypothesis

h on available evidence e and background knowledge k

is a

function of its prior probability and its explanatory power
(posterior probability).

Bayes' Theorem, put in these terms,

may be expressed as follows:

P(h/e.k)

=

p(e/b.X) x P(b/k)
p(e/k).14

Given this formulation, Swinburne suggests that our evidence
can be distributed between e and k

(where k may represent mere

tautological knowledge or some aspect of contingent
13swinburne, Tbe Existence of God, 278. See also,
John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1989), 104-5. For a helpful introduction to
the conditional probability of Bayes' theorem, see Patrick J.
Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, 6th ed. (Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997), 539-42. Bayes'
Theorem is named after the eighteenth-century English
clergyman Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). The conditional
probability of a given theory is the probability of that
theory being the case given certain evidence, and is
expressed peA given B).
14Richard Swinburne, Tbe Existence of God, 64-69 and
281; and Idem, "Does Theism Need a Theodicy?" Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (June 1988): 303.
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knowledge).

P(h/k) is the prior probability of h, that is,

how likely h is to be true prior to obtaining new evidence e,
on backqround knowledge alone.

P(h/e.k) is the probability of

h, that is, how likely h is true in light of evidence e and
backqround knowledge k.

P(e/h.k) represents the predictive

ability of h, that is, the likelihood that e will occur if h
(along with k) is true.

And finally, P(e/k) is the prior

probability that e is the case solely on the basis of k being
true. IS

Feinberg summarizes Bayes' Theorea in the following

terms:
This says that the probabity of a hypothesis, given the
backqround information and available evidence, equa~s the
prior probability of the hypothesis times the probability
that there will be evidence of the sort in the world that
there is (given the truth of the hypothesis and the
background information), divided by the probability that
there will be the sort of evidence we have, given the
backqround information we know. 16
Each expression of the theorem receives a numerical value,
through which one then determines the probability of the
hypothesis from the results of working the math problem.
Probabilities range between 0 and 1, and once it is determined
that a hypothesis has a qreater probability than .5, it is
said to be confirmed in the sense that it is more likely true
than not. 17
ISSwinburne,"Does Theism Need a Theodicy?" 303-4. See
also, Bringsjord, 128.
I6Feinberg, Evi~, 163.
I7Ibid.
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Not all inductive arguments have the same force with
respect to the probability of the conclusion.

Swinburne

attempts to focus on inductive arguments for which he believes
the premises make the conclusion probable, that is, more
probable than not.

He distinguishes between C-inductive

arguments and P-inductive arguments.

We have C-inductive

arguments when the premises or evidence confirm the conclusion
of the hypothesis in the sense that the evidence has raised
the probability of the hypothesis from what it was, or would
have been, apart from that evidence.

We have P-inductive

arguments when the premises or evidence confirm the conclusion
of the hypothesis in the sense that the evidence makes the
hypothesis more likely than not to be true. 1S

In other

words, each of the phenomena (i.e., the evidences) renders a
theory more probable than it would be without it and results
in a correct c-inductive (confirmatory) argument for a qiven
hypothesis (e.q., theism).

Of course, the question is whether

correct C-inductive arguments can be built toqether into a
correct P-inductive argument showinq that the final
probability of a theory is qreater than .5 (i.e., that the
theory is likely true).19

And, as Swinburne admits, it is

l8see , for example, J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of
Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 95-96. See
also, Swinburne, The Existence of God, 7.
19Hick, 106. See also, Brinqsjord, 128. Brinqsjord
argues that if each of el' ••• , e~ represent evidence in a
series of six purportedly qood C-1nductive arguments, then
where h = 'God exists,' p(h/e l , ••• , e6 & k) > .5.
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harder to tell when we have a qood P-inductive argument than
when we have a qood C-inductive argument, but the primary
concern is with relations of non-deductive support between
certain evidence, in the liqht of a body of beliefs or
propositions constitutinq backqround knowledqe, and a
hypothesis or conclusion. 20
Prior Probability
Swinburne arques that a successful application of the
theorem includes an assessment of the prior probability of
hypotheses on tautoloqical backqround information (i.e., apart
from considerinq evidence of the sort in the world that there
is).

That is, "a hypothesis is confirmed by certain evidence

if and only if (apart from or prior to that evidence's beinq
observed) the addition of the hypothesis to the backqround
knowledge or belief makes it more probable that the evidence
would occur than it would be in relation to the backqround
knowledge or belief alone."21

intrinsic probability.

Swinburne refers to this as

But it is unlikely that the intrinsic

probability of a theory can be determined only on the basis of
some tautoloqical evidence.

This leads Swinburne to adopt

specific criteria (e.q., simplicity, scope, and backqround
knowledge) as a further means of determining the prior
probability of theories.

The more detailed and broader ranqe

20Swinburne, ~he Existence
21Mackie, 96.

or

God, 278.
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of claims that a hypothesis makes, the lower its intrinsic
probability.

Hypotheses that postulate fewer entities (or

fewer kinds of entities) bave greater intrinsic
probability. 22
When considering the prior probability of a theory
(e.g., the hypothesis of theism), Swinburne arques that (like
scientific theories) the criterion of simplicity is crucial.
It is simplicity, arques Swinburne, which gives an explanatory
hypothesis (whether scientific or personal) its greatest
degree of prior probability:
The existence of God is a very simple hypothesis which
leads us to expect various very general and more specific
phenomena which otherwise we would not expect, and for
that reason is rendered probable by the phenomena. Or
rather, as with any big scientific theory, each group of
phenomena add to the probability of the theory; toqether
they make it significantly more probable than not. Z3
A simple theory is one which accounts for few laws, each
connecting few variables.

It is a theory which postulates few

entities, few kinds of entity, few properties, and few kinds
of property.

Simple theories have fewer details to account

for, and there is less chance to misinterpret the data.
Swinburne contends that scientists follow the same pattern of
argument to arque to the existence of unobservable entities as
causes of observable phenomena. 24
22 I bid.,

304-5. See also, Swinburne, The Existence of

God, 52.
23 swinburne,

"Autobiography," 10. See also, Clark, 37.

24 Swinburne,

"Autobiography," 5-6.
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The criterion of simplicity is also essential for
swinburne to argue his further point that a

sc~entific

explanation of the existence of the universe is too complex to
account for the phenomena of our world accurately (i.e., it
works against the criterion of simplicity).

Scientific

explanations, for example, explain phenomena in terms of the
regularity of laws and some prior state of affairs.
Phenomenon e is explained in terms of some prior state of
affairs f

(the cause) and some regularity 1 with respect to

the way objects involved in f and e behave. 25
Personal explanation, on the other hand, is when the
occurence of a phenomenon e is explained as brought about by a
rational agent p doing some action intentionally.26

The

point is that an explanatory hypothesis is likely to be more
probable when it invokes fewer entities and fewer kinds of
entities.

Furthermore, such entities should have easily

describable properties and behave in mathematically simple
kinds of ways (i.e., a person having certain capacities and
purposes which do not change erratically) which give rise to
many phenomena.

Swinburne thinks that if we cannot find a

scientific theory which satisfies the criteria in attempting
to best explain the phenomena, one should look for a personal
explanation. 27

When other theories are unable to explain

2S I bid., 6.
26Swinburne, The Existence of God, 32.
27Swinburne, "Autobiography," 7.
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the phenomena in question, what we postulate should lead us to
expect (to some degree of probability) what we observe. 28
Using the criterion of simpicity, then, Swinburne argues that
the personal explanation of theism ultimately offers the
greatest degree of simplicity, and thereby, a higher degree of
prior probability than any of the alternatives.
A further criterion for determining the prior
probability of an explantatory hypthesis is a matter of

background knowledge (i.e., our knowledge of how well a theory
fits with our general knowledge of how the world works).

Do

the kinds of entities and laws which the theory postulates
tend to agree with those which we reasonably think are the
case in other fields?

Swinburne suggests, for example, that

if a theory postulates no unknown entities, then on background
knowledge, it is more likely to be true than a theory which
postulates new (or even unobservable) entities. 29
The final criterion in determining a theory's prior
probability is that of scope.

The narrower a theory's scope,

the more it adds to the prior probability (and simplicity) of
a theory.

Swinburne suggests that the more objects involved

or allegedly covered by a theory, the less probable it is.
For the more a theory asserts, the more it is likely to
explain the data inaccurately or inadequately.
28 I

bid., 6 and 11.

29 Swinburne,

~he Existence of God, 52.

Hypotheses
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which have the best fit with background knowledge and are
narrowest in scope are the most likely candidates for
simplicity.

Of course, Swinburne's criteria for the prior

probability of theories do not ipso facto rule out the idea
that some theories which do not satisfy these conditions are
in fact more probable than not.

Rather, such criteria seem to

represent what Swinburne sees as the accepted pattern of
science in determining a theory's prior probabilitYn
Theories, then, have explanatory power (or probability) in so
far as they are able to explain the wide range of phenomena,
particularly when the phenomena are not otherwise to be
expected apart from the theory.

The greater the theory's

prior probability, the greater the theory's power to explain
the phenomena, and the more likely it is to be true. 30
Posterior Probability
When considering the posterior probability of a
hypothesis, Swinburne is concerned with just how all the
available evidence makes a hypothesis probable.

In other

words, given the determination that "all the relevant factual
evidence is included in e, and k is mere tautological
evidence, what is the value of P(h/e.k)?

We may not be able

to give it an exact numerical value, but the important issue
30 I

bid.
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is whether p(h/e.k) > p(-h/e.k) and so > 1/2.

Do we have a

good P-inductive arqument to the existence of God?,,31
Evidences considered in determininq the posterior
probability of the theistic hypothesis, for example, include
the existence of the universe; the universe's temporal
orderliness and design; the existence of humans and animals;
the fact of conscious beings, particularly human agents of
limited power and knowledge, and possessing a degree of free
will in which humans have opportunities to co-operate in
acquiring knowledge, changing their environment, influencing
history.

other forms of evidence include the occurrence of

miracles; the fact of morality (which Swinburne thinks does
not add evidential weight); and the existence of evil, which
he also regards as having no evidential weight.

Religious

experience, however, is given more weight than the other forms
of evidence.

Swinburne contends that "unless the probability

of theism on other evidence is very low indeed, the testimony
of many witnesses to experiences apparently of God suffices to
make many of those experiences probably veridical.

That is,

the evidence of religious experience is in that case
sufficient to make theism over all probable. 32
In theistic terms, then, Swinburne believes that there
is higher probability for the hypothesis of theism (given
31 I bid., 278.
32 I bid, 291. See also, Selmer Bringsjord, "Swinburne's
Argument From Consciousness," International Journal for the
Philosophy of Religion 19, no. 3 (1986): 127-8.
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background knowledqe and posterior evidence) than there is for
the hypothesis based on background knowledqe alone, if and
only if there is greater probability that the evidence obtains
given the theistic hypothesis and background knowledge than
there is for the evidence to obtain (given only background
knowledge) apart from the theistic hypothesis. 33
Part of what is at stake here is whether Swinburne's
model of rationality (in terms of the probability of theories
and beliefs) goes beyond the suggestion that a theory (whether
scientific, philosophical, or theistic) is at best in better
agreement with the known data and offers a more coherent and
comprehensive explanation of the data (taking future evidence
into account) than alternative theories available at the time.
An

adequate model of rationality has to account for how it

will deal with the possibility that future evidence could
falsify our synthetic beliefs.

It should not be difficult to

see that Swinburne intends to offer a system that, while not
offering deductive certainty of synthetic claims, does suggest
that one's beliefs or theories will experience a level of
probabilty that is not expected to be shown false as a result
of future evidence.

Such evidence is thought to be evidence

of the appropriate kind and quality that it offers sufficient
reason for a cognizer to be rationally convinced that it is
more reasonable than not to believe that theories supported by
this evidence are more likely true than not.
33 Swinburne,

~he

Existence of God, 68-9.
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Swinburne's approach to the justification of theories
or beliefs, then, is different from Murphy's notion that all
of our current theories or beliefs are likely to be replaced
by future theories thought to better explain the evidence, and
that the most we can expect of our formulations is that they
will be tentative and subject to revision.

While Swinburne's

notion of the probability of theories is offered in place of
unachievable systems of indubitable certainty, it is also
expected that his model can make more rational sense out of
the synthetic claims of theism and allow one to reach greater
levels of certitude through a cumUlative approach to the
available evidence. 34

The question remains, however,

whether Swinburne's model of rationality provides the kind or

quality of evidence that can serve as an adequate replacement
to the sufficient evidence of Enlightenment evidentialism and
evidential arguments. 35

The Nature of Belief
Our purpose up to this point has been to see how
Swinburne uses prior and posterior evidence to argue for the
34 See , for example, Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science
and Religion (New York: Harper' ROW, Publishers, 1966),
147-148. For a summary of the different uses of confirmation
theories by Carnap, Popper, and Hempel, see J. P Moreland,
Christianity and the Nature of Science (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Baker Book House, 1989), 86-92.

35 See , for example, Antony Flew, God and Philosophy
(London: Hutchinson, 1966), 141. See also, Selmer Bringsjord,
"swinburne's Argument from Consciousness," 128.
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overall probability of explanatory theories.

By usinq the

same procedures of determininq the prior and posterior
evidence for beliefs, Swinburne thinks one can determine the
probability of a qiven belief and why one is rational in
holdinq it.

It is Swinburne's contention that, while the

concept of belief is not a completely clear one, we may still
be in an episteaic position to examine what it aeans to hold
to the concept of believinq that so-and-so (e.q., that there
is a God).36
swinburne argues that the nature of belief (as
sugqested by public criteria) is the concept of "believinq
so-and-so more probable (or more likely) than
such-and-such."37

Belief, like theories, is relative to

alternatives, and accordinq to Swinburne, the alternative with
which a proposition is normally contrasted is its neqation.
He writes:
The negation of a proposition p is the proposition not-p,
or "it is not the case that p" • • • • Normally to believe
that p is to believe that p is more probable than
not-p.38
36swinburne, Faith and Reason, 3.
37 I bid., 3-4.
38I bid., 4. See, for example, Banner, ~he
Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious
Be~ief, 101. Banner indicates that SWinburne's notion of
probablity here is to be distinguished from those instances
where one acts on the assumption that p. In such a case, it is
swinburne's contention that we do not have a valid instance of
belief, since the assumption is held without thinking that p
is probable to any siqnificant deqree. This amounts to what
Anthony Kenny describes as the "actinq-as-if" behavior of the
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Furthermore, Swinburne seems to suqqest that he sees the
probability of a belief (together with its relation to
alternatives) in terms of the likelihood of its truth.

He

thinks that one's beinq certain of p is an extreme case of p
beinq probable, but more importantly in terms of an approach
to rationality, if one does not believe that p is probable,
then one cannot believe that p is true.

Likewise, if one

believes that it is more probable that not-p than that p, then
one cannot be rational in believinq that p.39

In addition,

it is important to understand that, while the probability of a
belief does not necessarily rule out epistemic certainty
(i.e., the qreatest deqree of evidence one can have for either
analytic or synthetic statements), such certainty is not a
necessary condition for a belief's probability.
Belief and Evidence
Swinburne has argued up to this point that beliefs,
very much like theories, are defined in terms of probability.
To believe in the proposition that p is, in essence, to have
the inclination that p is more probable than not.

The notion

of epistemic justification, then, is understood in term of the
warrant, reasons, or qrounds that make one justified and
rational in holdinq a belief.

So on Swinburne's account of

justification, while a person does not have to verify (i.e.,
aqnostic (101-102). See also, Anthony Kenny, ~he God of the
Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 129.
39 swinburne, Faith and Reason,

4.
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establish a belief on the basis of the total evidence
available) a qiven belief as true, a person is rational and
justified if he thinks the evidence renders it likely to be
true.

Swinburne refers to this as epistemic probability, and

suqqests that it is relative to evidence.

A proposition's

beinq epistemically probable (i.e., more likely true than not
true) depends on the evidence-class relative to which the
probability is
assessed. 40
The epistemic probability of a proposition, argues
Swinburne, is determined alonq lines that are similar to the
probability of theories.

In both cases, it is a question of

the extent to which the evidence in question supports a
proposition or theory.

But, as Swinburne recoqnizes,

establishinq the probability of a proposition on evidence is a
more difficult and arbitrary task than he thinks is true in
the case of theories:
The epistemic probability of most ordinary claims cannot
of course be qiven an exact numerical value; the most that
one can say about the probability of most ordinary claims
is that one claim is more probable than some other claim.
(If one claim is more probable than its neqation, it has a
probability of more than 1/2. If on the evidence a claim
is certainly true it has a probability of 1; if i t is
certainly false, it has a probability of 0.)41

40 I bid., 18-19.
41 I bid., 19.
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It will become clear, however, that the matter of probability
and certainty with respect to one's propositions involves a
host of epistemic features.

That is, the epistemic

probability of a person's beliefs, in Swinburne's view,
concerns the evidence available to a person at the time.
Swinburne's position amounts to the claim that S believes
that p "if and only if S believes that the total evidence
available to him makes p more probable than any alternative;
that, on the total evidence available to him, p is more
probable than any alternative. n42
Part of what functions as the prior probability of a
belief is what Swinburne refers to as a person's inductive
standards.

He states that when two or more people are

attempting to judge the probability of a proposition, they
may differ "not in their evidence, but in their inductive
standards, that is, in what conclusions they judge to be
probable on the basis of the evidence. n43

Briefly put,

inductive standards include some kind of generalization
principle about the evidence.

If all (or most) objects of

some kind have been observed to have a certain property, then
it is (very) probable that some other object of that kind will
have the same property.

Of course, people will differ on how

many observations are needed before a judgment of high
probability can be made.

Most inductive standards are

42 I bid.
43 swinburne, Faith and Reason,

37.
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identifiable on the basis of commonly accepted criteria, but
some people will have inductive standards quite different from
the rest of us (e.g., the Azande for whom it seems intuitively
right that a spell can be cast on someone, or a gambler who,
having just become the father of a baby boy, thinks
coincidental resemblances of events are important and bets on
a horse called "Sonny Boy").
seem intuitively right.

Soae inductive standards just

other inductive standards, on the

other hand, may make it altoqether rational for a person to
accept a belief, even though that person may be unable to
state those standards in propositional terms.

Furthermore,

not all inductive standards are grounded in experience (i.e.,
observation of phenomena).

One such standard is the testimony

principle, that other things being equal, if someone tells you
that p, then probably p.

This principle is subsequently

qualified on the basis of future evidence and onels own
observations.

We tend to give higher probabilities to our own

observations.

In addition, there is the inductive standard of

authority, that qenerally speaking, we believe what we are
told on authority."

But beliefs based on testimony and

(when it is possible) beliefs based on authority are typically
qualified by later attempts to investigation the evidence on
one's own.

44 I bid.,

38-42.
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Swinburne's point is that a person's inductive
principles are his beliefs (whether explicit or not) about
what makes what probable.

Inductive principles, to some

extent, may represent the psycholoqical states and personal
preferences of the coqnizer.

This is important to Swinburne's

model of rationality and justification, since, like basic
beliefs, one's inductive standards usually give rise to other
beliefs that one finds probable by the evidence. 4S
The relation among a cognizer's beliefs and the degree
to which such a relation counts as evidence with respect to
epistemic probability is primarily a doxastic

relation (i.e.,

solely on the grounds of other propositions which he
believes), but it can also involve other non-doxastic states
as well. 46 Part of a cognizer's evidence, then, consists of
the set of propositions that are basic for that person.

Basic

propositions are propositions which seem to be true to a
person and which that person is inclined to believe, but not
solely on the ground that they are made probable by other
propositions which he believes. 47 Reports of a
person's perceptions ("I see a clock") or what a coqnizer
perceives ("the clock reads 5.10"), or a coqnizer's memories
("I remember going to London yesterday") or what a cognizer
remembers (liit rained in London yesterday") are examples of a
4S I bid., 44.
46 I bid.
4'Ibid., 20.
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person's basic propositions.

Swinburne points out that a

person is inclined to hold such basic beliefs simply because
he is inclined to believe that they are forced upon him by his
experience of the world.
Swinburne's notion of basic belief, however, differs
from that of classical foundational ism, since his idea of a
basic belief is not necessarily one that requires no further
justification or is indubitable.

He writes:

In terming all such propositions basic I do not mean to
imply either that they are known infallibly (i.e., without
the possibility of error) or that they are known
incorrigibly (i.e., without the possibility of the subject
subsequently rationally believing that he has been in
error about them) or that they are known at all. On the
contrary, the subject will have different degrees of
confidence in them (i.e. he ascribes to them different
degrees of prior probability).48
Much like what counts as evidence for determining the
probability of explanatory hypotheses, a person's reasons for
initially holding some basic propositions with a certain
degree of confidence is because "his experiences have been
such that it seems to him to be probable to that degree. 1I49
A cognizer's evidence, then, consists of the set of basic
propositions which report what he is initially inclined to
believe, together with the degree of prior probability or
initial confidence he has in them. so
48 I bid.
49 I bid.
SOIbid., 20-1. Swinburne is aware of the manner in
which his system differs from strong foundationalism. He
writes, liThe view that a man's system of beliefs must
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According to Swinburne, then, it is this kind of
evidence that allows a basic proposition to acquire the status
of a belief (and ultimately a basic belief) unless it is
rendered improbable by other basic beliefs to which a person
holds. 51

Most basic propositions acquire the status of

beliefs, but some do not.

Swinburne writes:

The greater the prior probability of basic propositions p,
and the qreater the conditional probability of a further
proposition q on the basic propositions p (i.e. the
probability that if p then q), the qreater the resultant
probability of the further proposition. In so far as the
subject believes that the prior and conditional
ultimately be justified by their being made probable by some
basic set of beliefs which just seem (on qrounds of experience
or reason) to the man to be so, is usually called
Foundationalism. The alternative is the view that each of a
man's beliefs might be justified solely by being made probable
by some other belief, and so there could be 'an infinite
regress of justification, or justification in a circle (e.g.
belief A by belief B, belief B by belief C, and belief C by
belief A). I do not find it coherent to suppose that each of a
man's beliefs could be justified only by some other
belief . . . . I assume only that in practice for humans things
are not like this. Human beliefs find their foundation in
beliefs whose justification is not solely in terms of other
beliefs. Those called foundationalists often hold that basic
propositions are incorrigible; as I say, I am not claiming
that" (20-21, n.3.).
51 William Alston has suggested that swinburne at this
point may be too relaxed in his standards for rationality. See
also, William P. Alston, "Swinburne on Faith and Belief," in
Reason and the Christian Religion: Essays in Honour of Richard
SWinburne, ed. Alan G. Padgett (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1994), 23, n. 3. Alston thinks (contra Swinburne) that people
often hold propositions or beliefs, even when rendered
improbable by one's set of basic beliefs. Alston thinks that
we are closer to an acceptable definition if Swinburne's
phrase, "unless other of a man's basic beliefs render i t
improbable" is replaced with "unless the person sees that
other of his basic beliefs render it improbable."
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probabilities are great, the more probable he will believe
the further proposition to be. 52
So what is notable about Swinburne's criterion for basicality,
then, is his qualification that the person is not inclined to
believe the proposition solely on the grounds that i t is made
probable by other propositions the person believes.

The

proposition might be believed, in part, because of its support
from other beliefs or cognitive states.

As such, as Alston

has pointed out, Swinburne's suggestion that many different
forms of perceptual beliefs may count as basic should be
understood as being compatible with the view that those
beliefs are partly based on other background beliefs, so long
as there is at least some non-doxastic basis (e.g.,
experience) somewhere in the picture. 53
While i t is clear that Swinburne's examples of basic
propositions include both doxastic and non-doxastic evidence,
it is always a question of prior probability as to whether a
proposition gains the status of belief, and such prior
probability largely influences the assessment of the overall
evidence available to a person at any given time.

I may, for

example, have a certain experience in my room one night which
initially causes me to form the basic proposition that I saw a
ghost.

But my evidence of what I have read and been told

about the kinds of things that are in the world may ultimately
52 I bid., 20-1.
53Alston, 23.
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make such a proposition very unlikely to me.

consequently, I

do not in fact come to believe what seemed to me, on the
evidence of my senses at the time, to be the case. 54
HOw, then, does one go about assessing a belief's
probability with respect to the additional evidence at one's
disposal?

Swinburne admits that there is no austere manner in

which he believes a person typically considers how certain
evidence could count for or against the probability of a given
belief.

People do not tend to make very explicit calculations

in holding their ordinary beliefs:
Normally for example men do not consider directly whether
their evidence makes some proposition probable (or rules
out some would-be basic belief), but only whether their
other beliefs do this, but this is on the assumption
(which can be questioned), that those other beliefs are
rendered probable by evidence. 55
Swinburne further recognizes that, should a person be
cognizant of the reasons why his evidence makes a given
proposition probable, this does not necessarily imply that
such a person could at the same time state explicitly the
inductive standards (i.e., standards for how one proposition
is made probable by another) which are being used.
In addition to the question of prior probability and
evidence for a belief, Swinburne contends that there are no
restrictions on the kinds of propositions which can function
as basic.

Basic propositions may include ordinary reports of

54 swinburne,

55 I

Faith and Reason, 21.

bid., 21-22.
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things perceived and remembered, but they may also involve a
person's hunches and intuitions that are thought to be
justified (in terms of reasons that the cognizer thinks are
true) by the experiences to which that person has been
subjected but cannot justify in terms of propositions.

This

is important to Swinburne's model of rationality, since he
follows a form of epistemic structure in which we use basic
propositions to reason to other justified beliefs.
Furthermore, argues Swinburne, a person may be rational for
holding a belief in a proposition even if the evidence for it
changes or is eclipsed over a period of time. 56

This is so

not by way of one's subjective certainty (i.e., to be strongly
convinced that a belief is right apart from good evidence),
but by way of memory (or some other cognitive state) of which
he is aware.
Swinburne's claim for what makes one rational in
holding a belief (i.e., that a man believes p if and only if
he believes that his total evidence makes p more probable than
any alternative) does not rule out the possibility of being
rational for holding to certain beliefs for which a person
cannot cite public evidence.

This is not to say that a

person's reasons for holding a belief can be arbitrary, or
that his reasons can exclude any kind of evidence, but rather,
56 Ibid., 22. I may remember, for example, that some
past investigation of historical evidence or arguments (which
I no longer can recall in detail) gave me good reason to
believe that Washington did not chop down the cherry tree.
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it is that a person may be considered rational at the point in
which he is convinced that his belief has not been overruled
by any further evidence.

Swinburne thinks that such beliefs

help to provide a rational framework in which certain kinds of

beIief can be thought of in terms of the different kinds of
evidence and degrees of probability by which they are
supported. 57

This offers further insights into Swinburne's

model of rationality and his arguments for the various levels
of rationality upon which rational beliefs are based.

On this

additional qualification, then, his model of rationality
becomes one in which a belief is rational for a person if that
person is justified in holding it for epistemological reasons,
and by epistemolgical reasons he has in mind primarily the
likelihood (or probability) of the belief being true. 58
By restricting a person's evidence at this point to
the set of basic propositions for that person, Swinburne seems
to betray some form of foundationalist structure to his model
of rationality.

A cognizer, for example, holds to a

proposition that is rendered more likely than its negation,
not "by evidence that consists, in whole or in part, of
57 I bid., 23. Cf. Alston, 23. Alston believes that this
statement by Swinburne is a concession to the notion that
people are not always so rational as to reject a belief when
it is rendered improbable by the public evidence. The crux of
the matter is that if a person has enough confidence in the
truth of a proposition (whether scientific or theistic), then
the belief will be held even if the rest of that person's
beliefs make it improbable.

58 Swinburne,

29-30.

Faith and Reason, 45; Cf., also, Alston,
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propositions that themselves are believed solely on the basis
of further evidence, .. S9 but on the basis of evidence that
seems to have privileged status (i.e., the belief that one's
basic propositions are likely true) for that person.
Coherentism in knowledge (i.e., the notion that one
proposition is supported by evidence from other propositions
possessing no particularly privileged status) does not seem to
be an option for Swinburne.

William Alston, for example, sees

swinburne's restriction of evidence to basic propositions as
reflecting a foundationalist assumption "that the support for
all non-basic beliefs can ultimately be traced back to basic
beliefs ... 60
swinburne admits that there is a sense in which
privileged status is granted to certain propositions once they
have become beliefs for a person.

He writes:

Once a proposition (e.g. 'there are no such things as
ghosts') is admitted into the belief-corpus, it plays its
part in promoting further beliefs, without the extent of
its own evidential support very often being brought
explicitly into question. 61
Alston understands this commitment by Swinburne to be a form
of psychological foundationalism, which claims that all
S9 Al

s ton, 23.

60Ibid., 24.
61swinburne, Faith and Reason, 22.
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non-basic beliefs are based, directly or indirectly, on basic
beliefs. 62

Alston states that psycholoqical

foundationalism, unlike stronger forms of epistemic
foundationalism, is not so much concerned with the evidence
one has in support of beliefs that are thought to be
indubitable; rather, it is simply a commitment that one has
toward a particular proposition, whether such a commitment is
based, at least in part, upon other propositional evidence or
beliefs that a person has, or whether such evidence is based
solely upon something that seems incorrigible to that person.
So, psychologically speaking, one's basic beliefs can
take on an incorrigible quality once one becomes convinced
that they are true.

While there may be a level of certainty

based on appropiate evidence, there is also the sense in which
Swinburne seems to admit that one's basic beliefs can be held
without an appeal to propositional evidence or arguments, and
they may be held with a sort of psychological incorrigibility.
This is not to say that one has basic beliefs for no reason
(in terms of some reason-based conception of justification),
but that such reasons (e.g., reasons based on authority or
testimony) seem rather clear and are typically not questioned
by the one holding them unless evidence to the contrary
becomes overwhelming.

This, as we will see, represents a

significant shift away from the system of epistemic
62 Al s ton, 24. Cf., also, Robert Audi, "Psychological
Foundationalism," The Monist 62 (l978): 592-610.
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foundationalism in which it is argued that in order to be
jus~ified

a non-basic belief must be based ultimately on basic

beliefs that are thouqht to be

sel~-evident,

evident to the

senses, incorriqible or indubitable. 63
It is Swinburne's contention, then, that his formula
for the prior probability of ordinary beliefs is equally
applicable to theistic belief, even should a person admit at
the outset that the public evidence seems to count aqainst
that belief.

He writes of the person holdinq to theistic

belief:
He must claim either that the public evidence has been
wrongly assessed or that he has private evidence. He may
claim that while at first sight it looks as if the various
arguments do not render probable the existence of God, in
fact their force has not been appreciated by the public or
that there is public evidence which others have not
noticed, which does render probable the existence of
God. 64
So even an appeal to private evidence (e.q., prophetic
visions) can be rational if a cognizer is claiming that his
theistic belief is based on reasons or evidence similar to the
awareness people have of material objects.

But such an

admission on Swinburne's part does not suqqest that the theist
(or any person) could rationally believe a proposition if the
public evidence has clearly rendered it improbable and the
theist acknowledqes that there is no other form of evidence.
63 Al s ton., 24. This would appear consistent with
Swinburne's attempts to direct the evidence for theism away
from deductive arquments to the more probable evidence of
inductive reasoninq.

64 Swinburne,

"Faith and Reason," 23.
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Belief is Involuntary
Swinburne states that if his argument is correct up to
this point, then a person believes that p if and only if he
believes that the total evidence available to that person
makes p more probable than any alternative.

The implications

of his system, then, are that a person's beliefs are a
function of his basic propositions (and the degree of
confidence placed in them) and his inductive standards (i.e.,
the way that one goes about evaluating the evidence).

But

Swinburne suggests that such a process is not wholly cognitive
and must include the additional element of certain features
that are involuntary to the knowing subject.

He writes:

If his beliefs were to be under his voluntary control,
then either his basic propositions and the degree of his
confidence in them, or his inductive standards, would have
to be under his voluntary control. Yet our reason for
trusting our basic propositions is our conviction that
they are formed by outside factors independently of our
will.
If I were to control at will my basic propositions
and the degree of my confidence in them, I would know that
I would; and hence I would know that whether a proposition
was among my basic propositions was not determined or even
influenced by whether what it reported was the case. 65
Swinburne's remarks at this point seem consistent with his
attempts to demonstrate a correlation between the inductive
attitude toward scientific hypotheses and the hypothesis of
theism.

In fact, it is precisely because certain inductive

standards (i.e., the procedures one uses to determine what
counts as evidence for a proposition and to what extent) are
65 I

bid., 25.
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not under the control of my will that they seem to me to be
intuitively right and I utimately trust that the resultant
beliefs indicate how things are.

Theistic belief, then, must

conform to no less a rational obligation.

The theist cannot

adopt standards which allow the evidence to count for a belief
for volitional reasons rather than through a more objective
(i.e., probable) process; otherwise, argues Swinburne, one
would know that one had no rational basis for trusting the
resultant belief and would consequently not really believe
it. 66
Furthermore, there is some indication here that
Swinburne is accounting for objective and subjective
distinctions in his model of rationality.

He alludes to

certain notions of realism and truth that appear somewhat
consistent with the established views of scientific realism.
Realism, for example, expresses the general view that material
objects exist externally to us and independently of our sense
experience. 67

And we mean by truth the basic idea of

correspondence in which, as Micheal Devitt expresses it, "a
sentence is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts
(or to reality).,,68

Scientific realism, then, is the basic

view that good scientific theories are rational (in that such
66Ibid., 26.
67 see , for example, Encylopedia of Philosophy, 1967
ed., s.v. "Realism" by R. J. Hirst.
680evitt, Realism and Truth, 27.
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theories are true, or at least approximately true,
descriptions of the world).
It is, nevertheless, Swinburne's contention that,
while a person may not be able to chanqe her beliefs at will,
she is at least in an episteaic position to chanqe them over a
period of time.

We are clearly aware that additional evidence

may lead to a chanqe of beliefs.

Certainly it is not

difficult to see that a person can cUltivate a belief by
lookinq selectively for favorable evidence; one could, for
example, consider the evidential force of certain evidence,
while delibertly rejectinq other potentially available
evidence.

I may even become convinced that I need to chanqe

my inductive standards to those more suitable to the evidence.
But, as Swinburne has indicated, at any point our beliefs are
dependent on the view of the evidence we have at the time, and
it is only when the process of chanqinq beliefs is a lonq and
arduous one that we can be convinced that what the evidence
supports does not depend on our will, but rather on the
evidence itself. 69

Degrees of Rational Belief
As we have indicated above, Swinburne's notion of
rational belief is one of epistemic probability.

But it is

also Swinburne's contention that the concept of rationality is
ambiqious, and the question of how far it is incumbent on a
69 Swinburne,

Faith and Reason, 26.
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person to hold only rational beliefs depends, in larqe part,
on the different kinds of evidence which are offered in
support of different beliefs, toqether with the different ways
in which such evidence is treated.

In Swinburne's estimation,

there are various ways in which evidence relates to a belief
that make that belief rational (includinq different deqrees of
rationality).70

His model of rationality is based in part

on his notion of justification.

A person is rational (and

hence justified) in holdinq a belief if the reasons he
provides for that belief (i.e., its justification) are reasons
which he thinks support the likelihood of that belief beinq
true.
This is not to say that all of one's evidential
support (or reasons) for a belief must be propositional
evidence (e.q., the non-propositional belief that one is
having an experience of being appeared to treely), but it does
attempt to limit justification to the matter of providinq
one's reasons for a belief, so lonq as those reasons describe
what one thinks likely shows that belief is true.

To be sure,

there are various reasons why a person may hold a belief
(e.g., it offers peace of mind, or it qives one a sense of
purpose), but epistemological reasons are the only reasons
which deal with the matter of rationality and
justification. 71
70 I bid., 33.
71swinburne, Faith and Reason, 45.
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swinburne argues, then, that there are various
possible levels of rationality or justification which attempt
to account for the relation between one's reasons for a belief
and the likelihood of that belief's truthfulness on evidence.
In doing so, Swinburne is arguing for a model of rationality
in which a distinction is made between a belief which a person
has verified as true and a belief for which there are rational
reasons that support it, even though it may ultimately prove
false. 72

Thus, as Alston has correctly observed, a close

examination of Swinburne's description of the different kinds
of rationality should reveal that "the dominant direction in
this list is toward greater objectivity and greater critical
reflective validation." 73
RationalitYl requires only that probability is
relative to

SiS

evidence and inductive standards.

A subject,

for example, must believe that he holds at least to a
rational 1 belief if he is to hold to any kind of rational
belief, even though that belief may ultimatley fail to be
rational 1 •

Swinburne states that "a failure in respect of

rationalitYl is a failure of internal coherence in a subject's
system of beliefs, a failure of which the subject is
72 I bid.,
and Reason," 30.
that the average
but false belief

73 Al s ton,

45-54. See also, Alston, "Swinburne on Faith
Swinburne, for example, has in aind the fact
man of the first century A.D. held a rational
that the earth was stationary.
"Swinburne of Faith and Reason," 30.
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unaware. n74

This represents a low level of truth or

epistemological reasons (i.e., getting at or verifyinq the
truth).
RationalitY2' on the other hand, requires the
additional element that the evidence consists of justified
beliefs (i.e., reasons he thinks are true and arque for a
belief's likelihood of truth) and that a person's inductive
standards be the correct ones.

Swinburne arques that in order

for a person to have a rationa12 belief, that belief must be
grounded in those initial propositions which his present
experiences (and memories of his past experiences) justify him
in holding.

Rationa12 beliefs are also based on prior

propositions which a person is justified in holding for qood
epistemoloqical reasons and correct inductive standards.

But

rationa12 beliefs can also find initial support in
epistemological reasons that a person may ultimately come to
deny.

A person, for example, can fail to have a rationa1 2

belief if the reasons for holding that belief are based on
initial propositions which the person is not justified in
holdinq.75

Of course, it's important to point out that a

74swinburne, Faith and Reason, 45 and 46.
75 I bid., 46. Swinburne notes, for example, that a
rationa1 2 belief could ultimately fail if a person claimed to
have some type of telepathic experience when no conscious
experience could justify it, or claimed to have seen a UFO in
a context in which his sensations could justify him only in
claiminq that he had seen a light. In addition, a person may
fail to have a rational, claim if it is based on initial
propositions about which one is overly-confident. On the other
hand, one may fail to have a rationa12 claim if it is not
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person who initially has a rational2 belief does not expect
that belief to be false.
R3 , R4 , and Rs differ from the first two in that a
person interactinq with these kinds of rationality is claimed
by Swinburne to have enqaqed in a critical examination of the
evidence (alonq with the inductive standards employed aqainst
the beliefs in review) and concluded in favor of the belief's
leqitimacy (i.e., its likely probability of beinq true or
confirminq the evidence).

Swinburne contends that a person

has a rational3 belief if, in that person's opinion, the
checkinq of the evidence and standards was adequate.

Adequate

investiqation is one in which the objective is the securinq of
true beliefs.

But a belief can fail to be rational3 if there

is, as Swinburne expresses it, "a culpable failure, of which
the person is unaware, to collect enouqh true, representative,
and relevant evidence of qood quality.n76

But it is only

irrationality (in the sense of rational3) which Swinburne
based on initial propositions which a person, qiven one's
experiences, ouqht to hold.
76I bid., 50. Swinburne indicates that the rationality
of a belief should result from adequate investiqation has real
siqnificance only in instances where a person (qiven a
rational3 belief) believes it important that he should have a
correct belief on the matter. For example, my belief that the
distance between Chicaqo and Detroit is 300 miles may be one
which does not concern me in any critical way. I may
determine, then, that a brief look at a map may be sufficient
for my objective. On the other hand, there are some beliefs
for which the matter of their truth is important to me (e.q.,
my belief that a device I installed in my computer is the
riqht device for carryinq out the function for which I believe
it was desiqned).
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believes is culpable irrationality, since it results from a
person's neglecting investigative procedures which that person
recognizes ought to be pursued. 77

On the other hand, the

failure to investigate the truth of a proposition may be
excusable if a person strongly believes that no amount of
investigation will change its probability on evidence.

In

such a case, it would not be irrational3 for a person not to
investigate its truth.

That is, if a person has good reasons

(based on that person's view of its prior probability, for
example) to believe that a further investigation will have no
effect on showing how likely a proposition is to be true, it
is rationally excusable that a person not investigate it. 78
swinburne arques that rationalitY3 and rationalitY4
center on a person's own outlook with respect to whether or
not a belief is supported by adequate investigation.

One's

rational4 beliefs go further than rational3 in requiring that
the checking of a belief be adequate by a person's own
standards for such investigation.

But as Swinburne has noted,

such a process is not always so easy to perform.

A coqnizer

can easily be blind to the need for an investigation of the
evidence.

A person may also think that an investigation of

the evidence has been sufficient by his own standards. 79
77 I

bid., 54.

78 I

bid., 52.

79 I bid., 53.
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And as swinburne goes on to suggest, this is why a
fifth kind of rationality is required.

In the final analysis,

we arrive at the highest level of probability for a belief
only when we subject a belief to rationals investigation.
Swinburne thinks rationals beliefs are least dependent on a
person's subjective beliefs about it.

Rationalitys is

assigned to a belief only when the checking of that belief
has, in fact, been adequate (i.e., if it has been verified on
evidence that the belief in question is a true belief).80

A

rationals belief, then, is one which is based on the
probability of the evidence for that belief and is least
dependent on a person's beliefs about it.

But the whole point

of subjecting a belief to a rationals investigation is to
provide a person with reasons which make that belief not just
fairly probable, but very probable. 8l

This being the case,

a person holding to a belief with any kind of rationality from
rationality! to rationalitys is considered rational, even
though rationals beliefs are said to be more likely true (for
evidential reasons) than rational l beliefs.
The Rationality of Religious Beliefs

Swinburne has argued up to this point that there may
be differences between (1) the kinds of evidences that people
have for certain beliefs,

(2) the various inductive standards

80Alston, "Swinburne on Faith and Reason," 30-31.
8lSwinburne, Faith and Reason, 54.
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which they employ to hold their beliefs, and (3) the
distinctive kinds of rationality involved in justifying their
beliefs.

That is, ultimately the rules and procedures that

one employs for determining the probability (and rationality)
of theistic belief on evidence should be no different than
those he uses for other beliefs. 82

But with respect to the

rationality of religious beliefs, rationalitY3 is the only
kind of rationality for which Swinburne believes a person can
be held to task.

For that is the only kind of rationality

which he has argued is genuinely under a person's control.
Where it may be true that a person cannot help having the
beliefs that he has at any given moment (i.e., if the belief
and the reasons why one holds it is a passive matter), he can
be held to task for not doing something about his beliefs over
a period of time.

For a person can always investigate a

belief to a more adequate extent, or gather more evidence
relevant to a given belief, especially the more likely a
belief is to be challeged in terms of its truth. 83
The remaining kinds of rational belief apparently, in
Swinburne's estimation, do not appear to pose the same threat
against the rationality of theistic belief as do rational3
beliefs.

He writes:

Irrationality in senses (4) and (5) are [sic] a matter of
objective discrepancy between the subject's actual
investigative procedures and either those which he
82swinburne, Faith and Reason, 55.
83 I bid., 72.
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normally recognizes or really adequate investigative
procedures; but in so far as the subject does not
recoqnize these discrepancies, no blame attaches to his
conduct.
Irrationality in senses (1) and (2) arises from
a failure to recoqnize certain things at the time in
question--discrepancies within the class of the subject's
beliefs in the case of irrationality (1), and unjustified
evidence and incorrect standards in the case of
irrationality (2).84
But as Swinburne contends, a person interacting at these
levels can hardly be rationally culpable.

For either a person

recognizes such discrepancies at the time or he does not.

And

if, as Swinburne further contends, recoqnizing is coming to
believe (and belief is initially involuntary), then a person
is not rationally culpable for what he initially believes (or
recognizes that he believes), but only for what he ultimately
fails to investigate with respect to the belief in question.
To understand more completely Swinburne's application
of rationality to theistic belief, it is helpful to recall
briefly the various distinctions he made with respect to the
different kinds of rationality possible.

He writes:

A man's beliefs are rational l if and only if, given his
evidence, they are rendered probable on his own inductive
standards. A man's belief that p is irrational l when he
has failed to draw the conclusion, using his general
inductive beliefs, that his evidence does not make p
probable. So when we see what a man's evidence and
inductive standards are, we can conclude with respect to
his religious beliefs that they do or do not follow from
his evidence, in accordance with those standards. 8S
Swinburne's point with respect to rationalitYl' then, is that

we may find (after considering a person's inductive behaviour)
84 I bid.,

54.

8S I bid.,

63.
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that such a person is using different inductive standards for
evaluating the evidence for theistic propositions than he does
elsewhere.

Swinburne states that if this is the case, then we

could conclude that either none of that person's judgements
about theism are rationall' or that he has one set of
inductive standards for arguing about mundane matters and
another set for arguing about theistic concerns, and that
there is nothing irrational 1 in this.

But it may be, argues

Swinburne, that both cases are possible.

It could be the

latter case if a person acknowledged the use of different
standards, and was consistent in the use of them, such that
his arguments about religion are never infected by normal
standards. 86

If a person claimed, for example, that the

only test for a theistic claim was what was written in the
Bible and never attempted to justify this claim through the
use of other inductive standards (e.g., never tried to argue
that archaeology corroborates the truthfulness of the Bible),
then it would seem that such a person is usinq one set of
inductive standards for theistic claims and another for claims
outside of theism.

In such a case, argues Swinburne, i t would

be wrong to accuse that person of being irrational l •

There

would be a coherence about this way of arguinq, even if we do
not prefer such methods ourselves.

On the other hand, if a

person makes no clear distinction about the application of his
inductive standards, but seems to apply them inconsistently to
86 I bOd
~ .,

63.
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theistic claims and mundane matters alike, then it would seem
that we could not assign rationalitYl to his beliefs about
theism. 87

swinburne next argues that we cannot accuse a

person of holdinq beliefs which are irrational2 unless we
aqree in advance what makes a belief probable (i.e., the prior
and posterior probability of the belief on evidence, toqether
with the procedures one uses for evaluatinq the evidence).
Once aqain, rationalitY2 beliefs draw on a qreater deqree of
the evidence available to a person at the time of his belief.
Swinburne writes:
A man's belief is rational2 if and only if
rendered probable by his evidence, and his
consists of basic propositions which he is
holdinq with the degree of confidence with
them. 8 S"

i t is in fact
evidence
justified in
which he holds

So if a person is to be accused of irrational2 belief, it can
only properly take place, argues swinburne, "by extrapolatinq
from the most particular judqements which we make and then
seeinq whether we are prepared to stick by any particular
judqements which do not conform to the resulting
standards. 1189

It may be that the inductive standards we

extrapolate from our judgements in disciplines outside of
theism (which we make sufficiently qeneral to have application
to theistic belief) end up yieldinq different judgements about
theistic claims from those which we are initially inclined to
87 I

bid.

88 I

bid.

89 I

bid., 64.
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make.

That being the case, we might conclude that those

standards require us to see the existence of the universe as
evidence for theism, even though we were inclined to think
otherwise at the start.
converse.

Or it could equally well be the

Whatever way it is, argues Swinburne, we have to

reflect what seems intuitively most obvious.

Those standards

come from our particular judgements in the religious field, or
the general standards extrapolated from other fields.

The

point is that we will have to modify our account of the true
inductive standards accordingly.90
swinburne acknowledges that the task of discovering
the true inductive standards is a process that involves the
consideration of a wide number of possible alternative sets of
principles which a person must test against his own
intuitions.

Such is the work of confirmation theory, and it

is Swinburne's contention that we will eventually be able to
codify our inductive standards, since he is convinced that
such standards are implicit in most of the judgements which we
make and which seem to be intuitively correct to us. 91
But as Swinburne further reminds us, the rationalitY2
of a person's beliefs involves more than just using correct
inductive standards; it also involves evidence consisting of
basic propositions which one is justified in holding to the
degree of confidence with which one holds them.
90 I bid.
91 I bid., 64-5
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may recall, involves the element of truth, that is, whether a
person's justification of a belief is based on reasons (i.e.,
testimony, authority, mental states, or other evidence or
arguments) that a person thinks are true and make it more
likely than not that a belief is true.

Such evidence consists

of prior propositions and initial propositions.

Swinburne

remarks:
[A person] is justified in believing prior propositions if
they seem to him to be true, intuitively, on qrounds of
reason, and if he is not too hasty in making such a
judgement • • • • If a man's beliefs are based on initial
beliefs that someone has told him so-and-so or that he has
seen so-and-so, his sensations toqether with his memories
of past e~eriences have to justify the initial
beliefs. 92
Thus, with respect to a prior belief, Swinburne arques that if
a person's theistic belief is grounded in an ontoloqical
argument, the premises of that argument must be ones which
seem evident to that person and on which that person has given
sufficient reflection (although we may disaqree with respect
to the amount of reflection that is necessary) to determine if
there is any possible way in which they could be false.
Initial beliefs, on the other hand, may seem initially
reliable (e.g., that one is seeing a UFO or a man walking on
water), but over the course of time a person can investigate
whether the judgments he initially makes tend ultimately to be
correct or turn out false.
92 I bid.,

65.

The success or failure of his
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judgments can be used to determine the justifibility of his
past initial propositions. 93
It is Swinburne's conviction that the extent to which
a person accepts those basic propositions which he believes
his experience justifies him in believinq (and thereby comes
to hold further propositions which are warranted on the basis
of his basic propositions and true inductive standards), makes
his beliefs rational2'

Since a person's evidence for

rational2 beliefs will include his basic propositions, some
claim that their evidence makes it probable that theism is
true, and some claim that the evidence makes it probable that
theistic belief is a false description of the world.

And as

Swinburne further asserts, the most controversial issue in
dealing with rational 2 beliefs has to do with the manner in
which any individual piece of evidence or all of a person's
evidence put together (along with true inductive standards)
renders it probable that claims of theistic belief are
true. 94
The level of potential inadequacy in rational 1 and
rational2 beliefs for rational theistic belief forces
Swinburne to turn his attention to rational3' rational4'
and rationals beliefs, which, as it might be remembered,
deal with the matter of belief being backed up by adequate
earlier investigation.
93Ibid.
94 I bid., 66.
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A belief is rational 3 , you will recall, if it is based on
evidence resulting from investigation which was in the
subject's view adequate and the subject has subjected his
inductive standards to criticism which was in his view
adequate, and checked in his view adequately that by them
his belief was rendered probable by his evidence. 95
Crucial to rational3 beliefs is Swinburne's notion that what
constitutes adequate investigation depends on a person's
belief at earlier times about (1) the probability of
investigation affecting the probability of the conclusion,
(2) one's belief about the importance of holding a true belief
about the hypothesis, and

(3)

one's belief about the

importance of the belief in general (i.e., when a person
thinks it is important to have a correct belief on the
matter).96

According to rational3 beliefs, a person's

religious beliefs are automatically rational3 at any point in
which that person is objectively certain about the truth of
those beliefs (i.e., he has good reason to think that all the
appropriate evidence has been marshalled in favor of the
belief).

If he is objectively certain, then no further

investigation is required.

For to be objectively certain is

to know that all the available evidence for a believe has been
properly considered and evaluated.

A person in this situation

would have no further rational obligation to investigate their
truth.

On the other hand, should that person consider his

religious beliefs at any time to be dubious or only fairly
95 I bid.
96 I bid.
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probable, then, for his beliefs to be rational), be bas a
rational obligation to investigate them.

There can be at

least two reasons for this: first, it may be a result of a
person's subjective certainty, and has to do with that
person's level of conviction that a belief is either true or
false, possibly despite what the evidence would seem to
suggest.

Second, it may have to deal with a person's

knowledge that the objective case he's previously made is not
as good as it might be.

But, as Swinburne has earlier

indicated, it is only by investigation that a person has any
chance of acquiring beliefs which are very probable. 97
swinburne argues that the matter of knowing when
investigation is required and how much investigation is needed
for a rational) religious belief is a complex issue.
will come to different conclusions in this regard.

People
swinburne

explains:
How a man investigates an issue depends on what he already
knows about the field and, in particular • • • on his
beliefs about who are the authorities in the field • • • •
There are fields and cultures where a man has no idea
bow to set about investigating further the answer to some
question.
I so interpret my definition of rationalitYJ
that in that case a man's belief, even though he does not
believe that it has a probability close to 1 and even
though he has done no investigating, is still rational J •
In one way the man does not believe that his investigation
has been adequate-- for there is more which he believes
ought to be done; but in another way he does believe that
the investigation has been adequate--for he has done all
that he can. Since the definition of rationality! was
designed to pick out the rationality which lies w thin a
97 I bid.,

66-7.
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man's powers to achieve, I shall say that in such a case a
man's beliefs are rational3.98
Swinburne's point is that one may approach the rationality of
religious beliefs along similar lines.

A person may believe

on balance that there is a God and yet have no idea how he
might pursue a further investigation of theistic claims.
Initially, then, his belief would qualify as a rational3
belief.

But it is only a matter of time before such a person

would come to learn that the subject of God's existence is a
disputed one, and in order to continue holding a rational3
belief, he would be required to make further investigation
into the relevant fields of inquiry.

As the evidence begins

to mount (either for or against his belief), he may need to
reconsider whether he is justified in believing the basic
propositions which form the foundation of his re1igious
beliefs with the degree of confidence he has in them. 99
Rational3 beliefs, according to Swinburne, allow every
area of evidence to be openly investigated.

A person's

inductive standards, for example, represent the most critical
area of further inquiry.

Whatever standards a person judges

98 I bid., 67. Swinburne states, for example, that a
four-year-old boy asking his father about some matter in
astronomy may be the only authority required at his level of
inquiry for an adequate investigation of that issue; the
ten-year-old his science teacher, the sixteen-year-old his
physics teacher; but a man with a Ph.D. in the field will
likely seek out a foundation to provide him with a grant to
study the issue on his own (although he probably takes for
granted the results published by other physicists).

99 I bid., 67-8.
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to be correct must be applied honestly to all the evidence at
one's disposal.

The more a person seeks to have rational3

beliefs about religion, the more likely it is that his beliefs
will converge with other beliefs.

Swinburne believes that

such a process will result in a greater sharing of evidence
and a common basis of evidence from which to make valid
inferences to religious truths.

For it is only through a

rational3 inquiry that a person can expect to obtain rational4
and rationals beliefs. lOO

A rational4 belief is one where a

person has "by his own standards adequately investigated the
evidence, his inductive standards, and the force by them of
his evidence. HlOl

And one has a rationals belief, then,

only in cases where one's inductive standards are standards
based on objective certainty.

rt may be that, even if a

person follows his own standards, they may ultimately fail to
be true standards, and, consequently, his beliefs may fail to
count as rationals beliefs.
rn the final analysis, Swinburne has provided various
kinds of rationality that may potentially lead a person to
rationals religious beliefs.

For it is only in relation to

rationals beliefs that the notion of truth accounts for the
greatest difference (i.e., one has in fact verified one's
beliefs as true on evidence).
lOorbid., 69-70.
lOlrbid., 70.

Swinburne argues that we have
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objective factors which determine how much investiqation is
needed to have rationals reliqious beliefs.

He writes:

Beliefs are rationa13 in so far as they are based on
investiqation which was, in the believer's view, adequate.
If it matters that I have a rational3 belief on some
issue, it matters because ensurinq that I have a rational3
belief is all that I can do towards ensurinq that I have a
rationals belief. Ensurinq that I have a rationals belief
is all that I can do towards ensurinq that I have a true
belief. 102
And as one may expect, this brings the discussion back to the
matter of probability.

For the rationalitys of a reliqious

belief depends on how probable the belief is at the start.

It

further depends on how probable it is that posterior evidence
results in the rational conviction that the belief has in fact
been verified as true.
We come full circle, then, in the effort to determine
the probability of a reliqious belief.

Swinburne arques that

an adequate investiqation for a rationals reliqious belief is
a function of four thinqs:

(1) the importance of the belief in

the specific field of inquiry; (2) the prior probability of
the belief apart from any subsequent investigation; (3) the
posterior probability that an investigation of the belief will
lead to evidence confirminq the belief; and (4) the deqree to
which a person thinks it is important to hold a correct belief
on the matter.

These functions for rationals beliefs are

somewhat consistent with what Swinburne arques is necessary
for establishing the prior and posterior probability of
102 I bid.,

72.
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theories.

And without going into more detail in these areas,

it should be sufficient to see that swinburne has simply
argued for a system of justification and rationality that
intends to allow for increased levels of the likelihood of
truth as a person moves from rational3 beliefs to rationals
beliefs.
Assessment of SWinburne's Hodel of Rationality

Before we go on to consider some of the more
positive features of Swinburne's model of rationality for
theistic belief, it may be helpful to look at some potential
weaknesses that surface out of his arguments for the
probability of theories in general.

Feinberg has argued that

Swinburne's use of simplicity as the key criterion to prior
probability has difficulties.

More than one theory can do

well on the matter of simplicity, and this seems to suggest
that determining prior probability will likely involve an
appeal to something other than simplicity, like background
knowledge.

A complex theory, for example, may fit background

knowledge better than a simple one. 103

Furthermore, argues

Feinberg, it is difficult to decide what is included in the
background knowledge for all theories and what is included in
the evidence for a particular theory.

So depending on how a

cognizer wants to shape the outcome, there can be a certain
degree of assessing the criteria from a non-public
l03 Feinberg, Evil, 247.
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(subjective) point of view, either to include information in
background knowledge in order to increase the prior
probability or to include information in the evidence that
will be considered later in calculating posterior probability.
The point is that calculating the prior and posterior
probability of a theory depends on all sides aqreeing on where
the information belongs.

But since we can (and sometimes do)

manipulate the information, it is not clear that people will
agree on which pieces of information belong to either
background knowledge or the evidence of posterior
probability. 104
In addition, Feinberg indicates that the overall
probability of a theory does not necessarily depend on trying
to establish that a theory (e.g., theism) has qreater prior
probability than any other hypothesis.

So long as it is

established that the prior probability of the theory in
question is not 0 nor its opponents' 1, a theory can have
greater probability than its opponents' on the basis of the
total evidence.

As long as the posterior evidence for the

theory in question makes the theory's probability exceed .5,
one is within one's epistemic rights to think that the theory
is more likely true than not.
So a model of rationality that is going to account for
enough of the right kind and quality of evidence (i.e., our
answer to the evidentialist notion of sufficient evidence in
l04 I bid.
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terms of indubitability) must be based on the total evidence
relevant to the theory.

If there is the potential to consider

only one kind of evidence (or somehow manipulate the evidence
in advance so as to assign any numerical value to represent a
probability judgment), then the justification of a theory or
belief (in terms of its likelihood of truth) has the potential
to be more a reflection of the subjectivity of the assessor
than a reflection of an objective (fair and unbiased)
consideration of the appropriate evidence.

Probability

judgments should be persuasive in terms of the evidence and
arguments that one can marshall for the truth or falsity of
any theory or belief.

Such evidence can be rationally

convincing enough (i.e., what is meant by objective certainty
on our proposed model of rationality) to show that one has
good reasons to think a theory or belief is either true or
false.

That is, in terms of justification, one is then in the

possible position to attempt to verify a theory or belief as
true on evidence.

Having said this, it is always possible, as

Feinberg notes, that one may grant the truth of arguments and
evidence but still find them unconvincing for psychological
reasons.

In such cases, one may deny that the arguments or

evidence establish the truth of the theory or belief in
question. lOS

Since the goal of Swinburne's system is to

offer as much evidence as possible in order to argue for the
probability of theistic belief, it seems necessary to drop the
lOSIbid., 293.
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requirement of simplicity as being the must crucial factor in
determining the probability of a theory (or belief) on
evidence.
Having stated the above concerns, Swinburne's
approach, with few exceptions, is closest to the model of
rationality I shall propose in chapter five.

The features of

his system attempt to account for the total available evidence
when considering whether a belief is more likely true than
not, even though this does not require one to in fact verify a
belief as true in order to be rational.

In addition, his

degrees of rationality seem to account for greater attempts to
verify a belief's truthfulness on evidence when possible.
Furthermore, Swinburne's approach attempts to offer a moderate
foundationalist structure for rational belief.

In such a

model of rationality, a proposition must be based on evidence
in the right way.106

Pojman summarizes Swinburne's account

of rational belief in the following terms:
Our basic evidence or beliefs are 'initial propositions'
(sense experience, mental states, and memory reports) and
'prior propositions' (truths known a priori, such as the
laws of logic or that '2+2=4'). From these we reason
deductively or inductively to conclusions. A problem in
deciding what constitutes rational believing is the fact
that we differ on inductive standards. Although all
people reason inductively, we may read the evidence quite
differently (e.g., the gambler who has just become a
father of a baby boy may bet on a horse called 'Sonny
Boy', thinking it an omen).107
106See Louis P. Pojman, What Can We Know? 90-1.
107Louis P. Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will,
(London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 127.
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As indicated above, Swinburne is optimistic that we can come
to some agreement on what should count as qenerally relevant
inductive standards.

This means, for Swinburne, that a belief

(including theistic belief) is rational at the point in which
a person applies her inductive standards to the available
evidence.

One is rational (in the sense of rationals beliefs)

in holding a belief that is thought to be true based on one's
past investiqation in light of true inductive standards.
There is every indication, then, that Swinburne's
proqram for rational reliqious belief represents a fallibilist
position.

By fallibilism I mean essentially the epistemic

position that our properly basic beliefs need not be
infallible, incorriqible, self-evident, or evident to the
senses.

What is self-evident or properly basic is more

relative to the individual's perspective than is thouqht to be
the case in the stronqer forms of foundational ism.

The thesis

of falliblism asserts that, while we may require an epistemic
structure in which basic beliefs are offered in support of
non-basic beliefs (where theistic beliefs are considered
non-basic beliefs), our basic beliefs could turn out to be
false, although we do not expect them to be false. loa
On Swinburne's model of ratonality, justification is a
reason-based conception in which a cognizer may appeal to
evidence in the form of other basic (or prior) beliefs, one's
lOSLouis P. Pojman, What Can We Know?, 93-4. Cf.,
Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will, 128.
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other mental states accepted on the basis of one's experience,
or one's inductive standards.

Alston, however, describes this

as a form of psychological foundationalism, since it seems to
include the possibility that a cognizer can infer other
non-basic beliefs from basic beliefs that are held for
psychological rather than for evidential reasons. 109

Basic

(or prior beliefs) are beliefs that a cognizer tends to hold
for non-evidential reasons.

Part of the reason for this is

found in Swinburne's notion that such beliefs are acquired
involuntarily.

Such involuntary acquisition of beliefs comes

through hunches, intuitions, and other mental states of which
the cognizer is both aware and unaware.

This seems to raise a

potential weakness in Swinburne's model, since it would
suggest that one can hold and infer other non-basic beliefs on
the basis of basic beliefs that most people would consider
irrational (e.g., various superstitious and prejudiced
beliefs).
Swinburne appears to anticipate these difficulties by
stating that a basic proposition will be believed (and
consequently included within the category of one's basic
beliefs) unless one's other basic beliefs render i t
improbable.

There may be evidential reasons (in the form of

one's other basic beliefs) in which one is not justified in
holding a given belief as basic.

So while it is not typically

the case that basic beliefs are described in terms of
l09 AI s ton,

"Swinburne on Faith," 24.

piS
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being rendered more probable than not (or than any of its
alternatives) by one's evidence, it is not entirely ruled out
in advance. 110

Swinburne argues that a cognizer is likely

to initially hold a basic belief simply because he is inclined
to believe that it is forced upon him by his experience of the
world.

But as indicated above, he is open to the possibility

that one's basic belief is not indubitable and may require
further justification on evidence.

In one sense, Swinburne is

simply admitting that people will not always acquire their
basic beliefs for the right reasons (i.e., the best available
evidence and with attempts to verify as true if possible).
But in another sense, one always has the rational opportunity
to determine whether a belief is more likely true than not on
the basis of one's total evidence, including one's other basic
beliefs.

So if propositional evidence (in terms of one's

basic beliefs) helps to det£rmine the overall probability of
one's non-basic beliefs, why cannot the same be said for basic
beliefs as well?

It seems that it would involve little effort

to make this adjustment in Swinburne's system, without
violating the essential structure of justification for which
he has argued.

We will argue for the criteria to do just this

in our proposed model of rationality in chapter five.
But even if we grant this concession, it could be
argued that Swinburne's program for rationality is even too
involved and complex to stand as a general account of
llOIbid., 24-5.
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non-basic belief. lll

Alston has suggested, for example,

that at the most basic and rudimentary level of cognitive
thought, people have beliefs about things they encounter in
their everyday experiences, and it is unlikely that they have
any beliefs at all about the extent to which various
propositions are rendered more or less probable by
evidence. ll2

Alston notes, for example, that he may form

the non-basic belief that a certain building is not finished,
based on the (possibly basic) belief that no windows have yet
been installed on one of its sides:
Did r form the belief that the proposition that the
building is not yet finished is rendered more probable
than some alternative--such as its negation--by my set of
basic propositions? If so, I regularly carry out such
doxastic ooerations in a way ideally calculated to escape
my notice. ll3
Alston's illustration is in response to Swinburne's idea that,
even though a person does not make very explicit calculations
when forming beliefs about comparative probabilities, an
individual does seem to have the conceptual resources for
making probability judgements, or one regularly makes use of
them whenever one comes to accept a non-basic belief.

But

Alston suggests, instead, that it seems entirely possible that
a person can have a belief that p without having any belief at
all about the probability of p.
lllIbid.
ll2 r bid.
ll3Al s ton, 26.

So if we eventually come to
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the point where one's belief that p is just to believe that p,
why not do this at the outset, rather than (as Swinburne
thinks) believing only in comparative probabilLties?114
But this need not detract from Swinburne's essential
point on the rationality of beliefs.

The probability of a

belief, on Swinburne's account, is more a matter of evaluating
the evidence in teras of the likelihood of truth.

Swinburne's

account of degrees of rationality is designed to show that the
closer one comes to rationalitys, the closer one is to being
rationally convinced of the probability of a belief as true on
evidence.

To think that a belief is more likely true than not

is to determine that the total evidence availab1e at the time
makes it more rationally convincing to accept the belief as
true than it is to continue doubting it.

This is a matter of

reflecting on the evidence available for a belief, and as
Swinburne indicates, it is typically a process that takes
place over a period of time, especially when it is difficult
to determine what evidence is available relative to a given
non-basic belief.

So while there may be greater degrees of

comparative probability as one moves closer to rationals
beliefs, the lower degrees of rationality (i.e., beliefs for
which one has good reasons to think are true, but has not
attempted to verify as true) can account for the acceptance of
non-basic beliefs without one appearing to have probable
beliefs about them.
114 I bid., 29.
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As indicated above, Swinburne's account of rationality
attempts to be as close to scientific theorizing as possible.
But, as we have also noted, SWinburne's account of the
rationality of a belief based on

pos~erlor

probability is

restricted to non-basic beliefs, the only category of belief
in which Swinburne arques that a person can legitimately
inquire into the probability of belief on evidence.

Basic

beliefs, among which are included one's initial propositions
(sense experience, mental states, memory reports, and other
factors), are either justified or not. 11S

Alston writes:

But, on his account, what renders a basic belief
justified--that it is held not solely on the basis of
evidence and that it is not rendered improbable by other
basic beliefs--certainly has to do with the likelihood of
the belief's being true. So why restrict the account of
rationality to non-basic beliefs?116
But as we have indicated above, Swinburne's rationality model
can be slightly modified and improved by considering posterior
evidence in determining the rationality of basic beliefs as
well. ll7

The point is that, if what Swinburne means by the

epistemic probability of a proposition is a consideration of
the evidence in light of one's inductive standards (i.e., the
way in which one goes about evaluating prior and posterior
11SAlston, "Swinburne of Faith and Belief," 31.
116Al s ton, 31.
117 r bid. Cf., Swinburne, Fal~h and Reason, 45.
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evidence), then there is no qood reason why such a process
should not work equally well with both basic and non-basic
beliefs alike.
Further, Swinburne's account of rationality is always
restricted to what evidence a cognizer has at the time he is
considerinq the probability of a belief.

SWinburne seems to

indicate that a coqnizer's available evidence may not always
be the same thinq as having all the available evidence for
that belief (with the possible exception of rationals beliefs,
since such beliefs are said to be rationally convincinq).
This is another reason for distinquishinq between different
deqrees of rationality.

Swinburne seems to think that one

can be rational and justified in holdinq non-basic beliefs for
which the evidence (in terms of the appropriate kind and
quality for the belief in question) has not been established
as true, althouqh being rational is always about reasons one
thinks are true.
It seems, then, that the primary caution against
Swinburne's model of rationality has to do with the epistemic
weight he gives to one's basic beliefs, as well as one's
inductive standards.

This is critical, since he argues for an

essentially foundational structure in which one's non-basic
beliefs are justified in part on the basis of both features.
Swinburne's proqram needs to qive some account for people's
differing inductive standards if it is to be consistent.
Similar to our concern about Swinburne's criteria for the
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prior probability of theories, if there are no aqreed upon
criteria for why one should or should not accept certain basic
beliefs (or inductive standards), then one's justification for
belief is likely to be influenced by factors (e.g.,
psychological) other than what the evidence suggests.

And

this would seem to go against Swinburne's attempts at a model
of rationality which accounts for the total available
evidence, including procedures for how one goes about
inductive reasoning.
Swinburne argued that one's evidence (including one's
inductive standards) consists of the set of one's basic
beliefs (i.e., the beliefs one holds on the basis of prior
probability or the deqree of initial confidence one has in
them), a process which Swinburne suggests we normally do not
associate with investigation of the evidence (especially with
respect to one's inductive standards).

One's perceptual

beliefs, memory beliefs, or beliefs of experience, as well as
one's beliefs in self-evident propositions are basic beliefs
and are either accepted or not accepted.

In other words, they

are not investigated in the normal sense of the term; they are
either justified or not, independently of the merits of the
investigative procedures. ll8

But it seems that Swinburne's

notion of R3 , R4 , and Rs beliefs (as resulting from the
evidence and with attempts to verify as true if possible) can
be modified to follow a model of rationality in which all of
ll8Al

s ton, "Swinburne on Faith and Belief," 32.
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one's beliefs, not just those that are basic for a person, are
justified on the basis of sufficient evidence.

The extent to

which it is possible to do so is the focus of our next
chapter.

Chapter Five
Toward a Resolution for Rationality
A Middle Ground synthesis
rf we are to suqqest a credible model of rationality
for theistic belief, we must first define what it means to be
rational and then perhaps qo on to suqqest an epistemic system
Which, in a rather broad sense, offers the features that are
best thouqht to satisfy the necessary criteria for
rationality.

The issue of rationality, then, toqether with

the various features that are essential to it, is our
fundamental concern in this chapter.

Furthermore, with this

immediate task in mind, it is anticipated that the essential
features of the proposed model of rationality will open the
way to an epistemic system for theistic belief which, broadly
speaking, provides the necessary criteria to either directly
challenge or else reinforce certain features in the rational
systems of Murphy, Plantinga, and Swinburne.
On this basis, then, we may sugqest the following
model of rationality as having more favorable criteria for
discerninq whether one is more likely to be rational about
one's beliefs: There is one sense in which to be rational in
holdinq a belief, one must hold it on the basis of sufficient
evidence (i.e., qood reasons, evidence or arguments).
217
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Sufficient evidence is evidence offered to show that one does
have good reasons (i.e., a reason-based conception of
justification) for one's beliefs, and that those reasons are
not arbitrary.

Furthermore, this sense of rationality

maintains that it is not rational to hold a belief in the
absence of sufficient evidence or on the basis of blind faith.
But there is another sense in which to be rational
about one's beliefs involves the process of verification, that
is, attempts to marshall enough of the appropriate kind,
quality, and amount of evidence so as to be so rationally
convinced of the truth or certainty of a given belief that one
can no longer maintain a reasonable doubt.

In this sense of

the term, to be rational about one's beliefs, one is at least
attempting to be right, and that, while one can be rational
without verifying (in the sense of marshalling the appropriate
kind, quality, and amount of evidence) or attempting to verify
one's beliefs as true (e.g., one can be rational simply by
offering a reason-based conception of justification for one's
beliefs), one may be in a position to verify one's beliefs as
true on the basis of good arguments and evidence.

In other

wordS, there is a sense in which rationality involves a
reason-based conception of justification which may coincide
with attempts to establish the truth or certainty of a
proposition, but it need not.

It is not necessary that

justification presuppose the truth or certainty of a given
belief (a matter of verification).
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This approach to rationality recognizes that i t is too
high a standard to maintain that one is rational in holding a
belief only when the cognizer has in fact verified (i.e.,
marshalled the appropriate evidence) that belief as true or
certain.

One may be rational in holding a belief arising out

of a reason-based conception of justification in which
sufficient evidence can rest on other beliefs (basic or
non-basic), or it can rest on mental or perceptual states for
which the cognizer believes he has good reasons to think are
true (even if a cognizer makes no attempt to verify his
beliefs as true, or even if those beliefs, mental states, or
perceptual states turn out to be false).

So long as a

cognizer holds those beliefs for reasons he thinks are likely
true (otherwise it is difficult to see how one would count
them as reasons), he is rational in holding them.

In

addition, it is sUggested that a necessary corollary of this
model of rationality is that a cognizer should attempt to
employ adequate methods for collecting and evaluating data
(evidence or arguments) for one's beliefs in such a way as to
be fair or unbiased with the data.

That is, one can be

objective (in the sense of being fair and unbiased with the
data) when considering the evidence for one's beliefs.

This

model of rationality further suggests that the more likely it
is that others will challenge the truthfulness of a belief
(due to insufficient or underdetermined evidence), the more
one is expected to provide evidence for that belief if one is
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to be rational in holding it (although that evidence need not
be indubitable or involve conclusive arquments).

rt also

suggests that, given insufficient or underdetermined data, a
cognizer is more likely to be rational in holding such a
belief more tentatively.

So while our model of rationality

allows room for the possibility that some of a cognizer's
beliefs may be provisional on evidence, it does not expect
this possiblity to be a governing criterion for the
rationality of one's beliefs.
Given this model of rationality, we can agree, for
example, that Murphy's system offers valuable insights for
improving and revising various problems and difficulties in
current models of rationality based on classical
foundationalist approaches to epistemology and correspondence
theories of truth.

But such insights need not imply her

alternative model of rationality which argues that our beliefs
and theories (scientific, theistic or otherwise) can at best
have a tentative status. l
Isee, for example, Jesse Hobbs, Religious Explanation
and Scientific Ideology (New York: Peter Lang Publishing,
rnc., 1993) xviii. Hobbs states that Murphy is commendable in
her attempts to take seriously Kubnian insights on the
incommensurability of conceptual frameworks and the
tenativeness of Lakatosian research programs, but he rightly
questions her position that the criteria for rationality can
be found in certain core beliefs which are thought to: (a)
allow one's research program to make adequate theoretical and
empirical progress; and (b) provide a plan for extending the
program and defending it against competitors. These criteria
are insufficient in that satisfying such conditions does not
necessarily direct itself toward truth and realism in the
correspondence sense.
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Plantinga argues that one can have rational belief
(theistic or otherwise) if that belief is held on the basis of
variously qualified experiences (religious or otherwise) and
the proper functioning of one's noetic faculties in
environments suitably designed for them.

One of the

difficulties with this view is that, in the absence of
defeaters, one is at best only within one's epistemic rights
to believe that God exists (i.e., one has only prima facie
justification or warrant for theistic belief).

At some point,

and particularly in the face of potential defeaters, if one
hopes to go beyond what is simply rational to believe (in the
sense of initial epistemic permissibilty), it seems that the
requirement for sufficient evidence becomes more rigorous and
requires marshalling the kind of evidence or arguments that
Plantinga argues are not necessary for being warranted (and
rational) in holding that belief at the prima facie level.

An

arguable belief (e.g., a child's belief in the tooth fairy)
that is only prima facie justified has little rational
endurance when assailed by the seas of conflicting coqnitive
claims.

It seems unavoidable, therefore, that one must

ultimately be able to suggest adequate reasons (i.e., evidence
or arguments) for why one's belief does in fact satisfy real
conditions and referents in the world (i.e., that one's belief
is true in some correspondence sense of the term).

While

Plantinga's notion of rationality seems promising, especially
in the manner in which it no longer confines rational belief
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to the rigors of evidentialism in the classical
foundationalist sense, it appears that his system needs
supplementation from a model of rationality that offers
possible solutions for bridging the epistemic gap between what
a person is within his epistemic rights to believe (i.e.,
rational in a properly basic sense) and what is rational (and
true in a robust sense of the term) because it does in fact
satisfy real conditions and referents in the world. 2
And finally, while the model of rationality in
Swinburne's epistemic system appears to be the most promising
out of the three systems we have considered, it is anticipated
that certain modifications can be made to add strength to his
arguments of probability and the inductive standards one uses
to determine the probability of a theory (or belief) on
evidence.

Most importantly, we will see that Swinburne's

approach can follow a broadly foundationalist structure, while
refraining from the stronger forms of foundational ism which
require that all non-basic beliefs must be inferred from a
privileged set of self-justifying beliefs (i.e., basic
beliefs).3
2see Paul X. Moser, Dwayne H. Mulder, and J. D. Trout,
The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 185. The authors suggest that
such a model of rationality aims at the twofold cognitive goal
of achieving truth in the correspondence sense and avoiding
error. Cf., Hobbs, Religious Explanation and Scientific
Ideology, xv.
3xe lly Clark, for example, indicates that most of the
theistic evidentialists mentioned in his book, Return to
Reason, are classical foundationalists (including
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Rationality and Truth

One of the most critical features of rationality has
to do with the nature of truth.

The notion that truth is a

relationship of some sort (on an ontoloqical level) between
language and the world has been a long-standing position in
traditional forms of rationality (e.g., modern notions of
evidentialism and scientific or philosophical realism).

This

notion of truth is typically referred to as the correspondence
theory or truth. 4

The correspondence theory of truth asserts

probabilistic arguers like Swinburne who do not demand
deductive connections between the various levels of beliefs
but do demand probabilistic connections). Clark thinks that
any epistemic system (such as that suggested in Swinburne's
The Existence or God) which views one's proofs as starting
from premises that are, in some sense, self-presenting, is
troublesome in that such premises are said to have a claim on
all reasonably attentive people.
Since, in Clark's estimation, Swinburne seems to be a
contemporary Lockean about knowledge (more so than Descartes,
Locke demanded reason for all of one's beliefs), his system is
in need of some revision. More specifically, Clark states
that: (a) if one's system of rationality accords roughly
self-presenting status to a certain class of beliefs (i.e.,
basic beliefs) and (b) one believes that there is a single
deductive or probabilistic conclusion (i.e., that God exists)
that follows from those basic beliefs, then one is committed
to some form of classical foundationalism. Clark argues that
Swinburne's proqram for rationality seems committed to both
(a) and (b). That is, Swinburne's system argues for
self-presenting basic beliefs which coerce (rationally or
probabilistically) non-basic beliefs. Thus, while one can be a
coherentist or a reliabilist and still embrace the
Enlightenement view of rationality, it is, in Clark's view,
more typically connected with classical foundationalism.
[Correspondence with Kelly Clark, e-mail,
tprovenz@harper.cc.il.us., December 3, 1997.]
4 see , for example, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v.
"Correspondence Theory of Truth, by A. N. Prior, 2 as cited
in John S. Feinberg, "Truth: Relationship of Theories of Truth
to Hermeneutics," in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, & the Bible, ed.
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that a proposition is true if and only if what it asserts
about a qiven state of affairs is the case.

For example, "The

present kinq of France is bald" is true if and only if France
does in fact have a currant kinq who is bald.

If what is

asserted by the content of the proposition does not in fact
describe the state of affairs as it really is, then the
proposition is false.

Thus, it is only in the case of

propositions or statements that we can inquire into the matter
of truth or falsity.

Furthermore, since truth is a quality or

property of propositions, only propositions can be loqically
considered either true or false. 5
A proper notion of truth distinguishes between its
ontoloqical and epistemoloqical qualities.
offers helpful insiqhts on this distinction.

John Feinberq
Feinberq states

that what i t means to say of any statement that it is true is
Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Zondervan Publishinq Company, 1984), 7 and 43, n. 17. Prior's
essay, as Feinberq notes, provides a summary of the major
adherents of the correspondence view (e.q. Aristotle, Bertrand
Russell, and the early Wittqenstein of the Tractatus) , alonq
with arquments for and aqainst their position (includinq
Wittqenstein's later qualifications aqainst strict
correspondence in his Investigations).
5Harold Netland, Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism
and the Question of Truth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans,
1991), 113-114. A helpful introduction on the distinction
between sentences and propositions can be found in Irvinq M.
Copi and Carl Cohen, ad. Introduction to Logic, 9th ed.
(Enqlewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1994), 4-5. See also,
and J. L Austin, "Truth," in Truth, ed. Georqe Pitcher
(Enqlewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964, 20; and Alan White's
helpful introductory discussion on propositions and their
relation to truth in his Truth (London: Macmillan, 1970),
chap. 1.
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an ontological question.

Questions of whether any specific

statement is true or false is an epistemological matter. 6
Our purpose at this point is simply to consider what features
of lanquage make a proposition true (an ontological matter)
and then consider whether we are in a position to objectively
evaluate propositions to determine their truth or falsity (an
epistemological exercise).

That is, with respect to

rationality, once we determine what sort of thing truth is, it
is expected that we can demonstrate with reasonable
sUfficiency that, as knowing subjects, we have as part of our
cognitive equipment (and as part of our perceptual processes)
the ability to discern what is true.

Thus, while a theory of

truth may net supply us with the specific conditions or
procedures for verification (the epistemological concern), it
does suggest that one will probably have some idea of how to
verify or falsify a statement.

When this notion is applied to

the correspondence view, for example, we are simply
considering whether a given proposition meets the condition of
corresponding in some sense to the world, while the
verification of such a correspondence would involve some kind
of perceptual or rational interaction with the world.
In addition, the correspondence theory of truth is
consistent with certain other metaphysical assumptions about
6John S. Feinberg, "Truth: Relationship of Theories of
Truth to Hermeneutics," in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, & the
Bible, ed. Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing Company, 1984), 4.
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the external world, such as the notion of realism.

Realism is

the belief that "material objects exist externally to us and
independently of our sense of experience."'

Or to put it

more precisely, realism is the view "that among the conditions
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the truth of
a belief (proposition, sentence, or whatever) is a condition
to the effect that a certain [mind-independent] state of
affairs must obtain."8

While realism itself is not a

competing theory of truth, there are theories of truth that
are realist theories (e.g., some form of correspondence).
Kirkham writes:
Exactly which state of affairs must obtain for a given
belief or statement to be true? It is the state of
affairs that the statement asserts or the state of affairs
believed. Thus on a realist theory of truth, the belief
that snow is white is true only if snow is white in the
extramental world (not i f and only if snow is white, for a
Realist theory may hold that there are other conditions
necessary to the belief's being true).9
The point is that realist theories suggest that such external
realities do exist.

So, while realist theories do not ensure

that we will get beyond our own psychological and personal
predilections for how we determine the data of our beliefs (or
that we really know what is in the objective world), they do
offer an idea of what kind of conditions a statement (or

'Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s. v. "Realism," by R. J.
Hirst, 7; as quoted in Michael Divitt, Realism and Truth, 2d
ed. (princeton University Press, 1991), 13.
8Richard L. Kirkham, Theories of Truth (Cambridge,
Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), 73.
9I bid., 75-76.
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belief) must attempt to satisfy in order for one to be
considered rational in holding it.

While other theories of

truth (e.g., the coherence and pragmatic theories) do not
necessarily exclude the condition of correspondence to the
world in order for a proposition to qualify as true, such
correspondence is not a necessary condition for truth.
The correspondence theory offers one of the best
possibilities for avoiding a confusion between epistemic and
ontological factors when considering the rationality for one's
beliefs.

This is critical to our model of rationality.

The

cognizer is aware that the ontological conditions for what
makes a statement true are different from the epistemological
procedures one uses to determine whether a given statement is
in fact true.

One's approach to epistemic justification

(i.e., the reasons a cognizer gives for holding a belief,
together with the relation among those reasons), while it
bears some relation to one's theory of truth, does not require
a specific theory of truth (i.e., the ontological conditions
that a statement must satisfy in order to be true).

In other

words, one's theory of truth is not about what gives a
cognizer a right to his belief.

It's about what makes an

assertion true in terms of the conditions a claim must
satisfy.

The point is that an assertion may be true, even

though no one believes it to be true (or even if no cognizer
has verified it or been in a position to verify it as true).
This means, in addition, that it is the matter of epistemic
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justification (i.e., the warrant, evidence, or grounds that
one gives for holding a belief) that makes a cognizer rational
in either holding a belief or rejecting it as false.

And

while being rational about one's beliefs can involve attempts
to verify one's beliefs as true (if possible) with arguments
and evidence, it does not require that all of our beliefs be
verified as true in order to be rational in bolding them.
Being rational does not necessarily mean that one is always
right, but as we will also see, it does not mean that one can
be rational in holding a belief for reasons that are arbitrary
or without any basis in reason at some level.

The

justification of a belief and the truthfulness of a belief may
be determined on the basis of different criteria.
It should be clear at this point that the
correspondence view of truth stands in contrast to the
pragmatic and relativistic theory of truth in Murphy's system.
Since her meaning for truth is one of unsurpassability (i.e,
a true statement is one which will never be shown to be
inadequate in its central contentions), there is no
correspondence criteria or conditions for truth. 10

But as

lOSee Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity:
Philosophical Perspectives on science, Religion, and Ethics
(Boulder, Colo.: westview Press, 1997), 125. Cf. Alasdair
MacIntyre's conception of truth in Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1988); idem, First Principles, Final Ends, and
Contemporary Philosophical Issues (Milwaukee: Marquett
University Press, 1990); and idem, "Moral Relativism, Truth,
and Justification," in Moral Truth and Noral Tradition: Essays
in Honor of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe, ed. Luke
Gormally (Blackrock, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 1994), 6-24.
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we saw in chapter two, Murphy appears to confuse the
ontological question of the meaning of truth with the
epistemoloqical matter of determining whether a given theory,
tradition, or stataaent ia true.

And aa we indicated, one

cannot automatically rule out a correspondence notion of truth
simply because it is difficult to determine epistemoloqically
whether or not certain conditions have in fact been satisfied
in determining whether a given sentence is true or false. l l

Rationality and Reasoning
To suggest that there is something like a core
rationality common to every human culture is at the same time
to suggest that there are at least some criteria that are not
theory-laden, context-dependent, or relative to some
preconceived theoretical ideas.

Such criteria, at least in

principle, can be used to appraise various competing theories
and claims to truth. 12

They in fact betray certain rules of

inference or kinds of reasoning (e.g., deductive and
inductive) and argue that certain assumptions, ideas, and
propositions seem common to every culture (e.g., that there
are other minds, that there is time, that things move, that
perceptions are generally to be trusted).
IlFeinberg, "Truth," 4-5.
12Harold Netland, Dissonant Voices: Religious
Pluralism and the ouestion of ~ruth (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 1991), 180.
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But how do we know our intellectual equipment works
accurately?

It seems that the best response we can qive to

this question is that, as wittqenstein has noted, there is no
other way our intellectual equipment works that makes sense to
us, and to raise doubts in this matter is to call into
question the whole framework of rational thouqht and
interaction with the world. 13

We have no way of knowinq

what any proposition means apart from how it is understood
relative to our most fundamental ways of thinkinq and
interactinq.

To doubt that our intellectual equipment works

accurately qoes beyond challenqinq our content presuppositions
(althouqh that is at issue) and calls into question our
methodoloqical presuppositions, namely, the very assumptions
we make about what intellectual equipment we have and how it
functions as we interact with the world and learn anythinq
about it.

FUrthermore, to call our rational framework into

question would require replacinq it with still another
framework constructed out of the very rules of our existinq
ways of thinkinq.14
incoherent.

But this would be self-referentially

One, for example, would have to invoke the law of

non-contradiction (i.e., that no statement is both true and
13Ludwiq Wittqenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M.
Anscombe and G. H. von Wriqht, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M.
Anscombe (New York: Harper' ROw, 1972), secs. 341-346, 44e;
and secs. 369-370, 48e.
14I bid., sec. 337-339, 43e.
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false at the same time and in the same way) in order to
suggest that the law of non-contradiction does not apply.
And any attempt to make an argument against the law of
non-contradiction would prove that very argument wrong, since
to make an argument against the law of non-contradiction, one
would have to presuppose the law in the very attempt to
dismiss it.

In uttering the sentence that one would have to

utter to deny the law of non-contradiction, one would be
uttering a sentence which both asserts and denies the same
thing at the same time.

So one ends up incorporating the very

rule he is attempting to avoid. 1S

One could utter the

nonsense statement, "Round squares exist in a triangular
universe," but i t is difficult to imagine what kind of rules
would make sense out of such a statement if our existng laws
of logic do not apply.
The basic principles of classical logic (i.e., the
principles of identity, noncontradiction, and excluded
middle), are rules for demonstrating the way in which the
equipment of human reasoning works.

For example, when applied

to statements, the principle of identity asserts that if any
statement is true, then it is true.

The principle of

non-contradiction affirms that no statement can be both true
and false at the same time and in the same way.

The principle

of excluded middle holds that any statement is either true or
1SHaro ld Hetland,

Dissonant Voices, 183-85.
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false. 16

Reflection on these principles shows us that they

are not mere social preferences, nor are they simply cultural
or linquistic frameworks.

Such principles can be shown to

transcend our social, linguistic, and cultural frameworks in
that they satisfy objective standards (i.e., fair and unbiased
procedures) for correctness and rational discourse.

As Harold

Netland puts it:
The three principles are important in that they provide
necessary conditions for meaningful and intelligible
thinking and discourse on any subject whatsoever. They
are not merely assumptions that have been adopted because
they prove useful; they are among the necessary conditions
for making any assumption in the first place. Nor are
they simply descriptive of the way people reason. They
are normative or prescriptive in being among the rules
which dictate the conditions under which one can have
meaningful and intelligible thinking and discourse.,,17
Basic logical principles, in other words, are crucial to the
rationality of beliefs in that they appeal to criteria of
reasoning which are public and repeatable.

And furthermore,

such criteria are independent of a cognizer's psychological
states, such as one's predilections, one's sense perceptions
(or even one's theory of perception), or even the degree of
verification or confidence with which one holds a proposition.
A further way in which we see reasoning demonstrating
a core rationality is in the area of arguments.
provide the reasons for a claim or assertion.

Arguments
In an argument,

16see Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction ~o
Logic, 9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994),
372.
17Netland, Dissonant Voices, 183.
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a finite series of statements (premises) is offered in support
of another statement (conclusion).18

It is common, for

example, to distinguish between deductive and inductive
reasoning (or arguments).

A deductive argument, for example,

is one in which the reasoning is conclusive in a certain
respect.

At the very least, when reasoning deductively, we

want our arguments to be deductively valid (i.e., when the
structure is such).

This is usually stated in two ways:

deductively valid arguments are such that if the premises are
true the conclusion must be true.

Or as it is often put, it

is logically impossible for the premises of a deductively
valid argument to be true and the conclusion to be false.

The

reason for this is because the information contained in the
conclusion of a valid deductive argument does not go beyond
the information contained in the premises. 19
This is consistent with our model of rationality in
that the rules for deductive validity, once again, do not
surface as a result of a cognizer's predilections.

Knowing

subjects reason from premises which logically entail their
conclusions, and they do so because such argument forms are
not private matters which merely reflect a person's
18Merrie Bergman, James Moor, and Jack Nelson, The
Logic Book. 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company),
5. See also, Moser, Mulder, and Trout, The Theory of
Knowledge, 129.
19Moser et al., The Theory of Knowledge, 129. See
also, Nancey Murphy, Reasoning and Rhe~oric in Religion
(Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press International), 33.
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preferences.

That our cognitive equipment regularly works

this way is evidence that it cannot function differently than
it does and still make sense to us.
In deductive arguments, the claim or conclusion is
already contained (implicitly) in the premises.

So, for

example, to make the claim that all men are mortal is to
include in that claim the knowledge that the man Socrates is
mortal.

Deductive arguments (especially in the form of modern

logic) can make us aware of something new, psychologically
speaking, but they typically do not increase or expand our
knowledge in appreciable ways (i.e., deductive arguments can
confirm that something is the case).20
Inductive arguments, on the other hand, can provide
genuinely new knowledge.

Good inductive arguments are

essential for expanding our knowledge, but they do so in such
a way that the truth of the premise (or premises) does not
guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

This is because

inductive reasoning is essentially an argument form in which
the claims or conclusions enlarge upon, or go beyond the
evidence.

The premises do not entail the truth of the

conclusion, but they do purport to offer good reasons for
accepting the conclusion.

If, for example, all our

observations of foxes are that they are red, then we may form
the generalization that the next fox we see will also be red.
20see , for example, Nancey Murphy, Reason & Rhetoric
in Religion (Valley Forqe, Penn.: Trinity Press International,
1994), 35.
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But we can never be sure that the next fox will not be grey.
So good inductive arguments (i.e., arguments that rightly
expand our knowledge) do so at the expense of the certitude of
deductive reasoninq.21
The point is that our conceptual framework is such
that we recognize that there is always some measure of
probability with inductive arguments.

We can make rational

inferences from observed pheomena to future possibilities, but
we recognize that this is not a guarantee that our conclusions
will be true.

Sometimes our perceptual and cognitive

apparatus do not get things right, but the fact that we are
aware of this is what is important for rationality.

We can,

in most instances, check our perceptions and recollections
through some publically accessible means.

In addition, both

deductive and inductive arguments involve inferential
reasoning, that is, some type of connection (whether entailed
or implied) from the premises to the conclusion.
always done correctly.

This is not

But, once again, the point is that our

conceptual frameworks can make us aware of this, and since
this is the case, we are typically in positions to take
21This most typical kind of inductive argument is
mentioned to make a general point about how inductive
arguments work. Inductive arguments are divided into several
kinds, all of which are forms of nondemonstrative reasoning,
in which, as Max Black notes, "the truth of the premises,
while not entailing the truth of tbe conclusion, purports to
be a good reason for belief in it.- Encylcopedia or
Philosophy, 1967 ed., s. v. "Induction," by Max Black. See
also, Howard Kahane, Logic and PhiLosophy: A Modern
Introduction, 6th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1990), 336-60.
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adequate steps to correct the potential problem that a
cognizer may understand the premises and yet deny that there
is some logical connection between the premises and the
conclusion.

Rationality and Objectivity
One of the central questions concerning the nature of
rationality has to do with its relation to objectivity and
truth.

That is, to what extent does holding a given belief

(or theory) satisfy the criterion of objectivity?

Such an

enquiry is desiqned to determine the extent to which
theorizing in a given discipline is a conceptual enterprise
that employs a conscious awareness of objective and subjective
distinctions within conceptual endeavors.

John Feinberg has

suggested an approach which offers an adequate response to
these issues based on various insights on the nature of
rationality and objectivity.22

Feinberg states that when

one is inquiring into the objectivity of a given conceptual
enterprise, one is asking the question whether or not one can
approach the study in such a way so as to avoid skewing the
results by one's conceptual framework or one's
predispositions.

The issue of objectivity has to do with the

human attempt to employ a model of rationality in which we are
able to arrive at the truth without simply working out the
22John S. Feinberg, "Rationality, Objectivity, and
Doing Theology: Review and critique of Wentzel Van Huyssteen's
Theology and the Justification of Faith,· ~rinity Journal 10
NS (1989): 161.
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implications of our presuppositions.

If the best that one can

expect to attain in conceptual theorizing is siDply working
out the implications of one's own subjective preferences,
then, as Feinberg contends, i t is impossible (on an epistemic
level) to come to ultimate decisions about what is right and
wrong with respect to one's theories or beliefs. 23
There are two different senses of subjectivity being
employed at this point.

There is subjectivitYl in the sense

of a cognizer using his own intellectual equipment in the
acquisition of knowledge.

This kind of subjectivity is a

necessary part of the relation between a knowinq subject and
the object of knowledge.

One cannot acquire knowledge without

the use of one's own intellectual equipment.

But there is

also subjectivitY2 in the sense of being biased and unfair
with the data.

Subjectivity in this sense is not necessary to

the acquisition of knowledge and is possible to avoid to an
adequate extent.
We are also saying that there are two different senses
in which we understand what it means to be objective.

In the

first sense, to be objective l means that the object of
knowledge is something that is ontoloqically apart from the
knowing subject.

But in another sense, objectivitY2 is the

sense we have in mind when it 1s suggested that one can (and
does) approach knowledge of a thing in a manner that is fair
and unbiased with the evidence and reasons.
23 I bid.

Part of our
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concept of rationality argues that we cannot have objectivitYl
when it comes to a cognizer's knowledge of something, but this
does not force us to operate with the second kind of
subjectivitY2' so that we have no choice but to be unfair and
biased with the evidence and reasons given in support of a
belief.
Belief that we can be objective2 relies on a model of
rationality that does not view all data as theory-dependent.
Although we do possess conceptual frameworks that influence
the way we think, it is possible to have knowledge about the
way the world really is on the notion that there are such
things as theory-neutral facts.

In other words, there is an

external world, an accessible reality that is external to our
minds.

The knowing subject can have knowledge of such an

external world (i.e., the object) when one leaves behind one's
presuppositions and observes facts apart from how a person's
theories might skew his perception of those facts.

All

theorizing is to some extent provisional and open to further
clarifications and revisions in light of additional evidence
and the undisputed conclusions of other disciplines.

As a

consequence, if there is to be an objective2 understanding of
the data between conceptual enterprises, it must be done on
the basis of certain shared standards of rationality.
It would seem, then, that the question of rationality
and objectivity in theorizing (theistic or otherwise) begins
with the methodology one uses when evaluating and
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investigating the potential evidence for a given belief or
theory.

Feinberg writes in this regard:

. it must be admitted that often one's prior training
and beliefs do influence his theorizing. • • • Hence, more
often than one might like, subjectivity colors theorizing
and removes objectivity (objectivity in the sense of
unbiased investigation and decision making) from it. On
the other hand, I do not think this means subjectivity
(bias, predilection for one view over another) must always
be involved in theorizing so that it is impossible to
discover objectively (i.e., in an unbiased way, not
predetermined by one's prior commitments) what is true or
to convince others of one's views. 24
This is so whether we are talking about cultural, perceptual,
linguistic, historical, or theoretical conditioning.

By this

line of thinking, we are not forced to conclude with Kuhn and
others that our sociocultural history so conditions the way we
look at reality that we cannot escape our subjective notions
and interpret data (whether empirical or rational) in an
unbiased manner. 25
While it is true that our conceptual frameworks play a
crucial role in forming our concepts, such concepts can be
held independently of any particular objects in the world, and
as such can be applied to any number of theories about the
world.

But as Israel Scheffler has stated, such objective and

subjective distinctions are not always easy to identify.

An

adequate model of rationality must give so.e account of how
one can make observations indepedent of one's conceptual
24 Feinberg,

"Truth," 182.

25 see Thomas Kuhn, The structure oL Scientific
Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1970).
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schemes, while not denyinq that one's conceptual framework is
operative. 26

This places the knowinq subject in the

precarious position of havinq to consider at any point whether
or not one's theorizinq and investiqation of the evidence
(includinq one's standards of rationality) are in fact
predetermined by views one already holds. 27
Scheffler arques that we do in fact have objective
standards (in the sense of unbiased investiqation) for
determininq whether we have forced our previous views on the
conceptualization process.
notions of determination.

In so doinq, he distinquishes two
In the first sense, a person deals

with a cateqory system (system of concepts) which, accordinq
to Scheffler, n(imposes] order in qeneral and in advance on
whatever experience in that context may brinq.n28

That is,

a category system tells us in advance what thinqs are
individuated as belonqinq to that cateqory.

Before one can

identify a scarecrow as a scarecrow, one must have the concept
of a scarecrow.

It is by havinq the concept of a thinq (e.q.,

a tree, scarecrow, snowman, bicycle, etc.) that one can limit
(or determine) the kinds of thinq that can riqhtfully belonq
to that concept.
26Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity
(Indanapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishinq Company, 1982), 22.
27I bid. Cf., Feinberq, "Rationality," 182.
28scheffler, Science and Subjectivity. 22.
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In the second sense, determination refers to the
assiqnment of specific items or objects into their respective
place in the cateqory scheme.

We mean by this the specific

desiqnation of an item as an example of a given concept.

It

is that sense of determination in which one's perceptual
experience and conceptual awareness leads one to identify an
actual scarecrow as a scarecrow and a snowman as a snowman.
But what is critical to the issue of objectivity is that, as
Scheffler arques, merely havinq a category scheme does not
determine how it will be applied in specific cases.

Havinq

the concept of a snowman, for example, allows us to determine
that it does not belonq to the category of scarecrows.

He

writes:
Cateqorization does not, in other words, decide the forms
of distribution which items will in fact display, nor does
it, in itself, determine the categorical assignments of
any particular item or class of items yet to be
encountered. • . • It means that we can understand a
hypothesis which conflicts with our favored hypothesis of
the moment, in terms of the very category system to which
the latter appeals. 29
So while one's conceptual framework determines (in the first
sense) what one perceives, it does not at the same time force
one to identify an item (determination in the second sense) as
belonqinq into one's preferred cateqory.

This is because the

set of concepts of which one is aware is held independently of
any particular objects in the world.

The implication of all

this is that our concepts can be used in any number of
29 scheffler,

38-9.
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theories that we formulate on evidence, even if those theories
ultimately conflict. 30
In light of this, we are not forced to conclude, for
example, as does Van Huyssteen, that our linguistic frameworks
so influence our theorizing that no attempt at theorizing can
be prelinguistic or pretheoretical. 31

If our language so

conditions our view of the data that reality is nothing more
than our cultural and lingistic constructs, and if, as Van
Huyssteen asserts, while there is a referential component to
our language, all we really have access to are our theories
which are no better or worse than other theories at solving
problems, then we can never actually get to the referential
object (in the correspondence sense) to which our language
refers. 32

We could, if Van Huyssteen's estimations are

correct, have no independent access to real conditions and
referents in the world.

If, as Van Huyssteen argues,

religious language is in large part metaphorical and
redescribes reality in a relational context (rather than a
referential context), then the best we have is language that
Van Huyssteen argues only approximates the truth and gives us
incomplete access to the external world.

The best that we can

expect is access to the best available theory (i.e., best in
30 Feinberg,

"Rationality," 183.

31 See Wentzel van Huyssteen, Theology and the
Justification of Fath: Constructing Theories in Systematic
Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989), 128.
32 I bid.,

128 and 137-8.
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the sense that i t is thought to provide better solutions to
specific problems in specific situations).

It ultimately

agrees with a pragmatic theory of truth and denies that there
is any corresponding sense of our lanquage to the world.

But

the insights of Scheffler's two senses of determination mean
that our identifications need not be biased in the direction
of our previously held concepts.

One may have the concept of

a scarecrow and prefer scarecrows over snowmen, but this does
not force one to identify a snowman as a scarecrow.

Having a

preference for certain notions or concepts does not rule out
properly identifying concepts that differ from what we expect
or prefer. 33
33 See Harold I. Brown, Observation and Objectivity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 143-49. Brown arques,
for example, that we often become aware of items in the
external world that are siqnificantly different from what our
previously formed theories would lead us to expect. This is
particularly clear in the area of scientific observation. It
is precisely because we are not forced to interpret preceptual
data according to some preconceived conceptual scheme that we
can formulate alternate theories to explain the data in a
manner different from our previous notions. He further
indicates that our sensory apparatus can make distinctions
between an effect and its cause by recognizing that (a)
an effect need not resemble a cause (e.g., the music that
flows out of my compact disk player does not resemble the
compact disk itself, or the laser eye that reads the disk);
and (b) an effect may at the same time be both the result of
causes upon which it is ontoloqically dependent and causes
from which it is ontoloqically independent (e.g., a person's
physical welfare is in part ontologically dependent on food,
water, and air, but is ontologically independent of the
environment from which it is supplied). See also, Harold I.
Brown, Perception, Theory, and Commitment: The New Philosophy
of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Larry
Laudan, Progress and Its Problems (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977); and Jarrett Leplin, ed. Scientfic
Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
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Thus, while we are strongly affected by our conceptual
schemes, unbiased methods for obtaining and judging evidence
relative to a given belief or theory are possible between
conceptual frameworks.

This goes beyond simply communicating

between systems; rather, such an approach to rationality and
objectivity places the knowing subject in a position to know
what is more likely true in the correspondence sense described
above.

Our manner of evaluating evidence, while strongly

affected by our conceptual frameworks, does not preclude
communication across worldviews so that we can get at what is
true in the correspondence sense.

Jesse Hobbs, for example,

offers the following valuable insight on objectivity and
incommensurability:
It has been commonplace since the work of Thomas Kuhn to
allege that there can be neither evidence nor perception
except within the framework of some worldview or
other. • • . Lines of incommensurability are those across
which discussants are failing to communicate, or are
talking past one another, not where communication is
impossible. Even if everything can be seen only from the
standpoint of one worldview or another, that does not
preclude worldviews from being flexible enough to permit
suspension of judgment on particular disputed issues. 34
In other words, one may recognize the depth of influence a
conceptual framework has on the theorizing process and still
maintain that objectivity between frameworks is possible.
One is not forced to simply work out the implications of one's
34Hobbs, Religious Explanation and Scientific
Ideology, xvi-xvii. See also, Thomas Kuhn, "Reflections on My
Critics," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre
Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), 232-3, 267-8, 276-7.
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presuppositions in theory formulation or with respect to the
acquisition of one's beliefs.
The upshot of our treatment of objectivity, then, is
that we do not have to be so controlled by our own conceptual
categories that we cannot gain some understanding of another's
conceptual scheme.

We can critically reflect and see the

weaknesses of our own conceptual systems.
for a more adequate explanation.

We can then seek

It is possible for reason

and perception to play a significant role in the examination,
revision, and rejection of one's current beliefs and the
acquisition of new beliefs.
For example, where it may be legitimately argued that
people are clearly influenced by their linguistic and
conceptual frameworks, such conditions do not force us to
entirely subjective investigations and biased conclusions.
And although a certain degree of cultural bias does pervade
our assessment of the world, such cultural biases need not be
constraining and can be adequately overcome.

The argument

here is that we can (and often do) overcome our subjective
biases and do theorizing appropriately, especially when one
considers that our conceptual and linguistic frameworks
(together with our perceptual capacities) are instruments
employed largely for the distinct purpose of assessing
individual truth claims and overarching theories.

In light of
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this, such frameworks can be entirely adequate for accessing
mind-independent reality.35

Rationality and Certainty
Crucial to our .odel of rationality is the notion that
a statement's truth is not the same think as it's certainty.
Feinberg remarks, for example, that "the truth or falsity of
any statement has nothing to do with whether or not it can be
verified as such or with the deqree of certainty to which it
can be proved or disproved."36

Of course, to talk about

certainty is to say something about the criteria or conditions
for what makes a statement certain.

In our model of

rationality, we have been arquing that the Enlightenment idea
of cartesian certainty (i.e., one in which the evidence for a
belief leads to the infallibility or indubitability of that
belief) is far too rigorous a criterion to be workable.

This

would seem to suggest that a more workable model should lessen
the requirement for what counts as sufficient evidence for
350ne of the more popular criticisms against this
model of rationality and truth can be found in the radical
pragmatism of Richard Rorty. For a good introduction to his
views, see his "Science and Solidarity," in Rhetoric of the
Human Sciences: Language and Arguments in Scholarship and
Public Afrairs, ed. Nelson et ale (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1987), reprinted as "Dismantling Truth:
Solidarity versus Objectivity," in Philosophy: The Ouest for
Truth, 4th ed., ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 1999): 197-204; idem, contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and
idem, Objectivity, Relativism, and ~ruth (New York: Cambridqe
University Press, 1991).
36Fe inberq, "Truth," in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and
the Bible, 19.
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justification and rationality.

Part of suggesting such a

model has to do with the distiction between objective
certainty and subjective certainty.
stated briefly, objective certainty relates to the
matter of truth and certainty (i.e., whether a cognizer has a
right to say something is verified).

Objective certainty has

to do with the amount, kind, and quality of evidence that is
marshalled for the truth of a proposition.

Subjective

certainty, on the other hand, has to do with the degree of
persuasion or conviction a person has (i.e., one's degree of
certitude toward the truthfulness of a given proposition).
Subjective certainty deals with the psychological factors a
cognizer brings to the matter of a proposition's truth.

Of

course, in our model of rationality, the goal is to have one's
subjective certainty stem from objective certainty, that is,
the degree to which a statement can be verified on evidence.
But the problem is that, as we will see, subjective certainty
can come about from factors not related to the verification of
a proposition.

One may choose to be subjectively certain for

all kinds of reasons not related to the quality and quantity
of the evidence.

One may, for example, go against what the

evidence seems to suggest, or choose to be subjectively
certain even when there is insufficient evidence for the
belief in question.
When considering the matter of certainty and the
rationality of one's belief, we are primarily concerned with
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the amount and kind of evidence available for the truth of a
given proposition.
certainty.

This is what is meant by objective

But to have an idea of what that evidence might

be, one must distinguish between different kinds of statements
and the manner in which the available evidence argues for or
against them.

It is here that we can draw upon certain

notions from the philosophy of wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein argued, as Feinberg notes, "that certain
statements (e.g.,

'I have a mind') are beyond any question of

doubt, because they are so foundational to all we are and do
that they could not reasonably be brought into question. 1I37
This is what is said of analytic statements (e.g., statements
of math and logic).

Analytic statements (i.e., statements

which assert that some relation among ideas exists, that, for
example, 2+2=4) are true by definition.
100% objective certainty.

Such statements have

In other words, we are saying that

there is no other kind of evidence that could be marshalled in
favor of their certainty.

This is the point that was made

earlier relative to the basic laws of lO9ic, such as the law
of non-contradiction.
other statements, however, can be doubted on a
meaningful basis, but one may be in a position to marshall
enough of the appropriate kind of evidence to be rationally
37 Fe inberg,

"Truth, II 21.
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convinced that it no lonqer makes sense to doubt them. 38
This is the case with synthetic statements (e.q., assertions
of empirical matters of fact).

The difference here is that

one can, at most, marshall 99' objective certainty for
synthetic statements.

For it is always possible that some

future evidence could count aqainst one's belief, even thouqh
a coqnizer does not expect that to be the case.

So when one

is considerinq whether it is rational to hold a qiven
synthetic statement, one is concerned with the extent to which
one can marshall sUfficient evidence (i.e, objective
certainty) to conclude that a proposition of this sort has a
99% probability (or as close to it as possible) of beinq true.
wittqenstein's notions on objective and subjective
certainty are desiqned to show that doubtinq and provinq are
matters of objective certainty, while the conviction that
somethinq is true is a matter of subjective certainty.

He

arques that the kind of certainty is the kind of lanquaqe-qame
(i.e., objective certainty).39

The emphasis here is on the

distinction between the kind of certainty and the degree of
certainty.

The point of this distinction is to show that one

can achieve subjective certainty (i.e., the conviction that a
38 I bid. See, for example, Ludwiq Wittqenstein, On
Certainty, sec. 559, 73e; sec.370, 48e; sec. 257, 34e; and
sec. 519, 68e.

39 Ludwiq Wittqenstein, Philosophical Investigations,
224e. Cf., John S. Feinberq, "Noncoqnitivism: Wittqenstein,"
in Biblical Errancy: An Analysis of its Philosophical Roots,
ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1981),
184-85.
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statement is true) to the same degree in the language-game of
religion, history, or science as in the language-game of
mathematics and logic, but the kind of objective certainty
upon which it is based will differ.

In other words, the

methods a cognizer uses to verify the statements of math and
logic (along with one's awareness of the kind of evidence
appropriate to such statements) are different from those used
in science or history, because the language-games are
different. 40

So when a cognizer claims to have subjective

certainty about a given synthetic statement (whether in math,
science, philosophy, or theism), that claim is rational to the
extent to which he is aware of the appropriate evidence for
that belief, together with the extent to which his conviction
that the belief is true is based on the kind and quality of
evidence mashalled for that belief (i.e., its objective
certainty).
It's important to note that if a cognizer has 99\
objective certainty of a synthetic statement, there is no
sense in which he can be more objectively certain about it.
So he is rational in being as subjectively certain about that
belief as he is about some analytic statement.

But a further

question for rationality has to do with cases in which we have
less than 99' objective certainty relative to empirical
matters of fact.

What degree of subjective certainty is

allowed in these cases if a cognizer is to remain rational in
40 Feinberg,

"Truth," 21.
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holdinq such beliefs?
ascertain.

This is a more difficult matter to

If the way one qoes about obtaining objective

certainty in the lanquaqe-qames of reliqion, science, or
history is different than the way one's qoes about qettinq
objective certainty in math or logic, as Wittgenstein
suqqests, then the matter of how one knows whether there is
appropriate evidence upon which to establish a statement's
truth will differ according to the lanquage-game in question.
Feinberq indicates that there are appropriate kinds of
evidence and appropriate amounts of evidence when considerinq
the matter of objective certainty relative to synthetic
statements.

The appropriate kind of evidence is evidence

relevant to the issue under discussion, evidence that is true,
and evidence that is used properly when structuring one's
argument (i.e., the argument contains no errors in reasoninq).
As to the appropriate amount of evidence, Feinberq suqqests
that "one has enouqh evidence when the evidence of the kind
mentioned is so rationally convincinq that one cannot
reasonably maintain a doubt. n41

Of course, with synthetic

statements, we will not always have enouqh evidence to make
them rationally convincinq.

But for those instances in which

enouqh objective certainty has been marshalled for the truth
of a statement, it makes no sense to continue doubtinq until
one thinks some "final explanation" has been reached.

The

reason for this is because a cognizer may already have that
41 Feinberq,

"Truth," 46, n. 62.
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explanation and simply not realize it, or he may have no idea
of what that explanation might look like should it be offered.
In the final analysis, argues Feinberg, when it comes to how
one knows whether there is an appropriate amount of evidence
to establish a statement's truth, "there is no set number of
arguments or pieces of evidence that must be reached to remove
doubt. ,,42
On our model of rationality, then, it seems reasonable
to suggest that a cognizer is rational in holding one's
beliefs when one retains the degree of rational conviction
that is warranted by the objective certainty (i.e., the
appropriate kinds, quality, and amounts of evidence).

This

will have much to do with the quality of the evidence or
arguments.

This is easier to accomplish in the lanquage-qames

of math and loqic, since the kinds of procedures one's uses to
determine an analytic statement's truth involve rational
proofs and the possibility of uncovering contradictions in
arguments.

So one may be in a better position to offer

evidence for the objective certainty of analytic statements
(and consequently have a right to a greater deqree of
subjective certainty about them) than for the synthetic
propositions of theism, but this does not rule out the
possibility of one beinq equally subjectively certain about
the statements of theism (or at least having a degree of
subjective certainty that is consistent with the evidence).
42 I

bid.
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Furthermore, while our model of rationality can accept
certain aspects about the distinctions between objective and
subjective certainty, we are not forced to conclude with
wittgenstein that the languaqe-game of theism does not deal
with factual claims that are open to being verfied or
falsified on evidence. 43

One does present evidence for the

synthetic claims of theism; they are in fact synthetic and in
need of inductive procedures for verification, but they are,
nonetheless, assertions like those of science, history, and
philosophy.

Wittqenstein asserts, as Feinberg notes, that

"after a certain deqree of evidence is produced, it no longer
makes sense to doubt the statement's truth (i.e., to question
whether objective certainty warrants subjective certainty in
such a case, regardless of whether the statement comes from
the lanquage-game of history, science, mathematics, or
whatever).,,44

If one can marshall 99% objective certainty

for a synthetic statement's truth, one is warranted in being
absolutely subjectively certain of the statement's truth, even
thouqh it is synthetic.

But we cannot be as doqmatic about

such statements where the objective certainty is not as
strong.

still it is important to point out that a statement's

truth does not depend on either subjective or objective
certainty.

As we have indicated, a statement's truth is a

43wittqenstein, Lectures and Conversations, 61-62.
44Feinberq, "Truth," 21. Cf., Wittgenstein, On
Certainty, sec. 257, 54; and Wittqenstein, Investigations,
sec. 87, 40e-41e and 180e.
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matter of whether it satisfies certain conditions and
referents in the world.

We simply may not be in a position to

verify a statement as true.
The above distinctions help to clarify the matter of
what kind of evidence is sufficient if one is to be rational
about one's beliefs.

In addition, objective certainty relates

to the matter of objectivity stated above, in that it attempts
an approach that uses fair and unbiased procedures when
reasoning from the evidence to a qiven conclusion.

It assumes

that a certain quantity and quality of evidence is publically
available.

So on our model of rationality, we are claiming

that the public nature of the evidence makes it possible for a
coqnizer to investiqate and determine whether the concept in
question fits a qiven object in the world. 45

For there to

be objective certainty, the evidence must be publically
accessible.

Furthermore, sufficient evidence cannot be based

entirely on private sensations and experiences, since neither
the particular person considerinq the evidence nor any others
have criteria (public or otherwise) to determine what they
are.

This means that a good deal of our synthetic statements

will be based on less conclusive evidence, and there still may
be legitimate room for doubt and explanation. 46
45 Ludwiq wittqenstein, Philosophical Investigations
(New York: Macmillan, 1968); and idem Lectures & Conversations
on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril
Barrett (Berkeley: University of California Press, n.d.),
56-57.

46 Fe inberq,

"Rationality," 183.
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Nevertheless, it still may be considered that, although the
evidence is public, a given person's investigation of i t may
be wrong or just underdetermine the issue.

While this is

certainly possible, it can be held into check when we do our
investigating and theorizing (whether theistic, scientific, or
otherwise) in community.

That is, if the public evidence is

conclusive in one direction, then its probability of falsehood
is not high, and doubting, proof and explanation must end at
some point. 47
As we have seen, Swinburne's model comes closest to
satisfying criteria for the distinctions between objective and
subjective certainty.

On his model of rationality, one should

be subjectively certain only on the basis of the appropriate
evidence for a belief.

The rationality models of Murphy and

Plantinga, however, are much more likely to utilize subjective
certainty for reasons other than what follows from the
evidence.

In Murphy's case, it is because the evidence for a

statement's truth (i.e., its objective certainty) is almost
always tentative and provisional.

It is unlikely that we will

have anything close to 99' objective certainty with respect to
our synthetic claims, but one can have prior commitments to
certain research proqrams (or a presuppositions of content)
that are highly suggestive of subjective certainty.
Plantinga's system, on the other hand, suggests that a
cognizer has an epistemic right to be subjectively certain (in
47

wittgenstein,

Philosophical Invescigacions, 180e.
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the way that we have been defining it) of the belief that God
exists

simply on the basis of prima facie evidence (i.e.,

apart from any attempt to verify the evidence for a belief
according to the criteria for objective certainty).
Rationality and Justification
While a person may be in a position to obtain
objective certainty by way of the verification processes
indicated above, and while it has been argued that a rational
model of cognitive claims to knowledge (including theistic
belief) involves some form of the correspondence theory of
truth, it must be stated that there is more to rationality
than the mere quality of having a true belief.

There are, to

be sure, many instances in which a person may hold a true
belief while holding that belief in the absence of adequate
reasons and reliable processes.

If I only feel a hunch that

my friend is holding four aces in his hand, my belief, while
it may turn out to be true, is not based on good reasons or
evidence.

In contrast, my friend, because he can see the

cards in his hands, has more than likely appealed to the best
evidence that his cognitive equipment has to offer for saying
that he is holding four aces.

We would say that he has

perceptual grounds for his belief.

So while both beliefs are
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true, only my friend has appealed to reasons consistent with
objective certainty.48
This illustration raises the question of the nature of
justification and its relation to verification.

Epistemic

justification signifies offering acceptable reason-giving
answers in support of our beliefs and claims to knowledge.

On

our model of rationality, justification involves the reasons,
evidence, or arquments (i.e., the objective certainty to which
one appeals) for holding a given belief.

Where it is

possible, it involves attempts to verify one's beliefs as true
with good arguments and appropriate evidence.

But it does not

necessarily require that the cognizer verify a belief as true,
or even attempt to verify a belief.

This raises the matter of

a significant distiction in our proposed model of rationality.
There are multiple senses (or two different respects) in which
a person can be rational in holding a belief.

In the first

place, as indicated in the previous section, there is a sense
in which rationality is tied to the stronger notions of truth
and certainty.

In this sense of rationality, one is rational

in holding a belief in virtue of the fact that one has
verified one's belief as true by appealing to the appropriate
kind, quality, and amount of evidence for the belief in
question.

In such a case, it no longer makes sense to say

that one's belief does not satisfy the conditions of being
48Louis P. Pojman, What Can We Know? An Introduction
to the Theory o~ Knowledge (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1995), 8.

258

rational.

One can do no better than to verify one's belief as

true on evidence.
But there is another sense in which rationality
relates to the matter of justification, and this sense of
rationality is not identical to the first.

It is clear that

we are not always be in a position to verify a belief as true,
but we are typically in a position to offer reasons for why we
think our beliefs are true.

In doing so, we are dealing with

a sense of rationality in which one is rational for holding a
belief that, while not verified as true (a matter of objective
certainty), one is at least attempting to offer a reason-based
conception for why he thinks his belief is true.

In making

this distinction, it is important to recognize that a rational
(or justified) belief is not necessarily the same thing as
knowledge.

The reason for this is because, on our model of

rationality, justification can lead to knowledge only if a
cognizer has verified a belief as true by marshalling enough
evidence for it.

But a cognizer's theory of knowledge (i.e.,

epistemic justification) is a different thing from one's
ability to verify a given belief.

And further, one's theory

of knowledge does not necessarily determine one's theory of
truth.

So if a person's verification of a given proposition

(objective certainty) offers good reasons for believing it
(e.g., given a correspondence view of truth), then such a
person has adequate justification for claiming that one's
belief is knowledge.
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While we may agree that hunches, guesses, conjectures,
and wishful thinking do not yield cases of knowledge even if
they are true, there is still the matter of what reasons a
person must have for a belief if she is thought to be
justified (and rational) in holding that belief.

Concerns

such as these raise the issue of what has come to be known in
philosophy as the Gettier problem. 49

Prior to Gettier, it

was generally thought that S knows that p if and only if:
S believes that Pi

justified.

(2) p is truei and (3)

SiS

(1)

belief that p is

These three conditions had to be satisfied in

order to constitute what was necessary and

sufficien~

for

knowledge, that is, all three conditions must be present for S
not to fail to know that p.

Edmund Gettier challenged this

"tripartite analysis" of knowledge by offering counterexamples
in which a person could hold a justified, true belief entirely
by accident or coincidence.

It may be, for example, that a

current reading of the barometer on my barn door is giving me
justification for forming the belief that a storm is in the
offing.

It turns out that there is in fact a storm in the

offing, but unbeknownst to me, the barometer is broken and is
only coincidentally indicating that a storm is on the horizon.
So while my belief about a storm in the offing is in fact
true, my belief is based on an instrument that is not
49Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge?" Analysis 23, no.6 (1963): 121-123. See also, Linda
Zagzebski, "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems," The
Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 174 (1994): 65-73.
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functioning properly.

Although my true belief seems quite

justified (the barometer has always produced reliable readings
in the past), it also seems that I cannot really know (i.e.,
if knowledge is justified-true-belief) that there is a storm
in the offing, since my belief is based on a reading of the
barometer that is only true coincidentally.
couterexamples take the following form:
(2) p is true; (3)

SiS

Such

(1) S believes that p;

belief that p is justified; (4) p is

entailed by or probabilistically inferred from some
proposition q; (5) S is justified in believing q; (6) q is
false; and consequently (7) S doesn't know that p.50
The field of epistemic justification is replete with
seemingly unsuccessful attempts to offer a fourth condition to
the traditional justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge
emerging out of Gettier-type counterexamples. 51

In

addition, we have seen that the Enlightenment conceptions of
evidentialism have traditionally employed models of
justification that rely on classical foundational ism or
coherent ism in knowledge.

In both cases, there is some sense

in which a person's beliefs are justified in relation to other
beliefs she may hold.

But in foundationalist theories, as we

have seen, justification is ultimately made by an appeal to a
50 I

bid., 72.

51 see , for example, stephen Robert Jacobson, "What's
Wrong with Reliability Theories of Justification," (Ph.D.
diss., University of Michigan, 1989), 24. See also, George
Pappas and Marshall Swain, eds. Essays on Knowledge and
Justification (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).
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privi1eged set of beliefs (i.e., basic beliefs) that are said
to have indubitable status. 52

In response to this, we have

considered two current models of rationality and justification
(i.e., Murphy and Plantinqa) that take exception to
evidentialist conceptions of rational belief.

We have seen,

for example, that Murphy's Lakatosian system rejects all
models of rationality that rely on any foundationalist theory
of know1edqe as inadequate notions of the way theories and
beliefs are actually formulated and justified.

She ultimately

replaces traditional (i.e., Enliqhtenment) notions of
evidentialism and rationality with a postmodern version of
rationality.

In Murphy's system, a cognizer is rational only

to the extent that she follows a theory of justification
(i.e., one that is non-foundationalist) which allows for the
tentative and provisional status of one's beliefs, qiven a
theory of truth which substitutes unsurpassibility for
correspondence.
Second, the concept of proper basicality offered in
Plantinga's system appears to call for, at the most
fundamental level, a qualified modification of classical
52 In addition to Pojman's book, What Can We Know? An
Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, excellent preliminary
discussions on justification in epistemology can be found in
Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3d ed. Foundation
of Philosophy Series, ed. Elizabeth Beardsley and Tom L.
Beauchamp (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1989); and
John L. Pollock, contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Savage,
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986). For a more advanced study of
justification, see Georqe S. Pappas and Marshall Swain, ed.
Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1978).
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foundationalism's distinction between the basic and non-basic
beliefs of one's noetic structure.

In light of his argument

that classical foundationalists criteria of proper basicality
are inadequate, Plantinga appears to offer what he thinks is a
workable criterion for proper basicality, one according to
which people are warranted (i.e., within their epistemic
rights) to hold beliefs that are formed by our our cognitive
and noetic faculties functioning properly in environments
specifically designed for them (i.e., they are aimed at the
acquisition of true beliefs in the correspondence sense).

And

once again, we have seen that Plantinga's system presents us
with the pressing problem that one may be rational in holding
that belief in God is properly basic (i.e., one may be within
his epistemic rights to hold that belief on prima facie
evidence), but even if his arqument holds, it applies to only
one kind of belief, namely that God exists.

Plantinga's

argument that belief in God is properly basic cannot be
applied as a model of rationality for a wide range of other
religious and theological propositions that Plantinga would
readily agree are made rational on the

bas~s

of evidential

arguments and reasons.
On our model of rationality, then, we have been
arguing that one can be rational in

believ~ng

a proposition

without verifying it or attempting to verify it.

Of course,

one can be rational in holding a belief in which one's
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reason-based conception of justification coincides with
attempts to verify one's belief as true or certain in light of
the appropriate available evidence (e.g., in a way similar to
Swinburne's different levels of rationality), but this is not
necessary for justification.

What this means is that one can

be justified in holding a belief that he has not verified
(i.e., verified in terms of offering public, unbiased rational
or empirical evidence).

Furthermore, it does not mean that

any reason offered for a belief must be irrefutable if that
belief is to be justified.

It is difficult to argue against

the simple thesis that a person may be justified (rational) in
believing x at time t given a background set of beliefs y.53
So while one's belief may be justified without verifying it as
true (or even attempting to verify it), it is, nevertheless,
not held arbitrarily or without some basis in reason.
So on our model of rationality, justification is a
reason-based conception in which a person could hold a false
53 r am indebted here to Harold Hetland's distinction
between two levels or sense of rationality. On the first
level, justification (or rationality) is not tied in with the
notion of truth in the hard sense. On this level, it is
reasonable for a person to hold belief x at time t given a
background set of beliefs y. On the second level, however,
justification (or rationality) takes place only in the
stronger sense where truth is operative. On this level, what
is reasonable to believe is related to what is in fact the
case, and it is rational because it is in fact a true claim
about reality. [Correspondence with Harold Hetland, e-mail,
tprovenz@megsinet.net, June 15, 1999]. Cf. also, James A.
Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 99.
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belief but be justified in doing so.54

As stated above,

this does not necessarily mean that one's reasons will be
right, but it does suggest that one has reasons for one's
beliefs, reasons he thinks make that belief true.

They can be

reasons based on other beliefs a cognizer thinks are true, but
they can also be based in other nondoxastic states of which a
cognizer is in some way aware.

But once again, a person's

justification for a belief can be a different matter from a
belief's truthfulness or certainty.

But in the same way that

a statement's truthfulness does not depend on a person's
ability to verify it, so, too, a person's reasons for being
justified about a qiven belief do not depend on its
truthfulness, or even the kind of objective certainty that
could verify the belief.
Can one be rational, then, in holdinq a belief for
which one is not justified?

If we mean by justification, at

the very least, the reasons that one offers for a belief
(i.e., reasons that are thought consistent with the kinds of
reasons people typically give for their everyday putative
beliefs), then one is rational in holdinq only a belief for
which there is some level of justification for it.

But as

Swinburne has suqqested, the reasons that a cognizer offers in
support of a belief can be considered epistemically justified
only to the extent that they are reasons which the coqnizer
54See Stephen Robert Jacobson, "What's Wronq with
Reliability Theories of Justification?" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Michiqan, 1989), 122.
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thinks are true.
a person.

Such reasons may seem initially intuitive to

Reasons can also be based on testimony, or

authority, or especally prior beliefs that one already accepts
as true.

Reasons are also based in perception, or memory, or

some other experiential or rational state of which the
cognizer is aware.

But the point is that the cognizer thinks

he has some non-arbitrary reasons for thinking that his belief
is true, even if it turns out to be false.

Summary and Conclusuion
Must the rationality and justification of a cognitive
belief (theistic or otherwise), then, conform to the standards
of certainty and evidentialism associated with Enlightenment
epistemology?

It seems that we are not rationally compelled

to accept this thesis.

Rather, we have seen that a person's

justification for a belief may be based in various kinds of
reasons, such as a child's being told something by a parent,
or a student by his teacher.

Justification can be doxastic

(i.e., a relation among beliefs) or nondoxastic (i.e., based
on factors in addition or apart from one's other beliefs), so
long as a cognizer is offering reasons for his beliefs.

So

when a person seeks to justify a belief on some reason-based
conception, those reasons may take a variety of acceptable
forms (whether rational evidence, perceptual evidence, beliefs
of memory, or at some level an awareness of one's mental
states).
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The criteria for rationality outlined above calls for
a modified form of foundationalism.

It argues that the

features of foundationalist theories (i.e., its conceptions of
truth, evidence, doxastic and nondoxastic relation among
beliefs, objectivity, and rationa1ity) from which it receives
its epistemic structure are essentially correct.

While

certain modifications and revisions of the epistemic and
rational features of foundationalist theories may prove
necessary, one may argue that there is still an essentially
foundationalist structure for rational belief that does not
conform to the tentative and provisional status of beliefs so
characteristic of Murphy's brand of postmodernity.

And

further still, we can aqree with Plantinqa's critiques of
classical foundationalism (i.e., that it is difficult to
arrive at aqreement on the criteria for basic beliefs) and
conclude that we are not necessarily forced to trace all our
non-basic beliefs back to basic beliefs.

This is not to say

that one could not trace one's non-basic beliefs back to basic
beliefs (on the assumption of some form of foundationalist
structure), but rather, that there is no need to do so once
enough evidence has been supplied.
In addition, as we have indicated above, our proposed
notion of rationality argues for two respects or senses of
rationality which are not identical: the first sense of
rationality involves truth and certainty (or verification).
But there is also a second sense of rationality that involves
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justification, and the use of both respects or senses amounts
to a modified or moderate foundationalism.
this are modest in nature.

The reasons for

In the first place, as i t has been

suggested earlier, not all beliefs need to be traced back to
basic beliefs for their justification.

All we need do is

supply sufficient reasons or explanations.

This allows us to

circumvent the stronger forma of evidentialis., while
continuing to offer evidence, reasons, and explanations for
our beliefs and theories.
Moderate foundationalism, moreover, is a fallibilist
position that is not committed to the indefeasibility of
foundational beliefs.

That is, one is open to the possibility

that further evidence could show a given belief (or theory) to
be false, even though it is not expected that such will be the
case.

This epistemic structure argues for fallibilism in at

least three ways.

First, one's foundational beliefs may turn

out to be unjustified or false or both; second, non-basic (or
inferential) beliefs are only inductively (and consequently
fallibly)

justified by foundational beliefs.

One's

non-foundational beliefs can turn out false, even when the
foundational beliefs from which they are inferred are true;
and third, the possibility of discovering error, even among
foundational beliefs, is left open. 55
In addition, a fallibilist position raises the further
question of the manner in which evidence relates to one's
55Audi,

The structure of Justification, 135.
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basic (or foundational) beliefs.

If it is qranted that there

is always the possibility of discovering error among one's
basic beliefs, then it seems reasonable to suggest that a
cognizer may at some point legitimately reassess those beliefs
in light of additional evidence.

That is, if at some later

point, at least for me, my basic beliefs are challenged by me,
I may apply evidence against those beliefs in a manner similar
to the way in which I apply evidence against my non-basic
beliefs.

In such a case, it is difficult to know whether my

basic belief continues to remain among my foundational
beliefs.

But it seems reasonable to suggest that, should I be

in a position to marshall enough of the appropriate kind of
evidence so as satisfy my own challenge and become so
rationally convinced that it no longer makes sense to
reasonably maintain a doubt, then there seems to be no good
reason why my belief cannot once again resume its place among
the basic beliefs of my noetic structure.
Furthermore, since the coherence among one's beliefs
plays a significant role in what is rational for one to
believe in a fallibilist position, then incoherence among
one's beliefs may defeat verification or knowledge, even of a
foundational belief.

For example, my justification for

believing that unicorns do not exist prevents me from
remaining justified in believing that there is one in front of
me.

Coherence may also account for an increasing number of

independent mutually consistent factors a cognizer believes to
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support the truth of a proposition.

My justification for

believing that the bag of apples is from the Clarkes, for
example, increases with each new belief I acquire, all of
which independently support that conclusion. 56

But while

fallibilism grants that incoherence can defeat the
verification of foundational beliefs, it does not regard
coherence as a basic source of justification.

Coherence by

itself is not sufficient for justification. 57 This model of
rationality incorporates the valid insights of Murphy,
Plantinga, and Swinburne without succumbing to the problems
indicated in their systems.
56Audi,

57 I

Epistemology, 205.

bid., 206.
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